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Life cycle, Divestment and Corporate Governance
Abstract
Divestment activities have become a popular trend in recent years. This thesis is
 a pioneering UK study examining divestitures from three points of view: shareholder wealth; corporate governance, and the life cycle. 

While the growth factor is important for most firms, most previous divestment research appears not to have given enough emphasis to the growth variable. This research emphasises the importance of the growth variable and the importance of two variables, growth and concentration ratio, are examined in a classification study, thereby enhancing previous research. Furthermore, most of the previous literature would appear to have made a more general investigation of divestments without reference to shareholder wealth or the corporate governance characteristics of each life cycle stage. The question is then raised: “Will market reaction to divesting firms be different when they are classified into different life-cycle sub-samples?” This study classifies divestments into different life cycle stages and seeks to provide a detailed study of understanding market reaction and corporate governance across the life cycle. 
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Since the 1980s, there has been a definite trend of multi-divisional firms selling off their subsidiaries, both in the US and UK, which peaked in the late 1990s (Toms and Wright, 2005) This period is the subject of research in this thesis. Corporate restructuring from the 1980s reversed diversification trends apparent between the 1960s and the early 1970s, when it appeared that company managers sought primarily to satisfy their own interests (Sudarsanam, 1995; Wang, 2000). 
Despite these important trends, the predominant focus of much research has been on mergers and acquisitions, in which agency problems can be severe. From a shareholder point of view, diversifications based on acquisition are likely to be value-destroying. This being the case, we can expect that divestment will unlock the conglomerate discount and redistribute wealth gains to shareholders. Previous research suggests that divesting firms generate significant wealth increases for their shareholders during the announcement period (Miles and Rosenfield, 1983; Alexander et al., 1984; Montgomery et al., 1984; Rosenfeld, 1984; Jain, 1985; Klein, 1986; Tehranian et al., 1987; Afshar et al., 1992; John and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1995; Weston et al., 1998; Hanson and Song, 2000; Boone and Mulherin, 2001; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001; Bates, 2005). The author’s research explores the research assumption that there are different wealth effects for different growth stages of the life cycle. Chapters 3 and 4 present very detailed methods of growth stage classification and the wealth effect results of different growth stages of the life cycle. Previous literature on the subject of divestment does not appear to have examined the subject adequately, ignoring growth and industrial concentration. Growth is arguably one of the most crucial factors in any given firm, regardless of its maturity. The growth concept of the life cycle is relatively new and growth is not entirely considered to be an important factor. It would be worthwhile to understand how all the characteristics relate to different stages of the life cycle with an improved model, i.e. an accurate life cycle that includes growth. One of the key contributions of this research is to add two growth variables, revenue growth and Tobin’s Q, into the classification methodology. This research highlights the importance of the growth factor and uses it as the key classification methodology. By including the growth variable in the classification methodology, the real position of different stages of divestiture can be reflected.  

Theoretically, it could be argued that wealth gains are related to the level of agency costs, which are themselves related to a company’s progress through the various stages of the life cycle. Mueller (1972) suggests that agency problems increase across the life cycle. In other words, older firms may have more agency problems, and need more corporate governance control over management in order to discipline managerial decisions. “Managerial shareholding is associated with their entrenchment and preferences for growth through diversification strategies. This evidence suggests that an increase in monitoring through the development of truly independent boards might be necessary to persuade managers to take downsizing decisions that might otherwise harm their pecuniary and non-pecuniary well-being, thereby securing shareholder wealth protection” (Filatotchev et al. 2006, p.268).  Filatotchev et al. (2006) also suggest that corporate boards need to monitor the management decisions of declining companies. Firms in the decline stage are likely to have higher agency problems, so stronger corporate governance, such as a higher percentage of non-executive directors, is needed to reduce managerial interests. 

Overall, there has been no previous empirical research which has investigated the interrelationship between the stage in the life cycle, corporate governance and the wealth effects divesting firms generate for their shareholders. This author’s research examines these interrelationships across the life cycle, examining the impact of corporate governance on divesting companies across the life cycle to see if corporate governance variables can act as effective management control variables. Consequently, this research classifies a sample of divesting companies according to their place in the life cycle.  This, in turn, allows the following, empirically testable, questions to be addressed: What are the stock market reactions on the announcement date to divestments by companies at different life cycle stages? a) in terms of the short run information content of the announcement, and b), in terms of longer run stock market performance. What is the differential impact of corporate governance arrangements on stock market returns for divesting companies in different life cycle stages?
1.2	Contribution
Previous literature on divestment has devoted relatively little attention to the life cycle, focusing on examining divestment at the overall level, such as the relationship between divestment and the wealth effect (e.g. abnormal returns). However, it is important to understand divestment on a specific level, such as the different growth stages. The same divestment factor could have different effects on different growth stages. For example, different investors could have different confidence for different divestitures across different life cycle stages and this can result in different wealth effects across the life cycle. 

Overall, the precise ways in which the stock market reacts to the divestment decisions of firms in different stages of the life cycle is also underdeveloped. This thesis is a pioneering study which examines divestment through the lens of the life cycle paradigm. In order to address the literature gap and the importance of understanding the detailed growth stage issue, this thesis tries to contribute a pioneering research model, which includes the following issues:

This research highlights the importance of the growth factor, in that growth is significant to the life cycle. It uses Tobin’s Q as the new classification variable to classify different divestitures into different life cycle stages. By presenting this specific growth factor, the reader can be helped to understand divestment in a detailed dimension. This research breaks the tradition of divestment literature. Generally speaking, most of traditional literature presents the wealth effect and divestment through one flat dimension (ignoring the growth factor). In other words, it assumes that all divestitures are in the same growth stage. Therefore, the literature cannot explain why there are different stock market reactions across the different growth stages. In order to address this issue, this thesis attempts to understand the wealth effects of different divestitures across the different growth stages. One of the key contributions of the research is to present a very detailed picture of stock market reactions. In other words, understanding divestitures is no longer just a flat dimension. Instead, investors may experience different reactions for divestitures in different growth stages. Therefore, this research illustrates how different market reactions occur for divestitures across different life cycle stages.  
A key illustration is presented here: understanding the relationship between corporate governance and divestment wealth effects. While there are different wealth effects for divestitures, the research tries to understand the wealth effect through the corporate governance dimension. For example, which corporate governance factor (s) could explain the stock market reaction. Overall, this research contributes to the understanding of divestitures through a brand new dimension: divestitures, growth stages across the life cycle and corporate governance. The aim is to help readers understand the importance of the growth factor and its role in divestitures.
Findings
In chapter 4, this author’s research examined the wealth effect of divestment in detail by using the life cycle framework. The benefit of using this framework is that it can help the reader to understand the relationship between market reactions to divestitures and specific growth stages of the life cycle, such as early and late life cycle stages. The first finding is that on the announcement day, investors have stronger positive confidence in divestitures in the later life cycle stages. The second finding is that for longer, post-announcement event windows, there are more positive market reactions to firms in the earlier life cycle stages. This finding shows that different life cycle stages lead to different specific market reactions. It may be related to the fact that investors have different reactions towards divestment owing to different characteristics in the life cycle stages. 

In chapter 5, the author’s research looks at the relationship between divestitures, corporate governance and the life cycle, aiming to provide an understanding of the impact of corporate governance on managerial divestitures across the life cycle.  The finding is that corporate governance is also an important factor explaining the wealth effects associated with divestment. There is a positive relationship between non-executive directors and the wealth effect of divestitures, which shows that non-executive directors can act in a disciplinary role to monitor managerial behaviour. While corporate governance can provide a control influence on managerial divestitures, this can result in investors having positive confidence towards divestitures. However, when analysed together, life cycle and corporate governance variables do not improve our understanding of the market reaction to divestment. The explanation for this apparent paradox is that investors generally do not use both factors together to inform their reactions to divestment. 
Definition and delimitations 
Definition
It is useful to have a clear concept of divestment, the main theme of this research, before considering the other chapters. A sell-off is defined as the sale of an asset or assets, such as a subsidiary, division or product line, of the selling company to another company (Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983; Alexander et al., 1984; Duhaime and Grant, 1984; Rosenfeld, 1984; Jain, 1985; Tehranian et al., 1987; Afshar et al., 1992; Sudarsanam, 1995; Weston et al., 1998), in which shareholders of the selling company maintain no link with the divested assets (Hearth and Zaima, 1986). In a sell-off, payment is in the form of cash, securities, debt, or a mixture of all three, and the parent company has a taxable capital gain or loss, with the unit separated entirely from the parent company (Boudreaux, 1975).
Delimitations









































Figure 1‑2 shows the relationship between the life cycle stage and agency problems. Chapter Three studies the classification of the sample of divesting companies. It is beneficial to understand the research methodology behind this classification. This author’s research suggests that divesting firms can be classified into different life cycle stages, such as early and late life cycle, according to the growth status of divesting firms. Furthermore, by analyzing financial variables of divesting firms, the agency problem classification of divesting firms is also obtained. By analyzing financial variables of divesting firms, the reader can have a broader understanding of agency problem characteristics of divesting firms, for example, whether these firms have a high or low agency problem. Chapter Four studies the relationship between the market reaction to divesting firms and the various life cycle stages. It suggests that there is a more positive market reaction to divesting firms later in the life cycle. The restructuring signals sent by firms in the later life cycle can give stronger positive signals to investors, thereby increasing the positive market reaction. Chapter Five studies the relationship between corporate governance, divesting firms and life cycle. Different corporate governance variables are used in this chapter. The reason for using these corporate governance variables is to see if they can act as an effective monitoring system for management to reduce their self-interest decisions. This chapter suggests that there is a positive relationship between corporate governance variables and the agency problem.

When divesting firms, which have low agency problems and are in the early life cycle stage, announce divestment on the announcement day, the stock market is likely to have a positive market reaction to these divestitures. Younger firms are likely to undertake strategic divestments in order to improve further growth and development opportunities for the firm. Therefore, investors welcome these strategic divestitures and this may explain why the stock market has a positive reaction. Furthermore, when divesting companies, which have high agency problems and are in the later life cycle stage, announce divestitures, on the announcement day the stock market is likely to have a very positive reaction to them. As these divesting firms have high agency problems, undertaking divestitures can send good signals to the market as firms improve their performance by restructuring. Therefore, investors welcome these divestitures. Overall, Figure 1‑2 illustrates that this author’s research hopes to provide an understanding of the relationship between the agency problems of divesting firms and the market reaction to them. 

This thesis is divided into the following six chapters:
Chapter One contains definitions and delimitations with regard to the research, the former providing meanings of key terms in order to help the reader to a fuller understanding. The section on delimitation highlights the limitations of this research, for example, the reasons for choosing the research sample from 1996 to 2000. Additionally, it shows the construction of the following chapters. Its aims are to help the reader to a better understanding of the connection/relationship between the different chapters. 

Chapter Two provides a comprehensive review of the divestment literature in order to increase the reader’s understanding of divestment. This comprehensive review is related to three research questions, seeking to provide support for these questions. Regarding the first research question, the review focuses on the characteristics of the earlier and later life cycle stages, explaining the basis of the life cycle framework. Then, the literature reviews the importance of the life cycle, aiming to explain why the researcher sees it as an important framework. The review also focuses on the classification of divesting companies, providing an explanation of why cluster and factor analysis is appropriate for this research. The second research question studies the literature covering areas like market reaction to young firms in the earlier life cycle stages and market reaction to mature firms in the later life cycle stages. These two literature reviews hope to make the reader more aware of the logic behind these market reactions, for example, the reasons related to market reaction. For the third research question, the literature reviews managers & divestment, market reaction and corporate governance in the earlier and later life cycle stages. This detailed review aims to provide a better understanding of management, for example, the impact of managers on divestment decisions and stock market reactions. Furthermore, the detailed corporate governance literature review shows that different levels of corporate governance systems are appropriate for different firms in the life cycle.

Chapter Three presents the classification of companies into different life cycle stages. It is important to classify a company into the correct life cycle stage. To incorrectly classify a company can lead to its characteristics being incorrectly analysed and the research results being misleading. Furthermore, it is crucial to understand a company’s position in the life cycle.  With this understanding, a company can know exactly where it stands in the market, and can pinpoint the exact position of its competitors. It can then adopt the right survival strategy. For example, if a company is in the mature stage, it needs to avoid further decline by using the right “regenerating” strategy. It then needs to compare its competitors’ life cycle positions to determine if it is in a better or worse situation than the competition. Indeed, understanding the life cycle position can help the company to consolidate in the current market and plan its next step, enhancing its competitive advantages in a tough economic environment. Chapter Three also describes the data and methodology in detail, for example, the data source, sample criteria and factor and cluster analysis methodology. This section seeks to present basic sample and methodology information before moving to the research results section. In Chapter Three, the importance of two variables, growth and concentration ratio, is examined, thereby enhancing previous research. This research then uses growth as the main variable to classify the life cycle stage, as growth is a crucial variable in the life cycle. This chapter hopes to provide a better classification of the life cycle.

Once all the stages in the life cycle are defined and classified, the next step is to perform further analysis to determine whether the market has optimistic or pessimistic views of firms in the different life cycle stages. Investors may have different expectations for firms in different life cycle stages and they may expect the stock market to reflect these expectations. Chapter Four examines different wealth effects for selling companies in different life cycle stages. The previous divestment research investigates the market reaction to divestment generally. For example, the previous divestment literature simply argues that positive or negative market reactions applied to samples, without understanding or classifying specific sub-samples. Actually, researchers may be able to understand specific market reactions for specific sub-samples, enabling them to understand further details or characteristics for their sub-samples. In other words, their research findings may currently be inconclusive, so this research would like to provide a comprehensive share price analysis for the life cycle and a better understanding of specific market reactions to specific life cycle groups. Additionally, Chapter Four explains the sample and methodology, giving sample details and event study methodology (including the market model, Brown and Warner (1985) and Dodd and Warner (1983) methods). A better understanding of sample and methodology can result in a clearer grasp of the event study results. This chapter also presents characteristics of the divestiture companies, economic information, mergers and acquisitions and divestiture wave and industry information, in order to provide background information about the author’s divestment research. The wealth effect of divesting firms is examined, using the market model and test statistics, computed by the Brown and Warner (1985) method. The Dodd and Warner (1983) method is also used for testing sensitivity. This chapter aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the stock market reaction, including abnormal returns analysis and cumulative abnormal returns analysis, for the different life cycle stages. 

Once the market reaction to different firms is established, it is informative to note the determinants of the market reaction. Undoubtedly, good corporate governance systems could motivate or pressurise managers to work better for their firms, as the system helps them to work in line with company interests. In other words, corporate governance is an important factor in explaining market reaction. In Chapter Five, regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between abnormal performance on the divestment announcement date and corporate governance variables in the life cycle. This research hopes to provide a detailed explanation for the causes of market reaction from the viewpoint of corporate governance. In Chapter Five the sample criteria are discussed and the definition given of the corporate governance variables. Clear sample details and variable definitions can help the reader to a clearer understanding of the regression models and regression results. This chapter presents complete information concerning the development of different hypotheses and regression models, giving the reader a greater understanding of the reasons for developing these models, which examine the relationship between corporate governance variables and the wealth effect of selling companies. In other words, the determinants of the wealth effect could be understood better through these regression models. This chapter also presents regression results, providing a clear picture of comprehensive regression analysis. A detailed discussion follows the regression results, aiming to provide a comprehensive explanation.    









The previous chapter gave a basic introduction to the thesis and this chapter reviews the literature in order to form a comprehensive picture of divestiture and to give support to the research questions raised in Chapter One. The aim is to help the reader gain a greater understanding of the divestment background and to build on the foundation laid by the existing literature. 

The literature review in section 2.2 includes three main parts:  Firstly, this chapter reviews the basic literature on divestment. The definition of ‘sell-off’ aims to give the reader a clear idea of this concept. There follows a background literature review for divestitures and diversification discounts, studying the relationship between them. Secondly, this chapter reviews the agency problem and corporate governance. The review focuses on the motives for managerial self-interest divestitures and the impact of corporate governance on management. This aims to give the reader a better understanding of the reasons for managers to undertake divestitures and how corporate governance can perform a disciplinary role in monitoring managers. Thirdly, this chapter reviews the literature on the importance of the life cycle and life cycle classification, and the relationship between life cycle, divestitures and the agency problem. The aim is to illustrate different managerial self interest divestitures in different life cycle stages. It also shows how the stock market reaction to managerial divestitures varies across the life cycle. Section 2.3 provides a brief summary of the chapter.
2.2	Literature 
Organisational restructuring: Divestment 
This section aims to review the literature that gives a basic background on divestitures. The reason for reviewing this literature is to help the reader to a better understanding of a basic definition, to provide information on divestitures and to establish a good foundation for understanding the relationship between diversification discounts and divestitures and also to introduce the agency problem that is emphasised in the later section of the literature review.
Definition of Sell-offs
The definition of a sell-off is the sale of some assets, including subsidiaries, divisions or product lines, of the selling company to another company (Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983; Alexander et al., 1984; Rosenfeld, 1984; Jain, 1985; Tehranian et al., 1987; Afshar et al., 1992; Sudarsanam, 1995; Weston et al., 1998; Sun and Chen, 2009). The following divestitures, from the author’s research sample, may help readers understand real examples of divestitures. One example of a sell-off is when Rolls-Royce (general industrials) divested Bristol Aerospace to Magellan Aerospace. Bristol Aerospace is an aerospace components and repair company, which Rolls-Royce divested in order to specialize in gas turbine engines (Simon, 1997). Another example is when Lasmo (oil and gas production in resources) divested its Colombian unit to a Brazilian oil group, aiming to rid itself of unwanted units, which were making little contribution to Lasmo’s profits. Some of the proceeds of the divestiture (paid by the Brazilian oil group) went to fund the purchase of the Brazilian asset that Lasmo wished to buy later. Lasmo wanted to buy the “under production” or developed asset in Brazil, where it wanted to expand. In Brazil, the oil industry is open to foreign investment (Corzine, 1998) and it is quite common for oil companies (in the resource industry) to use divestment as a strategy to expand investment in a country/market. The final example is British Steel, which divested its information technology operation in order to focus on core business (Taylor, 1996). Basic industry companies are likely to focus on specific development, such as building and construction. These examples suggest that firms undertake divestitures for different reasons in the financial world. They may want to use divestitures as a way to enhance their company’s competitive position.
Background for divestitures
Divestiture can be a challenging transaction for companies, requiring detailed planning and disciplined preparation and execution in order to make divestitures successful (Gole, 2009). The reasons behind this form of corporate restructuring could be as follows: the assets interfere with the existing operation of the divesting firm (Kiymaz, 2006) and would be of better use to the buyer. Therefore, divestiture is a good strategy for the selling firm (Hillier et al., 2009) and the benefit asset sales are likely to move assets to a use which has higher value (Hanson and Song, 2006). Generally speaking, correct divestment decisions can help the selling firms to get rid of unwanted assets and then obtain gains.

Divestment activities have become a popular trend in recent years (Afshar et al., 1992; Wang, 2000). Literature on strategic management suggests that it is important to understand the impact of divestment on corporate strategy (Duhaime and Grant, 1984). Employing a percentage of outside directors on the board is a proxy for the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms. They find that the structure of the board of directors of the selling firm can affect shareholders’ gains. However, empirical research has focused on mergers and acquisitions (Boudreaux, 1975; Alexander et al., 1984; Jain, 1985; Tehranian et al., 1987; Buchholtz et al., 1999; Gleason et al, 2000). The reason behind this could be that one company’s sell-offs become another company’s acquisition. Therefore, financial literature assumes divestitures are similar to mergers. A divestiture is likely to be a reverse merger or acquisition (Gole and Hilger, 2008) and the determinants for a divestiture are likely to be the reverse of the determinants for a merger (Boudreaux, 1975; Hearth and Zaima, 1986). This can result in little attention from the financial literature. The financial literature focuses more on “buying” (e.g. acquisitions) rather than “selling” (e.g. divestitures) (Buchholtz et al., 1999). There is more research relating to US divestitures and very little research relating to UK divestitures. Therefore, more research, including domestic and international divestiture, is needed in order to provide a broader picture of this sell-off activity. Understanding more about this restructuring activity may help firms to make the right sell-off decisions at the right time. 
Diversification discount and divestitures	
Having considered the basic background of divestitures, it is worthwhile understanding the relationship between diversification discount and divestiture. Evidence suggests that diversified firms become inefficient over time and diversification is not a successful way to improve a firm’s performance (Servaes, 1996; Berger and Ofek, 1995). Hoskisson and Hitt (1994) suggest that there is a mixed relationship between diversification and company performance. There is no doubt that a company can undertake over-diversification and their suggestion is that early diversification can benefit company performance up to a certain point. However, continued diversification can result in decreasing returns for the company, such that the relationship between diversification and company performance seems to be neutral when studied over time. However, extensive diversification that results in over-diversification is likely to decrease the overall performance of the company. Lang and Stulz (1994) suggested that companies might use development opportunities for their existing resources, making them more likely to enhance expansion chances through diversification. Servaes (1996) studied the value of diversified companies during a period of high diversification activity from the late 1960s to the early 1970s and found that there was a large diversification discount throughout the 1960s. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers are motivated to cause their companies to develop beyond the optimal size, as this can enhance managers’ power by increasing the resources under their control. Free cash flow is also discussed here and is defined as cash flow beyond that needed to finance all projects that have positive NPV when discounted at cost of capital. When companies create large amounts of free cash flow, there are conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. It is important to understand how to encourage managers to disgorge the cash instead of wasting it on company inefficiencies or investing it in projects at below cost of capital. Berger and Ofek (1995) have suggested that diversification reduces value. They estimated that this value loss averaged 13% to 15% over the 1986-1991 sample period, and occurred for firms of all sizes, but was mitigated when the diversification was within related industries. They also found that diversification reduced value, documenting that the segments of diversified firms had lower operating profitability than single-line businesses.  Empirical research suggests that diversified firms tend to have poorer performance than non-diversified firms. In takeovers, diversified firms with poor performance were more likely to be the target for acquiring companies. Berger and Ofek (1996) analyzed the relationship between value loss from diversification and the chance of takeover. They found that greater value losses from diversification could increase the chances of takeover. In order to reduce further loss from diversification, these companies tended to restructure their companies (Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002). Hoskisson and Turk (1990) suggest that corporate governance reduces the existence of large diversified companies. Their paper suggests the idea that poor monitoring, which could be related to inadequate governance, the reliance on incentive compensation and free cash flows, could result in higher diversification levels. Corporate restructuring could result in the reduction of inadequate governance, the focusing of diversification strategy and the enhancement of company performance and shareholder wealth.

When companies have a poor financial position and performance relative to their competitors, shortage of capital motivates firms to undertake divestitures (Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Schlingemann et al., 2000). Duhaime and Grant (1984) also supported the finding that low financial strength (return on equity, debt/equity ratio, dividends paid as a percentage of earnings) of divesting firms can motivate them to undertake divestitures. The reason these financially distressed firms undertake divestitures is because they can enable these companies to reduce their leverage and financial instability. For example, under financial distress companies tend to have difficulty raising external capital. These companies could sell a loss-making division in order to raise necessary cash and meet debt payments (Sicherman and Pettway, 1987; Denning, 1988; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002). Another reason for financially distressed firms to undertake divestitures is because divestitures are a useful means to solve their urgent financial problems. For example, some companies undertake divestitures because of difficult liquidity problems, including bankruptcies or near bankruptcies (Montgomery et al., 1984; Johnson, 1996). In such a situation, if a company cannot undertake divestitures successfully, it will suffer further decline and bankruptcy. Proceeds from divestitures can quickly reduce a liquidation problem. The divestiture proceeds can be invested in a more profitable manner in other divisions, reducing liquidation problems for the firms (Sudarsanam, 1995). 
 Divestitures can make companies operate more efficiently (Schlingemann et al., 2000) through reducing the risk of over-diversification and decreasing the number and diversity of the company’s operating divisions (Hamilton and Chow, 1993; Weston et al., 1998). Additionally, companies can use divestitures as a means of improving their future operating performance. John and Ofek (1995) suggest that a focus on increasing asset sales leads to the operating performance improving for the remaining assets of the divesting firms for three years following the divestitures.

The existence of the diversification discount from the 1960s to the early 1970s suggests that companies need to change strategy in order to enhance performance. In addition, in the 1980s, industrialists and academics raised questions about the ‘big is best’ theory and the performance problems of large diversified firms. These firms suffer from problems such as diseconomies of decision management and management control (Wang, 2000). Divestiture activity became popular in the 1980s. For example, in 1981, in the US, the value of voluntary divestment exceeded $12 billion and there were over 500 divestitures. Furthermore, 45 divestitures exceeded $50 million in value (Hearth and Zaima, 1984). At that time, there was a high percentage of large companies undertaking divestitures in order to restructure (Johnson et al., 1993; Sudarsanam, 1995) and refocus on their core businesses (Markides, 1995). Overall, corporate restructuring in the 1980s reversed the diversification trend from the 1960s to early 1970s where management achieved its own interests (Sudarsanam, 1995). 

Sell-off activity increased sharply in the 1990s (Kiymaz, 2006). Corporate restructuring, such as sell-offs, is a popular trend globally (Svejnar and Zhou, 2006) and UK multinational companies undertook significant restructuring activity through divestment (Wang, 2000). Kiymaz (2006) suggests that the value of sell-off transactions rose from $76 billion in 1993 to over $300 billion in 1998 and the number of divestments rose from 2,057 in 1993 to 3,134 in 1998. Furthermore, Gole and Hilger (2008) suggest that divestment activities accounted for almost 1/3 of mergers and acquisitions from 2002 to 2006 and sell-offs averaged more than 3,000 transactions from 2002 to 2006. Companies have been restructuring their businesses very actively, re-directing their business strategies and reducing the size of their business portfolios through refocusing divestitures (Gleason et al, 2000). Sell-offs are no longer seen as a sign of failure for companies, divestment is likely to be seen as a way to help companies to create or maintain shareholder wealth (Kiymaz, 2006). Overall, the increased divestment trend in both the 1990s and 2000s suggests that divestitures are a good strategy for over-diversified firms seeking to restructure. 

Hearth and Zaima (1984) define divestitures as large when the ratio (the announced value of divestitures to the total assets of the divesting firms) is more than eight percent. Divestitures are defined as “small” when the ratio is less than eight per cent. They find that larger divestitures may result in larger positive excess returns, and suggest that selling a small unit (in order to focus on the core unit) cannot result in an increase in economic value to the shareholders. Wang (2000) has investigated the impact of transaction size on the shareholder wealth effect of divestitures and suggests that price disclosure provides the economic content of the restructuring plan of the company; therefore, large divestments may have stronger impacts on the stock market.  The size of divested assets is positively related to the shareholder wealth of divesting firms. 

Additionally, Afshar et al. (1992) find a positive relationship between event day ARs and the relative size of a divestment, and that the greater the disposal, the bigger the impact on the increase in shareholder wealth. In another study, Klein (1986) also supports the view that there is a positive relationship between the relative size of the divestitures and the announcement day return. They find no significant ARs when the percentage of the firm sold is less than 10 per cent. There are positive and significant (2.53 per cent) ARs for divesting firms when the percentage of the firm sold is between 10 per cent and 50 per cent, and positive and significant (8.09 per cent) ARs for the seller when the percentage of the firm sold is greater than 50 per cent. 






Agency problem and corporate governance 
This section reviews the agency problem and corporate governance, seeking to provide a detailed picture of the concept of the agency problem, such as the conflict of interest between management and firm owners in divesting firms. The section also provides a literature review of how different corporate governance variables act as monitor functions to discipline management. 

After reviewing the literature on diversification discounts and the background to divestiture, it is clear that managers play an important role in divestiture, as they are key people in undertaking divestitures. It is therefore worthwhile studying the literature on the problems of agency and corporate governance. There has been significant research studying corporate diversification, which raises the question of whether diversification increases or decreases the value of a company (Jiraporn et al., 2006). In the 1960s and 1970s, managers were maximizing their own interests by increasing the size and scope of their companies rather than increasing value (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993). Ahn and Walker (2007) suggested that diversified companies that undertake value-decreasing diversification could be related to less effective corporate governance. Denis et al. (1997) argued that agency problems were responsible for companies continuing to diversify. In another later study, Ahn and Walker (2007) also supported this view that agency problems could be a major reason for companies to undertake value-destroying diversification. Jiraporn et al. (2006) also suggested that agency theory was a factor in decreasing the worth of diversified companies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained that an agency relationship was a contract under which the principal employed an agent to carry out service on his behalf. In the agency relationship, the principal gave authority for decision-making to the agent. Furthermore, they suggested that if both the principal and the agent were utility maximisers, the agent may not always act in the principal’s best interests. In fact, there may be a divergence between the agent’s (manager’s) decisions and those that could maximize the principal’s (shareholder’s) wealth. Denis et al. (1997) studied the relationship between the agency problem, equity ownership and diversification by analyzing 933 U.S. companies throughout the 1980s. They suggested that as managerial ownership increased, managers tended to bear a higher proportion of the costs related to value-decreasing actions. Therefore, they were unlikely to adopt policies that decreased shareholder wealth. If diversification decreased shareholder wealth, they would predict that managerial ownership would be negatively related to the level of diversification. Their research results supported this idea, finding a negative relationship between the level of diversification and managerial ownership. 
Ahn and Walker (2007) argued that the relationship between company behaviour and the system of corporate governance was controversial. Their paper raised the question of whether managers would undertake divestitures voluntarily or involuntarily. What was the relationship between the impact of corporate governance and refocusing? This author’s research presents the following literature to the reader in order to enable a better understanding of corporate governance characteristics and refocusing. The literature is divided into two main groups. The first group studies the motives for managerial self-interest divestitures and the second group studies the impact of corporate governance variables on divestitures. The reason for comparing these two groups of literature is to illustrate the different managerial motives behind sell-offs and to show that the corporate governance system can be a control system to help managers act in shareholders’ interests. 
Motives for the managerial self-interest divestitures
It is useful to understand the different managerial determinants of divestment.  Indeed, there has been an increasingly popular trend for management to sell assets or whole units (Sicherman and Pettway, 1987) and managers tend to undertake divestitures when the companies show declining performance (Dess and Miller, 1993). Usually, when managers take the decision to divest, they tend to consider whether these divestitures could enhance their wages, reputations and promotion opportunities. For example, the managers of profitable units tend to avoid making divestiture decisions because they may affect their good reputations. In contrast, the managers of units making financial losses are likely to opt for divestiture because it may enhance their reputations (Guedes and Parayre,1997). Overall, the motives for managers making divestment decisions include short term profits. The following are detailed studies supporting the view that managerial motives lie behind divestment decisions.

 In reality, short term profits could motivate divestitures. According to Lang et al. (1995), a motivation for management to divest assets is that asset sales provide the cheapest funds to achieve their aims, such as operating efficiency, rather than to maximize shareholder wealth. The motivation for management to divest assets is that asset sales raise funds to achieve their aims when alternative sources of financing, such as capital markets, are too expensive, possibly because the company has high leverage and/or poor performance. Managers are likely to raise funds to reduce leverage and the costs of financial distress, to pay out proceeds to shareholders in the presence of the pressures of corporate market control, or to make further investments in order to achieve their own objectives. Generally, fund raising through divestitures can be a crucial reason for managerial sell-offs. 

Additionally, the size of the divisions concerned is associated with managerial divestitures. When managers have greater control, companies are more likely to sell large divisions. Through sell-offs, managers can achieve their own interests, including protecting their employment security and improving competitive resource allocation efficiencies (Bergh, 1995). Managerial ability could be a further determinant of managerial sell-offs. Buchholtz et al. (1999) suggested that divestitures are more likely to happen when managers sell divisions purchased for rehabilitation and turnaround. Undoubtedly, for the managers, the successful sell-offs of divisions purchased for turnaround would reflect well on their personal insight and wisdom. Successful divestitures also reflect managerial ability to maximize information efficiency in order to undertake divestitures at the right time. Overall, these reflections of good management skills on the market could provide significant psychological satisfaction and reputation enhancement for managers. 

To sum up the findings of the above literature, short term profits, the size of the division and the reflection of managerial abilities are important factors that motivate managers to undertake managerial divestitures. Managers use divestitures as tools to achieve their own objectives. This form of divestiture may not benefit the whole company. Therefore, corporate governance variables are needed as a disciplinary function for firms. The following studies show how different corporate governance variables enhance managerial divestitures and benefit the whole company. 
Corporate governance
While there has been a significant amount of corporate governance research in the last decade, relatively few studies focus on corporate governance and divestment (Owen et al., 2010). Cremers and Nair (2005) seek a better understanding of the governance system. They suggest that an internal governance system, such as a blockholder and board of directors, (working together with external control) can influence the market reaction to a firm.  Corporate governance variables (the total blockholders’ percentage, managerial ownership, the percentage of non-executive directors) are the main incentives to encourage and control managers to work in line with owners. In the financial world, undoubtedly managers have different aims for themselves within their companies. These corporate governance variables can act as a disciplinary function to help managers work for their firms’ best interests. Haynes and Wright (2000) suggest that sell-offs are related to corporate governance. Refocusing activity may be related to a reduction of conflict between the agent and firm owners (Berger and Ofek, 1999). Owen et al. (2010) also support the idea that if a company has a good reason to undertake divestitures, corporate governance can ensure that managers undertake divestitures well, as they have a natural reluctance to believe that divestitures reduce the self-interests of controlling large companies. The reason for choosing these corporate governance variables is that they are commonly used in corporate governance literature. The following literature provides a detailed picture of how these variables can be used to monitor managers.  
Total blockholders percentage
Holderness & Sheehan (1988) suggested that large block shareholders could obtain high salaries or invest in projects that may not benefit the whole company. However, Edmans (2009) argued that block shareholders had significant motivation to monitor company value. Chen and Austin (2007) studied the effectiveness of block shareholders in reducing companies’ agency problems, including under investment problems, poor asset management and extravagance on the part of management. Their results showed that outside block shareholders could act as a function for companies to reduce this latter problem. Furthermore, inside block shareholders, for example managerial block shareholders could help firms to enhance efficiency, such as asset utilization. Furthermore, inside block shareholders can also help firms to solve underinvestment problems.

 The total blockholders’ percentage is one corporate governance variable. Blockholders usually hold a sizeable share of the company (e.g. they have more than three per cent or five per cent of shares), and in order to safeguard their financial interests, they are likely to monitor the managers. Decisions made by the blockholders are usually made in the long term interest of the company and they may discipline management when divestment decisions are being made. The reduction of self interest in a manager’s decision to undertake negative net-present-value projects is crucial. Cremers and Nair (2005) found that internal (blockholder and board of directors) and external governance systems can work together in order to help companies obtain long-term abnormal returns. They found blockholder ownership to be a crucial factor for firms in the presence of takeover.

In certain situations, when managers undertake divestitures in their own interests rather than those of the shareholders, a high total blockholders’ percentage is needed to control the managerial divestiture activities in order to ensure the company’s market value. Blockholders could be the primary internal monitoring system for firms (Cremers and Nair, 2005). Berger and Ofek (1999) concentrated on studying refocusing activity. They studied about 107 diversified companies that undertook refocusing activity without being taken over by another firm and found that about 27% of refocusing activity is preceded by the arrival of a new outside blockholder. In other words, their study suggested that blockholders could act as a motivation or a control system to encourage firms to engage in refocusing activity. Furthermore, Owen et al. (2010) suggested that effective corporate governance systems could result in a higher probability of companies undertaking sell-offs. They also suggested that large boards can result in increased chances for firms to undertake divestment. Additionally, Filatotchev et al. (2006) argued that external shareholders need to monitor management decisions in declining companies. Furthermore, Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) suggested that the owners of large blocks of shares have both the right and the motivation to make sure that managers run the company efficiently. Blockholders could discipline managers by pressurising them to undertake divestitures and increase cash payments to shareholders. In other words, the total blockholder percentage is anticipated to have a positive relationship on the shareholders’ wealth. In another study, Ahn and Walker (2007) investigated the effectiveness and impact of corporate governance on a company’s chances to undertake refocusing activity. Spin-offs are value-enhancing activities for companies to reduce their size and scope. Their studies show that there is a positive relationship between effective corporate governance and higher chances of undertaking spin-off. Furthermore, ownership by outside board members is positively related to the probability of spin-off. Although their research focused on studying spin-off instead of sell-off, their paper supported the idea that corporate governance can bring benefits in encouraging firms to undertake downsizing in order to enhance the firms’ value.

According to Haynes et al., “Under a strong corporate governance regime, timely action to address under-performance is likely. Outside blockholders of equity provide the basis for active shareholder influence over management and the reduction of entrenchment behaviour by management with large equity holdings” (Haynes et al., 2005, p.146).  Haynes et al. (2005) also examine the determinants of divestment activity and argue that there is a significant positive relationship between blockholder (defined as a single shareholder who owns five per cent or more of the ordinary shares of a company) and divestment (their definition includes divestiture sales to third parties and management buy-outs) for some of their test specifications. 
Managerial ownership
Morck et al. (1998) suggested that increased managerial ownership could be linked to a management entrenchment problem for companies. However, Owen et al. (2010) found that previous research suggested management was unwilling to undertake divestitures even if they should do so. They found that a corporate governance system could motivate managers to undertake divestitures and suggested that there was a positive relationship between corporate governance and the probability of undertaking divestitures. They also suggested that significant management ownership could result in increased probability of the firm undertaking sell-offs. They suggested that internal and external corporate governance could work together to maximise the shareholders’ benefits. Managerial ownership is one corporate governance variable that can motivate managers to make divestiture decisions consistent with shareholders’ interests. Generally, managerial ownership gives management a “sense of belonging” to the company and, as a result, they consider the company’s interests to be their own. If the company can enhance its performance in the future, the market value of the firm is likely to increase and management experiences job satisfaction. In other words, managerial ownership is an important means of encouraging management to increase shareholder wealth, providing an “intangible bonding” to tie management to company performance. 

Hanson and Song (2006) suggest that companies that have lower management ownership tend to be more likely to undertake acquisitions and this suggests weaker internal control systems. Furthermore, Denis et al.’s (1997) study of the relationship between the agency problem, equity ownership and diversification, analyses 933 U.S. companies throughout the 1980s. They suggest that as managerial ownership increases, managers tend to bear a higher percentage of the costs related to value-decreasing activity, so are less likely to adopt policies that decrease shareholder wealth. If diversification is shareholder wealth-decreasing, they predict that managerial ownership will be negatively related to the level of diversification. Their research results support this idea by finding a negative relationship between the level of diversification and managerial ownership.

Additionally, Hanson and Song (2000) suggest that stock ownership by the management of the firm making the sale could affect divestiture gains by making the managers bear the costs of “negative synergies” and therefore providing a motive for them to become more proficient bargainers (negotiating a better price for the divested assets). In other words, managerial stock ownership can serve as an important internal control mechanism, giving managers economic motivation to work in line with shareholders. Their results suggest that higher levels of managerial ownership motivate managers to divest negative synergy assets and negotiate a better price for assets, creating gains for the divesting firm. Furthermore, in their later study, Hanson and Song (2003) support this view by suggesting that divestment can help firms rid themselves of unwanted assets that create negative synergies. Management ownership provides incentives for firms to enhance operations following sell-offs. 

Lang et al. (1995) also support this view in their findings, noting a positive relationship between managerial ownership and ARs for their sample of 93 divestitures from 1984 to 1989. Firms with higher managerial ownership experience higher ARs. Hirschey and Zaima (1989) suggest that the market can use ownership structure information to analyse whether a sell-off announcement is favourable or unfavourable for investors, and whether it can affect the market reaction to divestiture announcements. They investigate US firms undertaking voluntary sell-offs from 1975 to 1982, defining closely held (widely held) companies as those where insiders control five percent or more (less than five percent) of the total common stock outstanding. They find that the market favours divestiture decisions undertaken by closely held firms, when compared to divestiture decisions made by widely held firms. Additionally, Haynes et al. (2000) studied the determinants of UK corporate divestment, using 1149 voluntary divestitures across 141 large firms between 1985 and 1989 and found a significant positive relationship between divestment and management equity ownership. 

Tehranian et al. (1987) suggest that firms undertake divestitures in order to dispose of unprofitable divisions.  Management perceptions of “non-profitable” are related to their own time horizon, which is in turn influenced by their compensation plans. If managers’ compensation is related to short-term bonuses, they are likely to achieve short-term profits at the expense of the firms’ long-term profits. For example, remuneration schemes basing management bonuses on annual profits can further increase this short-term bias. As salary is influenced by short-term performance, managers tend to earn quick profits and, as a result, are likely to sell units which have low short-term earnings, even if they support the long-term profit of the firm as a whole. In contrast, when a long-term performance plan is made available to them, the management’s decision-making horizon is extended at least three to six years, as long-term performance compensation is postponed until the award period. Managers can lose this compensation if they leave the company during the award period, and as a result, the longer the period for which managers are hired, the more likely they are to make decisions in line with the long-term interests of the shareholders. Indeed, when managers’ compensation is related to long-term performance, they are likely to make decisions in line with the company’s long-term profitability, encouraging them to divest units that are inconsistent with the firms’ other divisions and which create permanent financial losses. In general, long-term performance plans can reduce agency costs by lessening conflicts of interest between management and stockholders. Managerial compensation plans function as effective mechanisms for encouraging better decision-making. 

Tehranian et al. studied the relationship between long-term performance plans and stockholders’ wealth effects by analyzing 146 divesting firms over the period 1974 to 1982 in the US and suggest that most firms have long-term compensation plans for their executives, defining stock options as part of this compensation. Their results show that there is a more favourable stock market reaction to firms with long-term performance plans around the announcement period, but insignificant negative ARs for announcements of sell-offs by companies without long-term plans. For the latter, the AR for t=-1 is 0.09 per cent and t=0 is –0.24 per cent and the ARs are insignificant at any conventional level.  Investors do not view these divestitures as positive NPV decisions. Tehranian et al.’s (1987) findings imply that managerial compensation plans can motivate managers to make better decisions for their firms.
The percentage of non-executive directors
Non-executive directors normally hold an objective view of their company, as they are not significantly involved in company operation activities, putting them in a good position to act as effective monitors of management divestment activities. In some cases, companies may invite powerful or influential individuals to take non-executive directors’ posts, to enhance market confidence. Investors are likely to believe that a company monitored by an individual of good reputation is going to be monitored well. The board of directors is another important internal mechanism by which firms may reduce agency costs and there are significant relationships between the make-up of the board of directors and the divestiture wealth effect.  

Management may consider only its own interests, and a high percentage of the non-executive directorship is needed to monitor management behaviour and give the company a higher value. Hanson and Song (2000) suggest that independent directors on the board are responsible for monitoring and evaluating management performance, providing advice for management and making decisions on levels of compensation. In fact, the major responsibility of outside directors is to reduce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. When managers divest assets in order to raise capital for general corporate use, outside directors tend to ensure that divestment activities do not harm the interests of shareholders. They argued for employing a  percentage of outside directors on the board as a proxy for the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms, finding that the structure of the board of directors of the selling firm could affect shareholders’ gains. Haynes et al. (2000) also support the idea that board composition can put pressure on management to be more responsive to shareholders’ interests, finding a significant positive relationship between divestment and board composition. Buchholtz et al. (1999) also provide evidence of a relationship between divestitures and outside directors, finding that divestitures are more likely to take place when there is a higher level of outside director stock ownership. They also suggest that management characteristics and governance systems are associated with the divestiture decisions of selling firms. 
Debt
Debt is another corporate governance variable that can reduce managerial interests. Berger and Ofek (1999) examined 107 diversified firms that undertook refocusing without being taken over by another company. They found that 19% of refocusing activities are preceded by financial distress. In other words, this paper supported the idea that financial difficulties in a firm could encourage firms to undertake refocusing. Praet (2008) suggests that one of the reasons for firms to undertake divestitures is that a divested unit’s performance has become a burden on the whole company’s financial performance. Furthermore, Haynes et al. (2000) find a significant positive relationship between divestment and leverage. Higher levels of leverage can encourage sluggish managers to decrease diversification, and debt can minimise management’s chances of undertaking self-interested activities. More recently, Haynes et al. (2005) also find a positive significant relationship between leverage (defined as both debt to total assets ratio and debt to equity ratio) and divestment.  Overall, debt can decrease managerial self-benefiting activities and send positive signals to the investors, which may result in a positive relationship between debt and shareholder wealth in selling companies. However, firms should reduce their debts through divestitures in order to enhance their performance and reduce the chance of bankruptcy.  For example, companies can sell a loss-making unit in order to raise cash and meet debt payments (Sicherman and Pettway, 1987; Denning, 1988; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002). On the whole, debt can motivate managers to voluntarily decrease large amounts of debt in a company. If a firm is carrying a high level of debt, it may not survive. Therefore, it would be sensible to carry a certain amount of debt to motivate managers, but the level of debt must not affect the operation of the firm.

For some mature firms, the most important objective for the owners is to avoid the further decline of the company as it struggles to survive in a very competitive environment. Therefore, the owners are likely to try their best to reduce high debts in order to enhance the company’s comparative advantage and reduce the threat of bankruptcy. In fact, the owners of mature firms are likely to undertake divestitures for reasons of efficiency, including the reduction of high debts by divesting unprofitable units, or any other reasons that benefit the whole company in the long term.
Life Cycle
In recent years, researchers have been trying to use the life cycle framework of marketing companies, such as the product life cycle (Dean, 1950; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Rink and Swan, 1979; Klepper, 1996; Birou et al., 2006). Rink and Swan (1979) state that the product life cycle concept has been in use since 1950. Dean (1950) suggests the concept of pricing on new products. He argues that firms can study the competitive degeneration cycle to help a company make decisions, such as significant causes, speed and degeneration chances. Pricing in the pioneering stage requires planning potential demand, price to sales estimation, customer preferences and product feasibility. The estimation of a range of prices can enhance the product’s attractiveness to buyers. Then, the second stage of the cycle is to make decisions on production and distribution methods and marketing strategy. Companies need to decide how to develop a high price or low price market. Finally, pricing for products that are in the mature stage of the life cycle needs a technique to determine if the product has reached the mature stage. In other words, this research introduces the concept of pricing on a new product that experiences different life paths or stages. Rink and Swan (1979) suggest that the product life cycle means a product’s unit sale curve, starting from the time that a product is introduced to the market until it dies. The evolution of product and market characteristics can help firms to plan and market their products. Generally speaking, the product life cycle can be divided into different stages, including pioneering, development, maturity and decline. Polli and Cook (1969) suggest that the product life cycle has been seen as a verifiable model in marketing literature. They conclude that the product life cycle model is valid in many market circumstances. This useful model can help companies to forecast their sales and plan their marketing. 

The following two studies look at the product life cycle and other factors, such as innovation and competitiveness. Utterback and Abernathy (1975) and Klepper (1996) studied the product life cycle, which is generally defined as the life of a product in a market that goes through different stages of the life cycle. Utterback and Abernathy (1975) suggested that firms in the early life cycle stages are likely to require high innovation and products that can be changed quickly. Companies need to adopt unique strategies in order to meet customer demands. On the other hand, in the later life cycle stages, firms tend to reduce the variety of their products, markets become quite competitive and companies need to adopt the right pricing or cost strategies in order to stay in the market. In another study, Klepper (1996) also focuses on the product life cycle. There are new entries when industries are new, companies can offer new and different products and firms have high innovation opportunities. In the later life cycle stages, firms’ innovation rates decrease and competition is fierce. Therefore, companies need to enhance their production processes in order to stay in the market and compete.   

Then, in a later study, Birou et al. (2006) studied the relationship between product life cycle and strategy. They suggest that product life cycle and strategies can be combined together to achieve better performance and understand more about firms’ competitiveness. Linking strategic planning and life cycle stages can help companies to plan proactively and allocate resources for efficient and strategic use. To sum up, the product life cycle has been used in the past as a good framework for companies to analyse their products, competitors and innovation strategies. The life cycle literature is useful to firms as it can help companies plan their strategies when making business decisions. 

According to Wickham (1998), the life cycle concept suggests that a firm is like a living organism and experiences a growth and development pattern. There are different stages of life: birth, growth, maturity and old age. Lester et al. (2003) suggest that the life cycle describes a development process for a firm’s experience from one stage to another stage through time.  Wickham (1998) suggests that organisations can best be understood by using the life cycle metaphor. “Metaphors also influence the way in which organisation growth and change are seen to take place. Again, such metaphors provide a base for recognising the challenges the organisation faces and the approaches the entrepreneur might take to meet them” (Wickham, 1998, p.265). In other words, the life cycle framework can help companies to a better self-understanding. Filatotchev et al. (2006) suggest that firms in different life cycle stages need to understand their life cycle position in order to enhance their competitive advantages. Overall, there is no doubt that the life cycle framework is very important for companies. 

The life cycle concept is also important for company management. Filatotchev et al. (2006) and Morroni (2009) suggest that there is a relationship between corporate governance and different life cycle stages. Montanari and Adelman (1987) argue that companies experience growth and decline in their life cycle, making it important for managers to recognize when businesses move into different life cycle stages, in order to make strategic plans for the future. Lester et al. (2003) suggest that knowledge of a company’s life cycle stage or position can help firms understand the relationship between the firm’s performance, competitive strategy and life cycle stages. Additionally, Bulmash (1986) suggests that examining the relationship between agency theory and the company life cycle highlights interesting implications for management. The life cycle concept could apply in divestiture areas, such as how this concept influences divestment decisions (Duhaime and Grant, 1984) and business strategy (Anderson and Zeithaml, 1984). In the early stages of the life cycle, the divesting companies tend to undertake strategic divestitures in order to enhance their competitive position. 
The importance of the growth life cycle
Growth rate can be used to measure company life cycle (Huse and Zattoni, 2008). Firms may then be classified into the different stages of the life cycle according to their specific growth rate, which is termed the growth life cycle classification. Indeed, the growth life cycle classification could be a good framework, because growth life cycle classifications can reflect the “real position and stage” of firms as it classifies them according to Tobin’s Q, the growth rate, rather than the SIC code (industry code). The problem of the industry classification is that many four-digit SIC industries could have the same response towards changes in economic conditions although it is generally assumed that each four-digit SIC industry could have different economic attributes (Amit and Livnat, 1988). Industry classification may not be ideal for all companies as different firms have their own individual growth rate. It may not always be reasonable to assume that firms in a specific industry have the same growth rate. Therefore, the growth life cycle classification can highlight the importance of growth rate for each specific firm and enable us to understand the real position of divesting firms in different life cycle stages. 

As this research uses the life cycle as a framework for analysing divestment, it is important to review the earlier and later life cycle stages in the literature. The following section reviews the literature on the classification of divesting firms, life cycle stages and corporate governance, aiming to provide more information for understanding the detailed characteristics of the life cycle.
Classification of divesting companies 
In the UK, Filatotchev et al. (2006) study strategy, corporate governance and the life cycle concurrently. Their study includes a conceptual framework that presents strategy dynamics and corporate governance across the different stages in a firm’s life, such as the founder/IPO threshold (the evolution of a company), the IPO/maturity threshold (the entrepreneurial company matures and goes on to the maturity stage), the maturity/decline threshold (the company becomes more mature and enters the mature/decline stage) and the re-invention threshold (the company tries to reinvent itself in order to overcome the effects of decline). Filatotchev et al.’s theoretical framework and empirical evidence show that a firm’s strategic dynamics are in line with governance changes. Their research covers the logical working of the life cycle.  

Patton (1982) suggests that ratio analysis can help external investors making investment decisions. From the management point of view, Thomas and Evanson (1987) suggest that financial ratio analyses are useful tools for management. Financial ratio analysis can help management to enhance the profitability and efficiency of their companies. The information obtained from ratio analysis, such as trend analysis, can help managers foresee future trends and reduce the chance of business failure. Furthermore, Barnes (1987) suggests that there are different uses for financial ratios, the first of which is to help evaluate business performance. Secondly, it can evaluate the managerial success of the company. Thirdly, it can help to assess if a company has the ability to pay its debts.  Patton (1982) suggests that the liquidity ratio can be used in a business contract. For instance, if the current ratio drops below two, debts need to be paid without delay. Reuters (2005) suggests that through analyzing liquidity ratio, the reader can understand if a company has liquidity problems, such as increased production but limited cash. Generally, the financial ratio can act as a useful tool for providing guidelines for financial planning and analysis, including interpreting corporate strategic decisions: mergers, consolidation, etc. (Gentry et al., 1987).

This research uses factor and cluster analysis as the main methodologies for classifying UK companies into the different life cycle stages. Chapter Three presents these methodologies and the reasons for their use. Ketchen and Shook (1996) suggest that, since the late 1970s, the application of cluster analysis has been used in strategic management research in order to examine issues of central importance. Harrigan (1985) suggests that cluster analysis has generally referred to different algorithms used to group entities. The application of cluster analysis was becoming popular in the 1980s and this may be related to the increased emphasis on developing knowledge by complicated statistical analysis of large data sets (Ketchen and Shook, 1996). On the whole, cluster analysis is a good statistical method for narrowing down large data sets. For example, Birley and Westhead (1990) have used cluster analysis for classifying their 249 small companies into clusters of companies with similar characteristics. Woo and Cooper (1981) also applied cluster analysis in their research. Different businesses are classified into different clusters based on their market, industry and product characteristics. Hambrick (1983) uses both factor and cluster analysis in his research. Factor analysis reduces the range of environmental variables to 10 environmental factors. Then, he needs to identify common characteristics of industrial-product environments and believes cluster analysis is the most appropriate for this identification as it can help researchers to identify similar objects. Eight clusters were obtained. In other words, both factor and cluster analysis can help researchers to reduce the number of variables and then study further the reasons for selected factors and clusters.  
Life cycle, agency problem and corporate governance 
The assumption is that traditional agency theory can be applied to any life cycle stage, but in reality, this theory may not be applicable. Morroni (2009) suggests the question “should companies be managed the same way when firms experience different life cycle stages? Or should there be different corporate governance systems for firms across the life cycle?” Filatotchev et al. (2006) reject the idea of a universal governance template. In reality, as the business world changes rapidly, different firms (in different life cycle stages) need to adapt to the changing environment by using an appropriate corporate governance system, built on an understanding of their life cycle positions and with the aim of enhancing their competitive advantages. Huse and Zattoni (2008) studied the relationship between board behaviour and company life cycle, including birth, development and crisis stages for small companies. They selected three small Norwegian firms from different life cycle stages. One of the researchers was a participant observer and they collected data through interviews, field notes and board reports. In Norway, it is traditional that small firms have boards. One of the propositions that they made was that there was a relationship between life cycle stages and the board of directors. They suggested that the company life cycle was very useful for understanding the boards and that future research could test their hypothesis in order to validate their argument. Large firms may have institutional power. They raised the question of whether their study could apply to other and larger companies. 

Earlier life cycle stages
In the earlier stages of their life cycle, firms are fast-growing and innovative. Generally, young firms are likely to be in better financial positions. Stinchcombe (1965) suggests that there are liabilities connected with new companies, with higher failure risks for young firms compared with older ones. In other words, death rates are comparatively higher for young companies. However, Bruderl and Schussler (1990) challenge this argument, suggesting that there are low death risks in the early phase of the life cycle. The reason for this is that decision makers are able to monitor company performance and postpone judgement on failure or success. They can rely on the stock of initial resources. However, in the later phase of the life cycle, initial monitoring of company performance is complete and firms are subject to the usual risks of failure. This author supports the findings of Bruderl and Schussler’s (1990) study. Generally speaking, younger companies are likely to hold a better status in the life cycle compared with older firms. Wickham (1998) suggested that young firms are energetic. Additionally, Strebel (1987) mentioned that the tendency of mainstream organization is ‘organic’ during the development stage and ‘competitive’ during the growth stage. He also suggested that companies in these stages have a low resistance to new ideas. Furthermore, Hamermesh and Silk (1979) suggested that there are more innovation and growth opportunities for high-growth units than those growing slowly. Young firms have low agency problems (Mueller, 1972). Young firms must struggle to grow and to compete with their rivals in the earlier life cycle stages, when growth is the most important factor and there are more venture opportunities (Mueller, 1972). Therefore, in the earlier life cycle stages, companies tend to be energetic and challenging with a lot of growth opportunities. 
Managers and divestment in the earlier life cycle stages
Young firms have to struggle to grow and compete with their rivals in the earlier life cycle stages. It is then that growth is the most important factor and there are a lot of venture opportunities for young firms. Therefore, the managers and owners need to work together in order to enhance their chances of survival. Mueller (1972) suggests that agency problems are likely to be low for companies in the early stage of the life cycle, as shareholders and managers have a common interest, with both trying to secure sufficient capital for company growth. Strong corporate governance is not necessary to monitor management. The company’s survival could be the main objective for a young firm, and undoubtedly, if a young firm has fewer agency problems, it also has a higher chance of success in the market. Huse and Zattoni (2008) mention that the board can act in an advisory role in the early life cycle stage. Morroni (2009) suggests that the governance system for young companies is co-operation. At the early stage of the life cycle, firms face different problems, such as uncertainty and financing, as it is difficult to evaluate intangible assets and business concepts for young firms. Generally speaking, young firms may not able to provide a good and stable record of earnings and financial stability. Managers act in innovator roles in order to help firms obtain marketing and technology opportunities. Entrepreneurs and investors have highly specific skills, experience and knowledge, and need to work with managers in order to share information. They all need to have close connections and assist the growth of firm and then enhance the firm’s value through active participation. Relationships between managers, entrepreneurs and investors are based on co-operation, assistance and knowledge-sharing. This co-operative governance can enhance a company’s long-term performance. 

Filatotchev (2006) supports this view, arguing that a low monitoring role is needed for younger firms. Buchholtz et al. (1999) maintain that from the management viewpoint, managers are more responsible for divestitures in the proactive context rather than in the decline context, as proactive divestitures present fewer psychological problems. Such divestitures are undertaken for positive, strategic reasons, both for the divesting company and the divisions being sold, so management does not feel protective towards them. Indeed, divestiture is one of the important means by which to increase the survival and development chances for young firms. At these stages, both the managers and owners are likely to achieve good strategy divestitures (Montgomery et al., 1984) in order to benefit the whole company as these divestments would increase the growth chances of the firm. Young firms are likely to undertake divestitures because of good company strategy, so the market would perceive a better value for the divesting companies. This could result in positive value for young divesting firms. Managers are less likely to have a defensive response to these divestitures, as they are motivated by good strategy, making the managers more responsive to the sell-offs. These “strategic” reasons for sell-offs could reduce arguments regarding lost company efficiency, making divestitures more acceptable to companies. Overall, these managerial divestiture decisions for young firms are likely to be consistent with shareholders’ interests.       
Market reaction to young firms in the earlier life cycle stages
Having reviewed the literature on the life cycle, corporate governance and divestitures, the next step is to consider the question, “What is the relationship between the stock market reaction to divestment and life cycle stages?” While most of the empirical studies on the topic of divestitures suggests that there is a significant increase in shareholder wealth for the seller during the divestitures announcement period (Miles and Rosenfield, 1983; Alexander et al., 1984; Montgomery et al., 1984; Rosenfeld, 1984; Jain, 1985; Klein, 1986; Tehranian et al., 1987; Afshar et al., 1992; John and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1995; Weston et al., 1998; Hanson and Song, 2000; Boone and Mulherin, 2001; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001; Bates, 2005), this section’s literature reviews the shareholder wealth effects of divesting companies in more detail, using the life cycle framework, and also seeks to determine whether positive share price performance exists in divesting firms across the different life cycle stages.

Young firms are likely to have a good financial performance status. In other words, young firms are likely to be in a better competitive position to find the right buyer and bargain for the “ideal” price. As with Mueller’s (1972) suggestion, young firms are likely to have low agency problems. Tehranian et al. (1987) suggest that some divestiture researchers see sell-offs as activities that coincide with stockholders’ interests and positive shareholder wealth, as they result from the reallocation of assets and other efficiencies, for example, performance improvement through increasing focus (John and Ofek, 1995) and the improvement of management and future performance (Afshar et al., 1992). Furthermore, Hite et al. (1987) and Klein (1986) also maintain that by reallocating assets to better use, a company can enhance efficiency and see resulting gains. In other words, research indicates that both managers and shareholders have similar divestiture determinants (such as efficient use of assets) and these lead to an increase in shareholder wealth for divestors. 

Lang et al. (1995); Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) and Bates (2005) support this view, finding significant positive ARs for divesting firms with low agency problems. Lang et al. (1995) suggest that the market tends to have a positive stock market reaction to divestitures not involving agency problems. Studying a sample of 93 US voluntary divestitures from 1984 to 1989, they find positive CARs (+3.92%) during the (-1,0) event window for companies with no or low agency problems. Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) also find positive CARs (+1.7%) during the (-1,0) event window for divesting companies with non-agency motives behind divestitures (e.g. increasing focus or operational reasons). Moreover, Bates (2005) finds the average three-day CAR to be +1.6% where there are no or low agency problems, such as announcing the distribution of divestiture proceeds to clearing debt.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Buchholtz et al. (1999) suggest that organizational stability and growth (positive performance context) can motivate firms to undertake “proactive” divestitures. Montgomery et al. (1984) examined 78 US divestiture announcements from 1976 to 1979 and found a significant positive cumulative abnormal return, +0.34531 (p value < 0.001), for proactive divestments.  Generally, a young firm is likely to be in a better financial position. Generally speaking, younger companies are likely to hold a better status in the life cycle compared with older firms. Young firms have more development potential, which helps them achieve a relatively better position.  

Wang (2000) suggests that a financially strong company can obtain higher abnormal returns through divestiture, as a financially healthy company is more able to negotiate the sale of its assets.  In other words, financial strength can put a company in a better position when making divestiture decisions. Hearth and Zaima (1984) find that the stronger a divesting firm’s financial position, the larger the positive excess returns around the divestiture announcement period. There are +0.578 cumulative average residuals (significant at the 5% level) for selling companies with good financial status (e.g. financially healthy firms – Standard and Poor’s ranking is A+, A, or A-). 

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, although traditional literature suggests that there are positive abnormal returns for divesting firms on the announcement day, reviewing the literature in this section can provide a detailed picture of further reasons why firms in the earlier life cycle stage could be viewed with  confidence by the market. Overall, literature from this section indicates that the young status of the firm, a good financial position, strategic divestitures and low agency problems could result in a positive stock market reaction for these firms in the early life cycle stage, on the announcement day. 
Later life cycle stages
Older firms are quieter and more sluggish (Wickham, 1998). Additionally, Strebel (1987) suggests that the tendency of mainstream organization is ‘mechanical’ during the maturity stage and ‘bureaucratic’ during the decline stage. Companies in these latter stages are highly resistant to new ideas. Mature firms in the declining stage have significant difficulty in organizing innovation due to the competitive pressure for cost reduction and the bureaucratic tendencies of its company structure.   

Competition is generally intense in mature/declining markets (Hamermesh and Silk, 1979). McKiernan (1992) also mentions that competition could be intense in the decline phase because companies compete for an increasing share of a limited market. The exit barriers for firms in the declining stage are associated with the unwanted specialized assets that limit a business’s strategic flexibility. These assets are likely be divested to rivals who want to stay in the industry. Harrigan and Porter (1983) suggest that there are important relationships between competitive position and company strategy, including divestment decisions, for firms in the decline stage. Companies divest early when they have no outstanding strengths. Gibbs (1993) argues that mature/declining companies are likely to have limited investment opportunities. Porter (1980) suggests that when a company reaches the mature stage, it uses competitive strategies to enhance company performance. In the later stages of the life cycle, it is very important for mature firms to avoid competitive disadvantage and further decline. 
Managers and divestment in the later life cycle stages
Morroni (2009) suggests that in the later life cycle stage, managers tend to undertake inefficient choices for companies because larger sized firms increase bureaucracy. Mueller’s further studies (1969) argue that non-pecuniary rewards for managers, such as status and power, are directly related to company size and growth, but not to company profitability. Compared with pecuniary factors, non-pecuniary factors have a greater influence on the utility functions of senior management and, in the later life cycle stages, the interests of company owners and managers are likely to differ. Mueller (1972) suggests that as the firm expands and matures over time, the managers tend to achieve their own growth-maximization objectives, causing conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.  Managers tend to increase the size of the mature firms, so they are not likely to undertake divestitures unless these could benefit their own self-interests. When companies mature, survival and growth, so important in the earlier life cycle stages, are no longer the most important objectives. Instead, the managers’ own benefits become their most important objectives. No matter which units they sell, the managers of mature firms are likely to put their own benefits first when making divestiture decisions. Overall, managers may want more individual benefits, such as good reputations, so are perhaps more likely to over-diversify in order to achieve this. Over-diversification may not be in line with the interests of the owners and indeed may result in poor financial performance for the whole company. 

Lang et al. (1995) take as their starting point the view that managers value the size and control of their company, and are unlikely to undertake divestitures for reasons of efficiency. They undertake divestitures in their own interests rather than those of the shareholders (which are more likely to be for reasons of efficiency, like selling assets to another firm that can better operate them). The motivation of these managers to undertake divestitures is to raise funds to finance other investments in order to achieve their own objectives when alternative sources of finance, such as capital markets, are too expensive, possibly because their company has high leverage and/or poor performance.  Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) support this view by suggesting that the divestiture process is influenced by the presence of agency costs of managerial discretion. The management of the divesting company can use its own discretion, channelling divestiture proceeds to achieve its own objectives.  Bates (2005) also suggests that managers are likely to retain and redirect divestiture proceeds into projects that can provide benefits for them rather than the shareholders.

In some situations, when a company has high leverage, managers can reduce this or return divestiture proceeds to the shareholders, but because of the rising agency problems of mature/declining firms, managers can use divestitures as a way of raising cash for their own investment purposes (Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001; Bates, 2005). Gibbs (1993) adds that the main conflict between managers and shareholders is the choice between retaining or paying out earnings. Retention of earnings can allow managers to avoid being monitored by the stock market and can also motivate them to make their own investments. 

Harrigan and Porter (1983) and Buchholtz et al. (1999) support the idea that for declining firms, managements’ emotional attachments and commitments to company units, pride in their past accomplishments and fear for the future can make them unwilling to take decisions on divestiture. However, management may delay a divestment, even after performance problems have been discovered, because of the existence of psychological barriers. These authors argue that in some circumstances, managers of declining firms are not willing to undertake divestitures as they fear losing job security, organizational status and opportunities for promotion. Managers in this position may maintain that a company’s poor performance is cyclical (not permanent) and results from a lack of adequate resource allocations. Bergh (1995) also mentions that managers undertake divestitures in order to protect their job security and provide more funds for their own investments. 
 
 In order to minimise high agency problems in declining firms, corporate governance needs to take appropriate action to recover the company and give more consideration to the shareholders’ interests. Indeed, when firms reach the mature stage of the life cycle, there are not too many opportunities for further growth. The mature market is very competitive and nearly all firms struggle to avoid further decline and to survive. If the performance of companies is in continuous decline, they are likely to face bankruptcy in the future. Schofield and Arnold (1988) suggest that managers need to reduce the chance of decline even though they face challenges of maintaining market share in the maturity stage. Hoffman (1989) suggests that management could have a two-stage plan to reverse decline. Firstly, managers could adopt a short-term strategy by generating a positive cash flow within a few months. Secondly, they could develop a long-term strategy in order to reposition the company. Huse and Zattoni (2008) mention that the board can act in a control role in the later life cycle stage. Morroni (2009) argues that a governance system acts as persuasion for management to avoid discretionary activity in large firms in the later life cycle stages. Managerial correction can be controlled, monitored and disciplined by the board of directors so that they work for the interests of shareholders. They also suggest that investors can act as controls in monitoring managers’ decisions. They can assess whether managers have tried their best to maximise shareholder value. Institutional investors, such as pension funds, may help to reduce managerial discretion activity and assess firms’ value.

In addition, Schendel et al. (1976) mention that there are important relationships between managerial behaviour and the successful performance of the company. The managers should take appropriate management action in order to ensure efficient operation. If the company is managed well, the competitive advantages of the mature firm could be greatly enhanced. Furthermore, as the owners are much more concerned about long-term survival for the whole company, they tend to use corporate governance (such as the corporate governance variable mentioned in the previous section) as a way to monitor managerial divestitures (managers who undertake divestitures in their own self-interest). They look to turnaround and recover the company by divesting unwanted divisions in order to restructure mature/declining firms and increase their survival chances. To sum up this section, at the later life cycle stages, managers are not likely to divest units unless there are benefits available for them. Managers might avoid good divestitures that benefit the interests of the whole company. However, the owners are likely to undertake good divestitures, including restructuring divestitures, in order to save the company and benefit the whole firm. There are conflicts of interest between managers and owners when they undertake divestiture decisions and agency problems are high. Therefore, corporate governance acts as an important control system to discipline managerial divestitures. 
Stock market reaction to mature firms in the later life cycle stages
When firms reach the later life cycle stages, they are likely to experience poorer financial status. A firm’s poor financial performance can motivate the company to undertake divestitures, as suggested by Sudarsanam (1995). Hamilton and Chow (1993) and Schlingemann et al. (2000) suggest that when companies are in a poor financial position and their performance is low relative to that of their competitors, the shortage of capital motivates firms to divest. Duhaime and Grant (1984) support the view that low financial strength (return on equity, debt/equity ratio, dividends paid as a percentage of earnings) can motivate firms to undertake divestitures. One of the possible reasons that firms in financial distress undertake divestitures is to reduce their leverage and financial instability. For example, firms in financial distress (severe liquidity problems, including bankruptcies or near bankruptcies (Montgomery et al., 1984; Johnson, 1996)), tend to have difficulties raising external capital, and may sell a loss-making division in order to raise cash and meet debt payments (Sicherman and Pettway, 1987; Denning, 1988; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002). In other words, divestitures can help firms resolve urgent financial problems.  

In this mature environment, divestment is an appropriate strategy for these firms (Harrigan and Porter, 1983; Hax and Majluf, 1984). Voluntary divestiture is a crucial strategy of portfolio readjustment and can be used by companies in the mature or decline stage to maintain status. Making the right decision on divestiture could turn around the whole situation and recover a company’s status. Sudarsanam (1995) suggests that the proceeds of divestiture can quickly reduce problems of financial distress, by investing more profitably in other divisions. Hamilton and Chow (1993) also support this view, arguing that a firm’s ability to convert unattractive assets into liquid form can strengthen the balance sheet, and the sale’s proceeds can be reinvested in new areas. Hearth and Zaima (1986) also maintain that divestitures can reduce the complexity of operations and enhance managerial efficiency. The selling company can use the financial and managerial resources provided by divestitures to enhance investment in other company divisions, which can then obtain higher returns as a result of the increase in investment. In this way, the overall value of the company can be enhanced. 
Montgomery et al. (1984) suggest that divestitures motivated by a firm’s poor financial situation can send a good signal to the market, as the divestiture may turn the company around. Afshar et al. (1992) argue that the market tends to have a good view of “performance improvement” divestitures undertaken by a financially weak company, as a sign of the company’s willingness to take decisive action to enhance future performance. Positive stock market reaction to these divestitures results in financial gain for shareholders. Lang et al. (1995) suggest that when the divesting company has high leverage, the market will have significant positive abnormal returns for the divestitures that pay out proceeds to creditors and shareholders. Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) also maintain that there are significant positive abnormal returns for divestitures that pay out proceeds to shareholders or use them to reduce leverage and that the market can react more positively to mature/declining firms divesting large units, as this can send a “restructuring” signal to the market. Hearth and Zaima (1984), Klein (1986), Afshar et al. (1992) and Wang (2000) suggest that the greater the divestment, the bigger the impact on the increase in shareholder wealth. By contrast, Montgomery et al. (1984) examined 78 US divestiture announcements and suggest that there is a significant negative cumulative abnormal return, -0.9125 (p value=0.07) for non-proactive divestments (e.g. divestiture without defined strategic objectives), indicating that investors welcome turnaround rather than non-strategic divestitures. McKiernan (1992) suggests that mature firms should use the appropriate strategies in order to achieve higher rates of return. Indeed, if mature companies could use the appropriate strategy and view decline as an opportunity rather than a problem, these firms are likely to gain high market rewards (Harrigan and Porter, 1983). To sum up this section, stock markets and investors welcome restructuring divestitures that reduce agency problems. There are positive stock market reactions to divestitures of mature/declining firms.   
2.3	Summary
This chapter has provided a detailed review of the relationship between diversification discounts, divestment activity, agency problems, corporate governance and the market’s reaction to divestitures across the life cycle. The literature review afforded the opportunity to gain further understanding of divestitures and subsequent chapters developed from this literature review aim to address the lack of growth and concentration ratio issues. Overall, most of the empirical studies on divestiture suggest that there is a significant increase in shareholder wealth of the divesting companies around the divestitures announcement period. This indicates that divestment can send optimistic signals to investors and that the market welcomes most news of divestment. This chapter has undertaken a detailed review of the literature concerning the three main research areas, including divestment, corporate governance and life cycle.  Firstly, the literature about diversification discounts and divestment was reviewed. Secondly, the relationship between different corporate governance variables and divestitures was discussed; for example, the conflicts of interest between managers and owners and the impact of corporate governance on management. Thirdly, the market reaction to different divestiture firms in different life cycle stages was discussed, together with a review of the literature concerning market reaction to young companies in the earlier life cycle stages and mature companies in the later life cycle stages.


Chapter 3:	 Empirical results of factor and cluster analysis 
3.1	Objectives and Structure

The objective of this research is to improve on previous studies by incorporating the important growth factor. By adding “growth” (sales revenue and Tobin’s Q) and “concentration ratio” variables into the factor and cluster analysis, a more comprehensive and accurate result may be obtained. In this chapter, the classification of a sample of divesting firms has been examined using factor and cluster methodology and has enhanced the work of previous research by focusing on the analysis of more variables. This research aims to extend the work done previously by including growth and industrial concentration to enable a better understanding of divestment and its relationship to the life cycle. Furthermore, this research analyses different financial characteristics of divesting firms to see if they have low or high agency problems. In other words, this research studies the relationship between financial characteristics and the agency problem. The reason for this analysis is to provide an additional breakdown to help the reader understand more about divesting firms from the point of view of agency problems. 

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 shows data and methodology, and the data source, sample criteria and detailed methodology are presented. This section hopes to provide the reader with a greater understanding of the sample and methodology of this research, thereby improving overall insight into the research as a whole.  Section 3.3 shows an improved research method, in which the “growth” variable is added into the equation.  This section will discuss how the author’s empirical results are an improvement on previous research. Results of the factor and cluster analyses will also be presented in this section. Section 3.4 will conclude all the findings. A brief summary of this chapter will be provided. 
3.2	Data and Methodology
Data Sources
Basic divestiture information, the names of the divesting companies and the divestitures announcement price (the announcement price of the divested segment) were obtained from the “UK divestment” section of Acquisitions Monthly from 1996 to 2000. The announcement date of divestments from Acquisitions Monthly is defined as day 0. This publication also contains short descriptions of the divestitures. The Financial Times CD ROM 1996 to 2000 also contains more detailed divestitures information, which is used for the industry analysis in Chapter Four. 










Initial divestitures sample from Acquisitions Monthly	1625
MINUS :	 
Firms not in the Datastream "Top 500 companies" List	944
Financial firms	98
Property firms	7
Multi-divestment, mergers and acquisitions within (-40,+40) days	189
Multi-divestment on the same day	18
Multi-announcement effects for both (-60,-40) and  (+40,+60) event periods 	49
Companies without financial information	20
 	 





Table 3.1, above, shows the sample companies used in this thesis. Initially, 1625 divesting companies were selected from Acquisitions Monthly.  The aim of this research is to analyse large listed UK companies, such as the top 500 UK companies, so all the initial divestiture companies were checked on the Datastream top 500 list. The Datastream top 500 list is ranked according to market value. All the UK listed companies with the Datastream code were ranked according to their market value. 

The reason for analyzing large companies is that they have a more significant impact on the stock market. Analysis of these companies gives an insight into most divesting companies, for example, how firms react on announcement day. Various researchers have analysed the top 500 companies (Ramsay and Stapledon, 2001; Tomasic and Bottomley, 1991). In the UK, top companies have more analysis value to investors. FTSE 100 firms are comprised of the 100 shares that are ranked highest by market capitalization and these firms generally represent the majority of market capitalisation of the London stock exchange in the UK. In 2008, the FTSE 100 represented about 84.95% of FTSE all share and FTSE small cap represents only about 2.74% of FTSE all share (FTSE All Share index series weightings, 2008). In other words, large companies represent a significant role in the stock market and can draw greater attention from investors. The commercial value of these company analyses is also greater.  

My thesis aims to analyse the top 500 firms in order to provide an analysis for large investors, fund managers and researchers who can draw important implications from my research. For example, investors can gain a better understanding of the detailed relationship between the life cycle and the significant players in the stock market. My thesis can also provide both research and commercial value. Also, since the top 500 companies have a greater impact on the stock market, the analysis of these large firms can provide a better insight into the stock market as they are significant players. In addition, it is easier for the researcher to gain access to public financial information for these top firms, by means of newspaper and expert analysis, enabling analysis from different points of view as more information is available. 

It may be argued that this thesis does not focus on analysing smaller firms in the stock market. However, as these small companies have only a limited impact, their inclusion has less research value and financial value for investors. Because small companies are minor players in the market as a whole, investors and market and financial analysts tend to pay them relatively little attention. There is less likelihood of obtaining adequate market or public information for these firms so their inclusion is likely to result in more deletions of the divesting sample due to the limited information available. Future research is recommended on the analysis of small firms.   

Most of the top 500 firms are in the expansion and mature life cycle stage as these firms are quite big and mature. Generally speaking, pioneering firms are very new to the market, and it is unlikely for a very young pioneering firm to become one of the top 500 companies immediately. It takes time for very young firms to grow in the life cycle. Therefore, this research ignores the pioneering firms because the top 500 values, which are in the expansion and mature stage, provide more research value and information to investors.

If the initial divestiture companies did not appear in the Datastream top 500 list, they were deleted; hence 944 companies were deleted. In other words, all the remaining divesting companies in this study are from the top 500 UK firms. Thereafter, 98 financial firms and 7 property firms were deleted from the initial divestiture companies. Divesting companies should not be financial and property companies. This may be due to the financial characteristics of these industries, which are different from the industry characteristics of the remaining companies in this research. In addition, 189 divestiture firms were deleted for multi-divestment, mergers and acquisition within (-40, +40) days. Eighteen firms were deleted for multi-divestment on the same day. 49 divestiture firms were deleted for multi-divestment, mergers and acquisition for both (-60,-40) and (+40, +60) event periods. These had to be deleted, as the multi-announcement effect could alter the market reaction on the announcement day. A further 20 companies were deleted from the initial divestitures sample as financial information could not be obtained. There are 300 companies remaining and these are used in section 3.3. 

Figure 3‑1 Privatised firms and total number of firms

The author’s research checked the research sample with firms’ corporate governance aspects. Three hundred companies were checked with corporate governance information and 43 were without corporate governance information. In other words, 257 firms remained for this research. The author checked with 257 firms in order to see how many firms were privatised and if there was any relationship between privatised firms and corporate governance. Of the 257 companies, 41 are privatised. In other words, 15.95% of the divestitures sample. Figure 3‑1 shows that the mean of the total block shareholders’ ownership, managerial ownership and percentage of non-executive directors are similar for both privatised firms and total number of firms. Regarding debt, the mean for privatised firms is lower than the mean for the total number of firms.  Newbery and Pollitt (1997) suggest that de-regulation shows an improvement in productivity and an efficiency gain for firms, as competition replaces regulation of firms. This suggests that after privatisation companies could show an improvement, thereby lowering the debt level of the firm. This could explain why privatised companies have a relatively lower level of debt than that of the total number of companies. However, as most of the privatised firms in the research sample undertook privatisation in the 1980s and this research examines divestitures from 1996 to 2000, privatised firms did not seem to have any important impact on the rest of the sample.
Factor analysis
Factor analysis is a statistical data reduction skill which can help explain variability between observed variables in terms of fewer factors. Factor analysis is widely used where the management of large data sets is required, including marketing and product management. Furthermore, factor analysis is also used in the social sciences and psychology. For example, in psychology, factor analysis can be used in questionnaires or tests (Kline, 1994). Gorsuch (1983) suggests that factor analysis is a very useful tool for summarizing the interrelationship between variables in an accurate and concise way.

The advantages of factor analysis are its ease of use, flexibility in naming the factors and reducing the number of variables. This research uses factor analysis as a way of reducing the different financial variables into main factors. The reason for using factor analysis is that it can help reduce the number of variables. This research investigates a series of financial variables. By using factor analysis, the list can be narrowed down to the main factors and the researcher can make an appropriate analysis based on these.  
Cluster analysis 
Cluster analysis can be used for classifying multivariate data into different subgroups (Everitt et al., 2001), enabling the detection of groupings in the data. Researchers using cluster analysis try to classify a set of objects into groups or categories. Romesburg (2004) suggests that cluster analysis is widely used in a variety of research areas, as it is very useful for determining clusters of similar objects. One example is ecologists’ use of cluster analysis to group similar objects in a forest. In medicine, cluster analysis can be used as a means of grouping diseases with similar patterns. In the market, cluster analysis can be used to classify products that the public perceives as similar. Romesburg (2004) suggests that cluster analysis is very helpful in studying market segment and target markets, developing different products and positioning products. In all these areas, cluster analysis can be used to group objects with similar characteristics. Overall, cluster analysis is widely used in the market, and this tool can help researchers to classify different companies in order to enhance understanding of the relationships between these samples. This research uses cluster analysis as the most appropriate method for classifying different divestment companies into their life cycle stages. When a large number of divestment companies appear in the author’s research sample, cluster analysis (in computing packages such as STATA and SPSS) helps to put similar divestment companies into their different life cycle groups efficiently.  For a more technical discussion of cluster analysis, please refer to the later part of this chapter.  
3.3	Research results (Including growth and concentration ratio variables)
Introduction
This aim of this section is to improve on previous research by focusing on arguably the most important factor in the life cycle – growth. Wickham (1998) suggests that the life cycle concept can be applied to a firm as it experiences a growth and development pattern (birth, growth, maturity and decline) just like any living organism. Such a concept has been widely used by management consultancies to provide professional advice to help their clients grow.  It appears that Arthur D Little, the world’s first consultant firm with offices in 30 countries worldwide, provides professional advice to its clients in respect of where they are in terms of the growth life cycle. This suggests that the growth of life cycle methodology is a good tool to analyse the characteristics of different companies.





 Definition of Tobin’s Q and additional variables 
Table 3.2 The definition of financial variables
Market power	1	concentration ratio (CONCENT5)	total sales for “top five” companies
 	 	 	      total sales for the industry
 	2	Market share (MSHR)	total sales for a company	 
 	 	 	total sales for the industry
 	3	Lerner index(LERN)	Sales- operating expenses
 	 	 	           Sales		 
 	4	Excess market value (EXCMV)	 
			Market value of equity-Book value of equity		 




		Revenue growth (5 years) (G5)			 
 	6	Tobin’s Q (TOBIN)	mv + preference shares + total debt	 
 	 	 	 Total assets employed by company	 
Liquidity	7	Quick ratio (QUICK)	Current assets-inventory	 
 	 	 	      current liabilities	 
 	8	Current ratio (CURR)	Current assets	 
 	 	 	Current liabilities	 
 	9	Redundant cash measure (REDCA)	(cash+marketable securities-Borrowed
 	 	 	      Money-6% of all noncash assets   )






Leverage	10	Interest-bearing debts measure	Interest bearing debts
 	 	(INBEAR)	        Total assets	 
 	11	Debt to equity (TOTDET)	Total debt		 
 	 	 	Total equity	 
 	12	Degree of financial leverage	  Earnings before interest and tax
 	 	(DFL)	Earnings before interest and tax- Interest
			
Dividend payment	13	Dividend payout (DIV)		
 	 	 	
 	14	Dividend yield (DYIEL)	DY code from Datastream
Profitability	15	Operating return on total assets	Earnings before interest and taxes
 	 	(EBITA)	                Total assets	 
 	16	Net profit margin (NPROM)	Net income before extraordinary items
 	 	 	                  Sales		 
 	17	Return on net worth (RONW)	Net income before extraordinary items
 	 	 	             Book value of equity	 
Sales	18	Total asset turnover (SALES)	 Sales  		 
Generating	 	 	Total assets	 






In Table 3.2, the reason for applying these financial variables in this research is that they are the main variables for measuring the financial performance of divesting companies. Tobin’s Q has been redefined in this author’s study as a variable to measure growth. This author’s research emphasises the importance of growth in the life cycle and uses growth as the main means of classifying the growth stage of divesting firms. The analysis of financial variables can also provide additional analysis for understanding the agency problems of divesting companies, such as high or low agency problems in divesting firms. Then, the question would be asked: why do we need to analyse these financial variables to interpret agency problems? While agency problems have a significant impact on a firm’s performance, it is worthwhile noting the agency reason behind a firm’s divestitures. For example, do the financial variables reflect the agency problem of the divesting firm? By understanding this agency problem, the reader can have a more in-depth analysis for understanding company characteristics. Detailed explanations of how these financial variables help in classifying firms’ agency problems are presented in Figure 3‑4 to Figure 3‑10. 

Market share, the Lerner index, and excess market value are used as market power variables. For example, the market share variable shows the competitive strength of a firm in the market. Through analysis of the market share, the reader can determine whether a company has a large or small portion of the total market, and the competitiveness of a firm can be analysed. Therefore, market power variables are good ratios for understanding the power of a company in the market. Furthermore, market power provides information about companies in the market and this could relate to the agency problems of divesting firms. The high or low market power of a firm may provide an opportunity for managers to increase or decrease the agency problem. 

Furthermore, the quick ratio, current ratio and redundant cash measures are used for measuring the liquidity ratios of divesting firms. Liquidity ratios are useful for understanding a firm’s liquid resources. For example, the current ratio measures whether a firm has the ability to meet its short-term obligations. The quick ratio also shows a firm’s ability to use quick assets to meet current liabilities. Through analysis of these ratios, a company’s liquidity position can be analysed. Furthermore, there could be a relationship between agency problems and divesting firms, such as how management manages the liquid resources of divesting firms at different growth stages. Therefore, it would be worthwhile considering the liquidity ratios in detail.

Additionally, the interest-bearing debt variable, the debt-to-equity variable and the degree of financial leverage are used to measure debt. The interest-bearing debt ratio is calculated by dividing interest bearing debt by total assets. The degree of financial leverage ratio is calculated by: dividing earnings before interest and tax by earnings before interest and tax minus interest. The debt-to-equity ratio can show whether a company has high or low debts. This ratio can be used to assess the financial health of a firm. Firms with a high debt/equity ratio need to pay careful attention to their financial health. Through analysing different debt ratios, the financial position of a firm can be understood and the debt-to-equity ratio can be a useful ratio for investors to evaluate a firm’s debt position. Furthermore, high or low levels of debt could reflect agency problems in divesting firms. There could be a relationship between debt and management agency problems. Therefore, it is helpful to understand the debt variable across the life cycle. 

Dividend payouts and dividend yield variables are used to measure the dividends of divesting firms. Dividend payout ratios give an insight into a firm’s dividend policy. Companies may choose to pay out dividends or keep the earnings for investment. The dividend payout ratio and dividend yield ratio could be related to life cycle position, for example, early or late life cycle stages. Furthermore, the motives behind management paying dividends could be related to agency problems of divesting companies, therefore dividend variables are important for analysis in this research.

Operating returns on total assets, net profit margins and returns on net worth are used for measuring profitability of divesting firms. The operating return on the total assets ratio is calculated by: earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. Return on net worth shows the efficiency of a company generating profits from equity. Net profit margin can be a useful ratio for investors to assess the profit status of a firm. Firms with a high net profit ratio may show that the firm has good control over its costs. This shows the effectiveness of the firm at converting sales into profit. Understanding the profitability ratios of a firm can help an investor evaluate their investment decisions. Therefore, these profitability ratios are included in this research. 

Total asset turnover and fixed asset turnover are used for measuring generation of sales in divesting firms. Total asset turnover shows how well a firm uses its assets to generate sales. Fixed asset turnover shows how efficiently a firm is using its fixed assets to generate sales. These ratios can show whether firms are getting more efficient in the use of their fixed assets. They can also show that management may use assets that do not benefit the whole company. Management may use assets in a way that does not generate cash flow and can result in a low asset turnover ratio. 

Additionally, two definitions of variables (concentration ratio and revenue growth – 5 years) were added to this author’s research. The definitions of these two variables are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
The first additional variable, concentration ratio (concent5), was added to measure market power. According to Lipczynski et al. (2005), the n-firm concentration ratio () is defined as:
              	  											   

where  is the share of the i’th largest company in the total sales of the industry and n=5. 


Industry concentration is of interest to economists and business strategists as it shows the degree of competition in the market. The reason this thesis includes the industry concentration ratio is to provide the reader with a better understanding of the proportion of relatively big market players in the industry. This can give an idea of the distribution of top firms in the industry. By understanding this industry concentration ratio, investors can understand the competitive power differences between a group of significant large firms and another group of relatively small firms. 
 
Tremblay et al. (2005) discuss the changes in industry concentration of micro-brewers in the brewing market since 1970. In other words, the concentration ratio was used as the key to analysing the rise and fall of micro-brewers in different time periods. Applying their concept, the concentration ratio was used in my thesis to analyse the rise and fall of life cycle effect, of my overall divesting sample firms. The concentration ratio could be changed across different stages of maturity, such as rising in the early life cycle stage and decreasing in the later life    cycle stage. Further discussion is presented.


This research does not examine the percentage of the market controlled by an individual large company. The reason for this is to present an overall picture of market power controlled by large firms. Additionally, three more market power variables, market share, Lerner index and excess market value, are also used in this research in order to measure market power. The aim is to use an objective method for measuring market power by using four different variables. Furthermore, market share is defined as the share of a company in the total sales of the industry. These are obtained from Datastream. All the companies within a relevant industry are summed in order to obtain the total sales of the industry.
The second additional variable, revenue growth (5 years), was added in this research to measure growth.  Damodaran’s definition of sales revenue growth (5 years) is used (Damodaran, 2002).  The formula for the sales revenue growth is: 
     
In this research, revenue growth and Tobin’s Q are used for measuring growth of divesting firms. The revenue growth ratios can help investors or financial analysts to understand how much a firm's sales are increasing or changing over time. Tobin’s Q is used for understanding growth in the different life cycle stages.
The exclusion of other  variables such as company age and R&D intensity variables.
The reason that a company’s age is not included as the main variable in my thesis is that a company’s age does not reflect technical characteristics. Balasubramanian and Lee (2008) studied the relationship between company age and innovation quality and they found that there is a negative relationship between company age and technical quality. It is normally believed a that firm’s efficiency improves with time. This may be a result of learning by doing. However, their studies suggest that company age is negatively related to innovation. In another study, Swanson (2009) gave the example that General Motors has been in existence for many years but news generally reports that this company shows decreasing company performance. It is falling behind relative to its competitors. In other words, there could be no direct relationship between company performance and age. The company age variable does not show any actual accounting, financial or other strategic information about a company. Different companies can experience very different financial situations, regardless of age. The company age variable simply reflects historical information, such as how long the company has been in existence, but it does not contain any important current accounting information or planning and development information. In other words, company age could be a theoretical variable that shows age but does not reflect the company’s operational or financial situation.

One of the examples to support my argument is Google Inc. The initial public offering of Google took place in 2004 but it then became a well-known company world-wide. It has not been in the marketplace for a long time, but has very mature power and the ability to manage the growth of its market and financial position. It made some acquisitions from 2004 onwards, one of which took place in 2006 when Google bought the online video site YouTube for US$ 1.65 billion. Google is very young company, but is already very mature. The growth of acquisition power by Google is equal in maturity to traditional large firms. Google has continuously improved its market share in order to seek long-term growth, and its future growth and development could enhance investor confidence. So in Google’s case, the conclusion is that the actual age of the company does not matter. What does matter is the maturity of the firm, which can be measured by the growth variable.  

A further example to back up my argument is the Microsoft Corporation. The first international office of Microsoft was founded in 1978 and it has become a giant global firm. The best-selling products are Microsoft Office and the Microsoft Windows operating system, both used worldwide. These products have become the most significant products in the computing industry. Microsoft has developed over 20 years, and though in terms of company age it is relatively young compared to traditional large firms, which are often a few hundred years old, in terms of maturity, Microsoft has a great ability to develop growth by product innovation. It has sought to improve the growth potential of its products and these are very successful in the computing industry. In other words, the innovation strategy behind Microsoft is to gain future growth potential in the market. From Microsoft we can learn that it is crucial to analyse a company’s actual maturity rather than its age.

This thesis has found that Tobin’s Q is considered to be a more meaningful variable for classifying company maturity. For example, if companies have a higher growth and development rate, they are likely to be experiencing the early life cycle stage. In other words, Tobin’s Q reflects the actual growth potential of the company and this is more likely to reflect company maturity. This thesis has emphasised the importance of growth potential and considers this a better proxy for measuring a firm’s maturity. Tobin’s Q provides more investment and financial information, meaning company age would not be considered a good variable for inclusion in this thesis.

The reason for excluding the R&D intensity variable in my thesis is as follows:
Krishnan et al. (2009) suggest that it is generally accepted that R&D is one of the strategic ways for companies to create returns on R&D investment. However, some technological firms experience competition from companies that have little or no R&D but gain profits by good marketing innovations from other companies. They also suggest that investment in both marketing and R&D are necessary in order to create better company performance. Investment in R&D alone does not have a positive effect on performance.  In other words, R&D intensity does not   reflect a company’s financial position directly. Profitability, liquidity, debt and market power variables covered in this thesis, are the primary “front line” variables that quickly reflect the company’s financial position. From the point of view of the investor, more attention is paid to the company’s fundamental financial analysis, as this is a direct reflection of the company’s actual financial position in the market. In contrast, the R&D intensity variable is a secondary, “indirect” variable that depends on other company factors, such as its commercialisation scheme and strategy, sales operation and the process of sending financial signals to investors. For example, companies can invest a billion pounds in R&D but get little return or even lose the money invested. In other words, there is no direct relationship between R&D intensity and its return. In general, R&D intensity depends on other company factors, such as company operational management and investment strategy. R&D could be a variable that relies on other company issues and this variable can be changed by the management from time to time, dependent on the strategy they are adopting. Hence, this is not considered a good variable to be included in my thesis.
Normality of the data
The first 16 and last 16 companies of the 300 divestiture firms used in this section were winsorized to reduce the adverse effect of outliers.  Then, all of the financial variables listed in Table 3.4 below were standardized (variable minus mean/standard deviation) with the result that the mean and standard deviation for all these financial variables was 0 and 1 respectively.  The detailed descriptive statistics of these financial variables are shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. 



















































































This study employs the Pearson correlation and Spearman’s rank order correlation to test for multi-collinearity between different independent variables (as shown in Table 3.5 above).  Deletion rules 0.9 and 0.5 are generally used for factor and cluster analysis respectively.  Field (2005) suggests that the correlation coefficient can be used for determining the appropriateness of the factor analysis. The researcher needs to scan the correlation coefficients and delete any variables that have correlation coefficients greater than 0.9. In the cluster analysis, the researcher should delete any variables that have correlation coefficients greater than 0.5. The author’s research needs to undertake first factor analysis and then cluster analysis, using both of the deletion rules (0.9 deletion rules and 0.5 deletion rules) and comparing them in the factor analysis. The reason for using both deletion rules is to test the robustness of the author’s data.
0.9 Deletion Rules
Two variables (LERN and NPROM), which have correlation coefficients higher than 0.9, were identified. LERN is not considered to be a good variable to measure market power and it was subsequently deleted. 
Assumptions
Again, there are a number of assumptions that need to be checked in order to carry out factor analysis:
First, the appropriateness of both the sample size and the number of variables must be ensured. Coakes (2005) suggests that the minimum number of variables for factor analysis is five, while a sample size of 100 is acceptable, but 200 or above is preferable.  The sample size and the number of variables used in this author’s study are 300 and 19 respectively, so the requirements set in Coakes (2005) have been adequately met.












































Measures of Sampling Adequacy (MSA)

According to Pallant (2005), the two main tests to determine the factorability of the matrix are Barlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO).  In this section, the factorability of the matrix can be assumed as the KMO measure is greater than 0.6 and Barlett’s test of sphericity is significant. Fourth, it is necessary to ensure the data is normally distributed.  Since this is not the case with the author’s data a suitable method, the maximum likelihood method of factor analysis, is used for this research.
Preparation Steps
Once all the assumptions have been met, the factor analysis can be carried out by the following steps:
Correlation matrix
According to Field (2005), the computation of a correlation matrix is to determine the appropriateness of the factor analysis. In this research, any variables that have correlation coefficients greater than or equal to 0.9 have been removed. 
Factor extraction




Table 3.8 Total variance explained	
Factor	Initial Eigenvalues	Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings















Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood

Table 3.8 shows the total variances explained by the solution. As shown in Table 3.8, the initial Eigenvalues of the first four factors are above 1. The third and fourth columns in Table 3.8 show the percentage of variance and cumulative percentage respectively.  The cumulative percentage for four possible factors is found to be 67.049%, as shown in Table 3.8.  The first four rows of data are extracted as they have Eigenvalues that are above 1.  The Maximum likelihood method is then used as it is considered to be the most suitable method for a non-normally distributed sample.  The extracted information is shown in the fifth, sixth and seventh columns. The values for these columns are called extraction values (the values are calculated after the extraction of components).  The extracted cumulative percentage for four factors is found to be 56.622%.  Four components are therefore extracted. The eighth, ninth and tenth columns show the rotated value. The cumulative percentage for four factors is found to be 56.622%.


Figure 3‑2 Scree Plot

The above Figure 3‑2 shows the scree plot of factor analysis.  Brace et al. (2003) suggest that the scree plot can be used as an important means to decide how many components need to be extracted. The Eigenvalues are plotted in descending order.  Factors with Eigenvalues above 1 are retained.  As supported by the above Figure 3‑2, four factors are therefore extracted for this thesis.

























Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.




Table 3.9 shows factor loadings after rotation. The strongest loadings which correspond to their respective financial variables have been highlighted. Table 3.9 shows that DYIEL, TOBIN, EXCMV and G5 load strongly to factor 1 whereas DFL and DIV load weakly to factor 1.  The DFL and DIV load is considered to be too weak and is subsequently not analysed in factor 1. The remaining factors (DYIEL, TOBIN, EXCMV and G5) are considered to be related to market power.  Factor 1 is therefore named “market power”.

Secondly, REDCA, CURR and INBEAR load most strongly to factor 2 and these ratios are related to “liquidity”.  Factor 2 is subsequently named “liquidity”. Thirdly, FATO and SALES, which are related to sales generating, load most strongly to factor 3. Therefore, factor 3 is named “sales generating.”  Finally, NPROM and EBITA, which are the profit variables, load most strongly to Factor 4.  Factor 4 is therefore named “profit”. 
0.5 Deletion Rule
In the above Table 3.5, the upper right side shows all the correlation coefficients of Spearman’s correlation and the lower left side shows all the correlation coefficients of Pearson’s correlation. Eight identified variables, which have correlation coefficients higher than 0.5, are subsequently deleted as they are not considered to be the most appropriate variables for measuring their respective factor. The eight variables are LERN, INBEAR, CURR, TOTDET, SALES, DIYET, MSHR, EXCMV. The remaining 11 variables are put into a further analysis in a later section of this research. The reasons for deleting these 8 variables are explained as follows:

There is a high correlation between variable net profit margin NPROM and variable learner index LERN (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.936 and the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.937). Variable LERN is deleted and variable NPROM is retained. There is a high correlation between variable current ratio CURR and variable quick ratio QUICK (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.879 and the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.866). Variable CURR is deleted and variable QUICK is retained for the research sample. The reason for choosing variable QUICK is because the quick ratio is very similar to the current ratio (except that stock is excluded in the current assets).There is a high correlation between variable return on net worth RONW and variable debt to equity TOTDET (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.85 and the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.603). Variable TOTDET is deleted and variable RONW is retained for the research sample. There is a high correlation between variable fixed asset turnover FATO and variable total asset turnover SALES (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.552 and the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.665). While these two variables have a similar definition, this research focuses on understanding the fixed asset turnover, so variable SALES is deleted for this study. There is a high correlation between variable Tobin’s Q TOBIN and variable dividend yield DYIEL (the Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.515 and the Spearman correlation coefficient is -0.542). The variable DYIEL is deleted and the variable TOBIN is retained for the research sample because Tobin’s Q can measure the growth of the divestiture firms and this variable can have an important impact on the “growth” life cycle. There is a high correlation between variable market share MSHR and variable concentration ratio CONCENT5 (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.522 and the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.567). Variable MSHR is deleted and the variable CONCENT5 is retained for the research sample. The variable CONCENT5 is retained because it is important to analyse the concentration for different industries. There is a high correlation between variable excess market value EXCMV and variable Tobin’s Q TOBIN (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.645 and the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.651). Variable EXCMV is deleted for this study and variable TOBIN is retained since TOBIN can help readers to a better understanding of the “growth” factor. There is a high correlation between variable interest-bearing debts INBEAR and variable redundant cash measure REDCA (the Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.834 and the Spearman correlation coefficient is -0.864). Variable INBEAR is deleted and variable REDCA is retained for this study. The “sensitivity” of the financial variables is also examined. For example, if there are high correlations between two variables, deleting either one of the variables would not have a significant impact on the research results.
Assumptions
The first, second and fourth assumptions (as discussed in 0.9 deletion rules section) are considered to be adequately met.  The third assumption is to assess the sample adequacy for each variable by using the anti-image correlation matrix.  The diagonal of the anti-image correlation matrix shows the measures of sampling adequacy (MSA).  Five variables, TOTDET, RONW, CONCENT5, MSHR, were found to have MSA values of lower than 0.5.  These variables, with MSA values below the acceptance level of 0.5, are therefore removed (Field, 2005). After deleting these variables, Table 3.10 below shows all the MSA values that are higher than 0.5.






















Table 3.11 Total variance explained	
Factor	Initial Eigenvalues	Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
















Table 3.11 above shows the total variances explained by the solution. As shown in Table 3.11, the initial Eigenvalues of the first four factors are above 1. The third and fourth column in Table 3.11 shows the percentage of variance and cumulative percentage respectively. The cumulative percentage for four possible factors is found to be 60.207%, as shown in Table 3.11. The first four rows of data are extracted as they have Eigenvalues that are above 1. The Maximum likelihood method was then used as it is considered most suitable for a non-normally distributed sample. The extracted information is shown in the fifth, sixth and seventh columns. The values for these columns are called extraction values (the values are calculated after the extraction of components). The extracted cumulative percentage for four factors is found to be 43.182%. Four components are therefore extracted. The eighth, ninth and tenth columns show the rotated value. The cumulative percentage for four factors is found to be 43.182%.


Figure 3‑3 Scree Plot

The Eigenvalues are plotted in decreasing order. The researcher needs to select factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1 (Brace et al., 2003). Figure 3‑3 shows that four factors are extracted for this research.
Rotation
According to Pallant (2005), the purpose of rotation is to interpret the determined factors in the previous step. The rotation of factors can assist this interpretation process and this does not affect the underlying solution. Pallant (2005) suggests that there are two types of rotation: orthogonal (if there is correlation between one factor and another) and oblique (if there is no correlation between one factor and another). Varimax, Quartimax and Equamax are the commonly used methods in orthogonal rotation, whereas Direct Oblimin and Promax are the commonly used methods in oblique rotation. According to Kinnear and Gray (2004) and Coakes (2005), Varimax, which is one of the most common rotation methods for orthogonal rotation, maintains independence among different factors as the axes are kept at right angles during the rotation. 
Preparation Steps
Once all the assumptions have been met, the factor analysis can be carried out by the following steps:
Correlation matrix
The computation of a correlation matrix is to determine the appropriateness of the factor analysis. In this research, any variables that have correlation coefficients greater than or equal to 0.5 have already been removed.

























Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.







Coakes (2005) and Pallant (2005) suggest that the main purpose of factor extraction is to determine the smallest number of factors that would best explain the relationships between the variables.  Table 3.12, above, shows factor loadings after rotation. The strongest loadings which correspond to their respective financial variables have been highlighted. Table 3.12 shows that REDCA EBITA, TOBIN and G5 load strongly to factor 1, whereas DFL loads weakly to factor 1. The DFL load is considered too weak and was subsequently not analysed in factor 1. The remaining factors (EBITA, TOBIN and G5) are considered to be related to market power. Factor 1 is therefore named “market power”. Secondly, REDCA and QUICK load most strongly to factor 2 and these ratios are related to “liquidity”. Factor 2 is subsequently named “liquidity”. FATO and NPROM, which are related to sales generating variables, load most strongly to factor 3, so factor 3 is named “sales generating.” Finally, DIV and RONW, which are the profit variables, load most strongly to Factor 4, which is therefore named “profit”. 
Summary






Two partition methods, K-means and K-medians, are mainly used to classify the firms into a distinct number of non-overlapping clusters. K-means cluster analysis, which is a commonly employed partition cluster-analysis (STATA 9.0, 2005), is an iterative process to split the large datasets into K clusters. The means of the final clusters are then calculated. In this thesis, K-means cluster analysis was used as the sample sizes are larger than 200. 
Number of clusters – Using stopping rules






The Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F stopping rule index (for N cases and g groups) is defined as:

Trace (B) / (g-1)
Trace (W)/ (N-g)
Where:
The trace of a square matrix is defined as the SUM of the diagonal elements.  This is similar to the identity matrix (where all diagonal elements are 1).  However, the identity matrix is not equal to trace, as it cannot be constituted even if one of the elements is equal to 1. 
W is the within-cluster sum of squares and cross-products matrix and B is the between-cluster sum of squares and cross-product matrix (STATA 9.0, 2005, p.187).
Table 3.13 The Calinski/Harabasz (1974) pseudo-F index








Table 3.13, above, shows the comparative analysis for the number of clusters. The optimum number of groups for this sample is three as its corresponding Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F value is the highest.
Sample classification
Having examined the number of clusters, this paragraph explains the sample classification. STATA uses “measures” as a means of identifying the similarity or dissimilarity of the data. 
L2 (drs) 
                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                             
where measurement X(ri) is one point and X (si) is another point. 




Table 3.14 Companies Classification for Euclidean distance	
Custer	Number of divestiture firms 






Three hundred UK divestiture firms were classified using squared Euclidean distance and Euclidean distance.  As shown in Table 3.14, the number of firms in the first, second and third clusters are 86, 110 and 104 respectively.
Result
The following tables show the variable mean values and the corresponding financial variables for all three clusters.






Expansion Stage	Early Maturity Stage	Mature/Decline
Stage



















The graphs below summarise the detailed financial information shown in Table 3.15 above.





Wickham (1998) suggests that young firms are active and have high growth rates and Porter (1980) suggests that mature companies are less likely to undertake a growth strategy. Figure 3‑4 shows that two growth ratios (sales revenue—5 years and Tobin’s Q) decrease from the late expansion stage to the mature/decline stage. The growth rate decreases as firms move across from the late expansion to the mature/decline stage of the life cycle. The decreasing growth rate of Figure 3‑4 could be in line with the findings of Wickham (1998) and Porter (1980).





















Figure 3‑6 shows that the debt ratio (degree of financial leverage) increases from late expansion to the mature/decline stage.  Huse and Zattoni (2008) mention that the board can act in an advisory role in the early life cycle stage. Morroni (2009) suggests that the governance system for young companies is co-operation. Managers act in innovator roles in order to help firms obtain marketing and technology opportunities. Entrepreneurs and investors have highly specific skills, experience and knowledge, and need to work with managers in order to share information. They all need to have close connections and assist the growth of the firm and then enhance the firm’s value through active participation. Relationships between managers, entrepreneurs and investors are based on co-operation, assistance and knowledge-sharing. This co-operative governance can enhance a company’s long-term performance. Overall, this may suggest that management and company owners need to co-operate together in order to benefit a company. Therefore, the agency problem is likely to be low.




















Figure 3‑9 Sales generating






Figure 3‑10 Market power


Figure 3‑10 shows that the market power ratio (concentration ratio—top 5) increases from the late expansion stage to the mature/decline stage.  Concentration, which is a new variable defined in the previous section, has been added to measure market power. Young firms are likely to have low market power. As Mueller (1972) suggests, it is important for young firms to have further growth. Therefore, when young firms have low market power and operate in a young and new environment, the management of young firms tends to work with company owners in order to enhance development opportunities. Low agency problems could increase the survival chances of the whole firm. When firms become more mature, they are likely to have a complicated company structure and high market power. Bushman et al. (2004) suggest that multi-national firms have monitoring problems as there is a complicated management decision-making environment, including cultural, operational and legal issues. In other words, mature firms, which have a complicated firm structure, can have high agency problems. 
 
Overall, the above figures show the different financial characteristics of divesting firms. In the early years of a company, management generally work together with the owners, therefore, the agency problem is small. As firms mature, they are likely to develop a complicated organisational structure and high market power. However, managers seem to make self-interested decisions, which may not benefit the value of the firm as a whole.  For example, assets are being used for unproductive purposes. In other words, management may make value-destroying decisions that do not benefit the firm. While the agency problem is high, good corporate governance, such as a higher level of debt, could act as a monitoring role to control self-interested management decisions. 
3.4	 Conclusions
This chapter classified 300 UK divesting companies into stages of the corporate life cycle. The chapter aimed to enhance previous research by adding two variables, revenue growth and concentration ratio, using Tobin’s Q to determine the clusters. Both the 0.9 and 0.5 deletion rules were used and similar results were found. To keep the research consistent, it was decided that the 0.5 deletion rule should be used in both factor and cluster analysis. Growth is arguably one of the most crucial factors in any given firm, regardless of its maturity. This author’s research adds “growth” (sales revenue and Tobin’s Q) and “concentration ratio” variables into the factor and cluster analysis, thereby a more comprehensive and accurate result should be obtained.













4.1	Objectives and Structure 
The previous chapter classified divesting companies into different stages of the life-cycle. This chapter examines the market reaction (using an event study) to different companies in different life-cycle stages. Most of the previous literature (Miles and Rosenfield (1983); Alexander et al. (1984); Rosenfeld (1984); Klein (1986) and Tehranian et al. (1987)) finds positive abnormal returns for divesting companies on the announcement day and also makes a general investigation of the divesting companies without using a framework to classify their main companies, thus explaining their inconclusive results. The question is raised as to whether market reaction to divesting firms will differ when they are classified into different sub-samples. There may be the possibility of neutral abnormal returns for the divesting sample overall but different (positive or negative), abnormal returns for different sub-samples. The well-known life-cycle concept can be used to classify divesting companies. 

This study aims to investigate the possibility of differential stock market reactions to divesting firms, using the life-cycle concept. By examining share prices in different life-cycle stages, the researcher can analyse the abnormal return trends in these stages, in order to increase understanding of each stage of the life-cycle. This study provides more up to date research, examining divesting companies from 1996 to 2000. Three hundred divesting companies are examined to enable a more objective analysis (a greater number of divesting companies is likely to reduce the research bias). A market model was used, including both the Brown and Warner (1985) and Dodd and Warner (1983) methods, to examine test statistics and investigate market reaction. Both methods are used to improve the robustness of the results. The Brown and Warner (1985) test is the appropriate test where there is cross-sectional dependence and the Dodd and Warner (1983) test is for investigating sensitivity. Additionally, this research provides market reaction results for different event windows in order to present a detailed picture of the event study. This research aims to give a detailed picture of the event study in order to enhance the robustness of the results.

Chapter Four uses event studies to provide the opportunity for investigating different divestiture companies to determine whether there are positive or negative abnormal returns on the date of announcement. From the previous chapter, 86 divestiture companies are classified into the late expansion stage of the life-cycle.  110 divestiture companies are classified into the early maturity stage of the life-cycle and 104 into the mature/decline stage of the life-cycle. All the divesting firms are in the later life-cycle stages. This chapter examines the market reaction to these divesting firms in different life-cycle stages. The chapter is structured as follows:

Section 4.2 presents the sample and event study methodology for this chapter, to increase the reader’s understanding of the process of obtaining an event study result. Section 4.3 examines the basic characteristics of the divestiture companies. Section 4.3 presents divestiture companies in different life-cycle stages, the late expansion stage, early maturity stage and mature/decline stage, from 1996 to 2000. In order to understand the relationship between different industries and different life-cycle stages, Section 4.3 also classifies the divestiture companies for different industries. These basic characteristics can provide a better understanding of divesting firms in different life-cycle stages. An important reason for conducting this review is to establish the likelihood of cross-sectional dependence in the company and industry sub-sample groups, as this factor affects the testing and interpretation of statistical significance. Section 4.3 also investigates the market reaction using the market model and test statistics are computed using the Brown and Warner (1985) method. To examine sensitivities, the Dodd and Warner (1983) method is also used. This section examines the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns in different life-cycle stages. Section 4.4 presents contribution and analysis. Section 4.5 draws conclusions.
4.2	Sample and methodology
Sample	
The previous chapter (Chapter 3) showed 300 divesting firms classified into different life cycle stages. In this chapter, the event study methodology, including Brown and Warner (1985) and Dodd and Warner (1983), is used to examine market reaction. This methodology will be discussed in the coming section. Using the Brown and Warner (1985) method, 300 divesting firms were selected minus major and minor outliers, leaving 243 divesting firms. Details of the major and minor criteria will be discussed later in this chapter. Using the Dodd and Warner (1983) method, 243 divesting firms were selected minus outliers, leaving 207 divesting firms. In other words, 36 divesting firms are outliers and have been deleted. Four outliers are in the late expansion stage, 15 are in the early maturity stage and 17 are in the mature/decline stage. Among all these 36 outliers, most are from the cyclical services industry (e.g. retailer, soft goods, publishing and hotels). This could be reasonable as most firms in my divestiture sample are from the cyclical services industry. The remaining outliers are from all other industries, such as the non-cyclic consumer industry, general industrials industry, resources industry etc.
Methodology
Event Study Methodology
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) are not used in the author’s research as Kothari and Warner (1997) mention that there are weaknesses in using them. They suggest that there are significantly right-skewed problems for long-horizon BHARs. As there are some limitations for BHARs, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are used in this author’s research.

Table 4.1 below shows the literature summary for methodology. Its three main sections are: methodology; event windows; and test statistic methods. Generally, the divestiture literature uses different models for event studies. These are the mean-adjusted returns model (Alexander et al., 1984; Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983; Rosenfeld, 1984), the market-adjusted returns model (Alexander et al., 1984) and the market model. The market model is one of the commonest in the literature, and this is the reason for its use here ((Boudreaux, 1975; Schipper and Smith,1983; Hearth and Zaima, 1984; Montgomery et al., 1984; Sicherman and Pettway, 1987; Tehranian et al., 1987; Afshar, 1992; John and Ofek, 1995; Lang et al., 1995; Hanson and Song, 2000; Wang, 2000; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002). As shown in Table 4.1, these authors use the market model as the key model for event studies.

 Analysis of the above literature shows that the life-cycle has not been used as a framework for examining event studies in any detail (including both the Dodd and Warner (1983) and Brown and Warner (1985) methodologies). The second section of Table 4.1 refers to studies on event windows. Most of the literature (Miles and Rosenfield, 1983; Rosenfield, 1984; Alexander et al., 1984; Schipper and Smith, 1983; Tehranian et al., 1987; Afshar et al., 1992; John and Ofek, 1995; Lang et al., 1995; Hanson and Song, 2000; Wang, 2000;  Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001; Clubb and Stouraitis, 2002) investigates short event windows, as it may be important to capture the market reaction within a short period of time (around the announcement day). Most of these studies examine the market reaction of day (-1, 0) as this may be the crucial event window (owing to possible information leakage on the day before announcement day). Moreover, Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) and Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) used day –300 to day –61 as the control period. The study control period is from day –300 to day –61, a somewhat longer period, which may provide a better estimation for the test period. Furthermore, Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) used day (-60, -10) and day (+1, +60) as the test period and Clubb and Stouraitis (2002) used day (-60, -4) and day (+1, +60) as the test period.  This study uses day –60 to day +60.  A longer test period presents a fuller picture, so a longer control and test period should provide better analysis and a more detailed picture of the market reaction (except for small fluctuations owing to temporary effects). This study also provides smaller event windows for event studies, such as (0, +1), (0, +5) and (0, +10) etc, in order to capture a detailed analysis of market reaction.

In addition to differences in the model and event windows, there are also different methods for computing the significance of abnormal returns. The two main methods are: Dodd and Warner’s (1983) method and Brown and Warner’s (1985) method (see Table 4.1 for examples of each). The final section of the Table presents two test statistics methods. Most of the literature (Miles and Rosenfield, 1983; Rosenfield, 1984; Hearth and Zaima 1984; Sicherman and Pettway 1987; Afshar et al., 1992; Wang, 2000; Kaiser and Stouraitis 2001; Clubb and Stouraitis 2002) uses Brown and Warner’s method and there are only two examples which use Dodd and Warner’s (1983) method (Tehranian et al., 1987 and Hanson and Song, 2000). This chapter uses Brown and Warner’s (1985) cross-sectional dependence test as the main tool for studying market reaction, because this study assumes cross-sectional dependence. There is evidence that mergers occur in waves determined by systemic macro-conditions, and it is likely that divestments occur in similar patterns. Rees (1995) suggests that merger activity could result in the growth of divestiture activity, indicating that the merger wave has a high impact on the divestiture wave and the latter is likely to be influenced by systemic macro factors. However, although there are general trends, it is also possible that divestments are motivated by company-specific factors. Brown and Warner’s (1985) method is used for the cross-sectional dependence test, and in order to verify the robustness of the results, the test statistics of this research will be re-performed using the cross-sectional independence assumptions of Dodd and Warner (1983). 





Table 4.1 Divestitures literature
Study	Methodology	Event Window(days)	Test Statistic Method*
Miles & Rosenfeld 1983	Mean adjusted returns model	(0,+1)	Brown & Warner (1980)
Rosenfeld 1984	Mean adjusted returns model	(-1,0)	Brown & Warner (1980)
Alexander et al. 1984	Market adjusted returns model	(-1,0)	Brown & Warner (1980)
 	Mean adjusted returns model	(-1,0)	 
Boudreaux 1975	Market model –residual analysis 	(-5,0,+5) months	The origins & details of the test statistic method was not shown in the article
Schipper & Smith 1983	Market model	(-1,0)	Prediction errors using Scholes-Williams (1977) technique to estimate Market model parameters
Hearth & Zaima 1984	Market model	(-10,0)	Brown & Warner (1980)
Sicherman & Pettway 1987	Market model	(-30,+30)	Brown & Warner (1985)
Montgomery et al. 1984	Market model (Residual analysis) 	(-12 months, 12 months)	The origins & details of the test statistic method was not shown in the article
Tehranian et al. 1987	Market model	(-1,0)	Dodd & Warner (1983)
Afshar et al. 1992	Market model	(-1)	Brown & Warner (1980, 1985)
John & Ofek 1995	Market model	(-2,0)	not shown in the article
Lang et al. 1995	Market model	(-1,0)	not shown in the article 
Hanson & Song 2000	Market model	(-1,0,+1)	Dodd & Warner (1983)
Wang 2000	GARCH model & Market model	(-1,0)	Brown & Warner (1985)
 	 	(-20,+20)	 















The market model is shown as follows:
=                                                                 (1)
Therefore, the abnormal return is defined as:
                                                                                (2)      
 	=	  Return on firm i on day t
 	=	  return on the FTSE ALL SHARE (FTALLSH)
 	=	 intercept for firm i
 	=	 beta for firm i
 	=	 error term for firm i on day t


FTSE ALL SHARE is used for the market index as this is one of the main company indices for the companies.  and  are ordinary least squares (OLS) values from the regression (estimation period). The OLS, regression of the return on firm i on the return of the market in the control period, is a means of obtaining the parameters of the model. 


In finance, the difference between a single stock (or portfolio’s) performance in regard to average market performance for a period of time is defined as abnormal returns (ARs). For instance, if the increase in a stock’s value is 5% and the increase for the average market is 3%, then, the AR is 2%. However, the AR is negative if the average market has a better performance than the individual stock. Furthermore, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is defined as the difference between a security’s expected return and the actual return. The sum of all ARs up to time  is the CAR. The CAR is equal to zero if no event occurs. The announcement of events can contribute to a CAR. This research defines the abnormal return for each share () as the difference between the actual return () and the expected value of return).     
 =)                                                                            	   (3)
Where  is the daily stock return of the divesting companies,  is the abnormal return for each share and) is the expected value of the return.
                                                                              (4)
  = share price of firm i on day t 
= share price of firm i on day t-1 
Brown and Warner (1985) method assuming cross-sectional dependence
According to Brown and Warner (1985), the test statistic is calculated as the mean excess return divided by its estimated standard deviation.





whereis the number of securities in the sample, is the mean excess return and is the estimated standard deviation.
The thin trading problem
Non-synchronous trading causes problems with empirical studies using daily stock returns, as the market model beta is biased and inconsistent when the beta is estimated by the OLS. Indeed, infrequently traded shares could have downward biased beta. In contrast, frequently traded shares could have upward biased beta (Brown and Warner, 1985). This paper uses the Dimson aggregated coefficients method (1979) to adjust the beta.
4.3	Event Study Results
Late expansion stage descriptive statistics
The basic descriptive statistics for the late expansion stage, early maturity stage and mature/decline stage will be examined in this section, aiming to help the reader to understand more about the divesting companies before examining the event study.

Table 6.9 on page A-29 indicates the basic descriptive statistics for 86 divesting companies in the late expansion stage. It is prudent to examine all the basic descriptive statistics before applying any financial models (such as the market model) or adjustments (such as the thin trading adjustment). The second column gives the company name of the divesting firm in the late expansion stage. The third and fourth columns present alpha and beta before applying Dimson’s thin trading adjustment. Alpha is between -0.00427 and 0.00361 and beta is between -0.02619 and 1.83355. The fifth and sixth columns present company actual returns (average for estimation period) and company actual returns (average for test period) respectively. The seventh and eighth columns show market actual returns (average for estimation period) and market actual returns (average for test period) for each of the divesting firms. These actual returns are the original returns before using the market model.

The ninth column presents the Durbin-Watson value. The Durbin-Watson test is to test the problem of autocorrelation. In regression, the assumption is that there is no correlation problem for the residuals. The Durbin-Watson value is 2 when residuals have no correlation problem. Positive autocorrelation occurs when Durbin-Watson values are less than 2 and negative autocorrelation occurs when Durbin-Watson values are greater than 2 (SPSS, 2001). In this study, the range of Durbin-Watson values for these firms is from 1.235 to 2.173. The final column shows whether or not a company has an autocorrelation problem. This autocorrelation test is a two-sided test. There is one independent variable (Rmt) in regression, so when k=1 (one independent variable) and n=200 (number of days is more than 200 but n=200 is the maximum available in the Durbin-Watson Statistical Table), the upper limit is 1.778 in the Durbin-Watson Statistic: 5% significance Table (Savin and White, 1977).  If the Durbin-Watson value is larger than this upper limit (du) and smaller than 4 minus the upper limit (4-du) (Kmenta, 1986), there is no autocorrelation. In this study, if the Durbin-Watson value is larger than 1.778 and smaller than 2.222 (4 -1.778), there is no autocorrelation problem. However, if the Durbin Watson value is either smaller than 1.778 or larger than 2.222, there is such a problem. In the late expansion stage, 53 companies have autocorrelation problems and 33 firms do not. In order to reduce the autocorrelation problem, the Dimson adjustment needs to be applied for the autocorrelation firms. Dimson adjustment is discussed later in the section. Overall, there is a greater number of divesting firms having autocorrelation problems in the late expansion stage. Expansion firms may have more autocorrelation problems (e.g. as a result of thin trading). Expansion firms may also experience less monitoring by the market, because they are younger firms. 


Early maturity stage descriptive statistics
In Table 6.10 on page A-33, the descriptive statistics for 110 divesting companies in the early mature stage are shown. The alpha column (column 3) to the market actual returns column (column 8) show the basic financial information of divesting firms in the early maturity stage. The alpha value (shown in the alpha column) lies between -0.00228 and 0.00225 and the beta value (shown in the beta column) lies between -0.02958 and 1.70299. This basic statistical information should provide a better understanding of the divesting companies as it is recorded before applying any models or adjustments. Additionally, the ninth column also presents the Durbin-Watson statistic and the tenth column shows whether or not the relevant company has an autocorrelation problem. Overall, the Durbin-Watson value is between 1.299 and 2.204.  66 divesting firms have no autocorrelation problems and 44 do. In order to reduce the autocorrelation problems, the thin-trading adjustment (Dimson’s method) needed to be applied for the autocorrelation companies. In the early maturity stage, the majority of firms do not have autocorrelation problems. This may be related to the fact that most companies are in the early mature stage. Generally, companies in the early mature stage are likely to have more trading, so the market will most likely be monitoring them more closely. This could be the reason why there are fewer thin trading problems (fewer autocorrelation problems) in early mature companies. 


Mature/decline stage descriptive statistics
Table 6.11 on page A-38 shows the basic statistical information for 104 companies in the mature/decline stage. The alpha column to the market actual returns column (column 3 to column 8) shows alpha, beta and actual returns for divesting companies in the mature/decline stage. The alpha value is between -0.00395 and 0.00272 and the beta value is between 0.18115 and 2.39232. All this statistical information provides a better understanding of the divesting companies. It is appropriate to examine all the original alphas and betas (without Dimson’s thin-trading adjustment) and company and market actual returns (without applying the market model). The Durbin-Watson value is between 1.255 and 2.281.  48 companies have autocorrelation problems and 56 companies do not. The thin-trading adjustment needs to be applied for the autocorrelation companies, in order to reduce the autocorrelation problem. In general, the majority of the mature/decline firms do not have autocorrelation problems, which may be related to the fact that these firms are below the mature stage and there is better transparency, e.g. more information available, and the monitoring system may be more mature for these firms. These mature/decline companies are less likely to have thin trading problems (autocorrelation problems). 


Excess returns characteristics: descriptive statistics
The previous section has shown the statistical information for different divesting companies in different life-cycle stages. The following section investigates the outliers from the main samples. For each life-cycle stage, two sets of descriptive statistics tables are shown. Table 6.12 on page A-42, Table 6.14 on page A-49, Table 6.16 on page A-58 respectively investigate the excess returns outliers and the second shows the statistical information after deleting the excess returns outliers. For these tables, all the excess returns are the original excess returns before applying the market model and the Dimson adjustment. Outliers could affect the calculation results of the whole sample, so they need to be deleted from the main samples. In order to identify the correct outliers, the following Table presents another type of descriptive Table (giving the minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation etc.). The descriptive Table shows the basic information, distribution and outliers of the excess returns. Through analysing the various elements of the descriptive tables, the extreme values can be identified. This study tries to obtain the correct research results by deleting the extreme values. 

Table 6.13 on page A-46, Table 6.15 on page A-54, Table 6.17 on page A-63 respectively show all the basic statistical information (maximum, minimum etc.) and distributions after deleting all the main and minor outliers. It is useful to identify the outliers in this section, as outliers would be used in the next section, the thin trading section. In the thin trading section, different main parts are examined: the alphas and betas before the thin-trading adjustment, both for the 300 original companies and the remaining 243 companies (original sample minus all outliers); the alphas and betas after the thin-trading adjustment (Dimson’s method, 1979) for all 243 companies; the alphas and betas after the thin-trading adjustment (Dimson’s method, 1979) for 112 autocorrelation companies.  
Late expansion stage 
Table 6.12 on page A-42 shows the basic statistics of 86 divesting companies in the late expansion stage. The companies are based on original market model returns (using old alpha/beta and without the Dimson adjustment). Column 2 shows the company name, column 3, the minimum, column 4, the maximum, column 5, the mean, column 6, standard deviation, column 7, skewness, column 8, Kurtosis, column 9, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and column 11, Shapiro-Wilk. Columns 3 to 6 show the basic statistical details of the divesting companies and the Kurtosis and skewness columns show the shape of the sample. As outliers could affect the research results, this study highlights major and minor outliers. Outliers are defined as minor if Kurtosis is more than 10 and as major if Kurtosis is far greater than 10 (e.g. over 20). Both minor and major outliers would be deleted as these could affect the results for the whole sample in each life-cycle stage. The reason for setting this criterion (according to the value of Kurtosis) is because Kurtosis determines the shape of the sample. Although this research shows that most of the companies do not have a normal distribution (as the results are shown in Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk), this research tries to maintain the normally distributed shape of the sample and so Kurtosis is used as the main criterion for deletion. 

In Table 6.12 on page A-42, certain Kurtosis statistics are very high. For example, company 2 (De La Rue) has a Kurtosis of 83.6059, so Kurtosis outliers need to be highlighted and deleted. From the Table, all major and minor outliers are highlighted. All the values of the major outliers are highlighted (minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness and Kurtosis for the relevant company). For minor outliers, only skewness and Kurtosis values are highlighted for the relevant company. Overall, there are 17 major and minor outliers and, in addition, the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests (column 10 and column 12) show that most of the divesting companies’ returns do not have a normal distribution (as the p-values are significant, smaller than 0.01). Both Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests (the main tests for normality) are shown in the Table for comparison. Although the results show that the author’s divesting sample returns are not normally distributed, the author’s companies are likely to follow the normally distributed shape, as there are more than 30 companies (of 86 original companies) in this stage. The central limit theory shows that the number of companies, which is more than 30, follows a normal distribution. 

Table 6.13 on page A-46 presents the basic statistics, after deleting all the major and minor outliers, in the late expansion stage. All 17 major and minor outliers are deleted from the original total of 86 companies. 69 companies remain in the late expansion stage. The second column shows the company name. The minimum column (column 3) to the standard deviation column (column 6) show the statistical information. Column 8 shows the Kurtosis value. After deleting all the major and minor outliers, the Kurtosis values are below 10, so the remaining companies should be closer to a normal distribution. 
Early maturity stage
Table 6.14 on page A-49 indicates the statistical information for 110 divesting companies in the early maturity stage. This Table is based on original market model returns (using old beta/alpha and without the Dimson adjustment). The minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness, Kurtosis, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk are shown in different columns of the Table. In this stage, the Kurtosis column (column 8) shows that some of the Kurtosis values are extremely high. For example, company number 71 has Kurtosis 97.9058.  This Table has identified all the major and minor outliers, 21 in all. In order to obtain a good and reliable research result for the later sections, all these major and minor outliers are deleted. Moreover, Table 6.15 on page A-54 shows all the basic information after deleting the major and minor outliers. 89 companies remain in the early maturity stage. The Kurtosis column (column 8) indicates that all the Kurtosis values are below 10. The low Kurtosis values suggest that the shape of the divesting companies is closer to a normal distribution. 
Mature/decline stage
Table 6.16 on page A-58 shows the basic statistics for the 104 divesting companies in the mature/decline stage. The minimum column (column 3) to the standard deviation column (column 6) shows the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation. The Kurtosis column (column 8) shows that some of the 

Kurtosis values are very high, so 19 major and minor outliers need to be identified and deleted. This research aims to provide accurate research results (these are shown in a later section) by deleting any inappropriate outliers. After these are deleted, Table 6.17 on page A-63 shows that 85 companies remain in the mature/decline stage. The Kurtosis column (column 8) shows that all the Kurtosis values are below 10. Although the Kolmogorov-Smirnov column (column 10) and Shapiro-Wilk column (column 12) still show that most of the author’s divesting companies are not normally distributed (most of the p-values of these tests are significant), the author’s divesting companies may follow the normal distribution shape under the assumption of the central limit theory.
Thin Trading 
The above sections have presented different statistical tables for the divesting companies, and have also touched on the topic of thin trading. This coming section discusses the idea of thin trading and the thin-trading adjustment and aims to present the impact of the thin-trading adjustment on divesting companies. 


Non-synchronous trading causes problems for empirical studies using daily stock returns as the market model betas are biased and inconsistent when beta is estimated by the OLS. Indeed, infrequently traded shares could have downward biased beta. In contrast, frequently traded shares could have upward biased beta (Brown and Warner, 1985). This study uses the Dimson aggregated coefficients method (1979) to adjust the beta. According to Dimson (1979), the advantage of using this method is that it does not need continuous trading of the market index. Neither does it need supplementary information (e.g. transaction information). The Dimson method is a good approach to estimate beta when transaction information (including the times of transactions) is not available.
Table 4.2 Before thin-trading adjustment	
 	alpha	beta
Before thin-trading adjustment:		 
Original alpha & beta for all 300 companies	-0.00019	0.71792
 		 





































Table 4.2 on page 151 presents alpha and beta results before the thin-trading adjustment. Before the thin-trading adjustment is applied, for all 300 divesting companies the beta value is rather low (0.71792) compared to 1, and for all 243 companies (original companies minus all outliers), the beta is also low (0.75780) compared to 1. Therefore, this study has adjusted for the thin-trading problem using Dimson’s Aggregate Coefficients method. 









































The previous paragraph presented the first approach, the thin-trading adjustment (for all 243 firms). This paragraph discusses the second approach of the thin-trading adjustment, which is applied to the 112 autocorrelation companies.  The remaining 131 companies used the old alphas and betas before the Dimson method (1979). Different combinations of Leads and Lags were used to calculate adjusted alphas and betas, shown in Table 4.4 above. In Table 4.4, 5 Leads and 2 Lags show the highest average beta (0.97608) compared to 1, and the thin-trading problem lessens. In general, there are differences for alphas and betas before and after the thin-trading adjustment. Before adjustment, average alphas are -0.00019 and -0.00008 and after adjustment, average alphas are -0.00019 and -0.00018.  Before adjustment, average betas are 0.71792 and 0.75780 and after adjustment, average betas are 0.90349 and 0.97608. The second approach of the thin-trading adjustment is preferable, as the beta (0.97608) is closer to 1. The second approach has been used for this research, being more appropriate (as applied to firms that have a thin-trading problem). 
Event studies – Brown and Warner (1985) method 
The previous section examined the definition of thin trading and the different approaches to the thin-trading adjustment. In order to reduce the impact of the thin-trading problem on event studies such as the market model, Dimson’s method (approach 2) is used for adjusting the thin-trading problem of the market model. This section shows the empirical results of market reaction to different divestiture companies across the stages of the life-cycle using the Brown and Warner (1985) method – the cross-sectional dependence test. The empirical results of the market reactions using the Dodd and Warner (1983) method (testing for sensitivity) is presented in the appendix (Table 6.25, Table 6.26, Table 6.27 and Table 6.28). For each of these methods, three main analyses are provided for different life-cycle stages, including the late expansion stage, early maturity stage and mature/decline stage. The first analysis is the detailed market reaction from day -60 to day +60, providing daily details of market reaction, enabling investors to analyse the market reaction specifically for the announcement day. The second analysis shows cumulative returns charts from day – 60 to day +60, presenting the graphical trend of cumulative returns from pre-announcement period to post-announcement period. The third analysis is of market reactions to different short event windows, aiming to capture the market reaction within these windows, allowing investors to analyse the pattern of different short event windows.  

The specification and interpretation of all event studies relies on certain assumptions about market efficiency. There were three main forms of market efficiency in the 1970s. They are: weak form tests, semi-strong form tests and strong form tests. The weak form test concerns the relationship between past and future returns. The semi-strong form test is about the reflection of security prices on public information announcements. The strong form test concerns private information held by some investors and that this private information may not be fully reflected in market prices (Fama, 1991). In this research, the semi-strong form of market efficiency is assumed. This suggests that all public information (such as financial information) is efficiently contained in the current share price. Thus, fundamental analysis of public financial information could not produce better than market returns (Rees, 1995).

In this research, weak-form efficiency is not assumed. The market price of divestitures should reflect all the information available to the public, not just historical information. Although weak-form efficiency assumes that investors cannot obtain excess returns as a result of trading rules based on historical information, this weak-form efficiency appears to have been too weak to be effective in the stock market in the late 1990s. This research covers the period from 1996 to 2000. The UK stock market should have been sufficiently mature in the late 1990s (information was available in the public domain for the listed companies) for a semi-strong form efficiency to be assumed. Firm efficiency has been too strong to apply to the UK stock market in the late 1990s. In the real world, in certain cases excess returns might be obtained by accessing inside information from a company, for example investors may get trading benefits from prior information concerning an announcement date. Neither weak-form efficiency nor strong-form efficiency are assumed in this research. Semi-strong market efficiency is used in this author’s research as this is the appropriate test for the author’s event study. All information on public divestitures is reflected in the share prices. Under the semi-strong form of market efficiency, the divestiture price, on the announcement day, is supposed to reflect all public divestitures information (Fama, 1991). Investors could not obtain excess returns, through trading rules, based on public information (as all the public information is already reflected in market prices). 
Late expansion stage – Abnormal returns 
In the late expansion stage, the main reason for divestiture is to focus on the core units (Authers, 1996), reduce borrowing (late expansion firms are likely to borrow in order to expand, so these companies might divest units in order to repay debts) and returns to shareholders. In the case of late expansion firms, companies may need to develop/expand. Buchholtz et al. (1999) suggest that a positive context, such as organizational growth, could motivate the companies to undertake “pro-active” divestitures, such as restructuring. Therefore, these firms are likely to undertake divestitures in order to enhance development opportunities. For example, Securicor is one of the author’s divesting companies in the late expansion stage. Securicor divested its Securicor Telecom telecommunication systems business, to Samsung (the South Korean electronics group) in 1998. Securicor decided to undertake divestitures as a refocusing strategy. Securicor Telecom is the main agent for Samsung (Samsung Telecoms Equipment) in the UK and is a profitable business (Cane, 1998). Securicor Telecom had growth potential and profit opportunities, so Samsung was willing to buy it in order to develop the telecom market in the UK. In this situation, Securicor divested its Securicor Telecom for strategic reasons. Securicor decided to refocus as a company strategy to enhance its position. 

Table 6.18 on page A-67 shows abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns from day -60 to day +60 for late expansion firms. For the divestiture companies in the late expansion stage, the highlighted area of Table 6.18 on page A-67 shows AARs as 0.00352 on the announcement day. At a level of 5%, it is positive and significant. The market has a slightly positive reaction to divesting companies. This may be related to investors’ positive views of expanding firms. It is also consistent with Montgomery et al.’s (1984) suggestion that there is a positive significant cumulative abnormal return, +0.34531 (p value < 0.001) for pro-active divestments.  Montgomery et al. (1984) found that the market has positive view on divestitures that are related to corporate strategy. 
Early maturity stage – Abnormal returns 
In the early maturity stage, the reason most companies undertake divestitures is to focus on the firm’s core units.  Greene King is a firm in the early maturity stage, and through divestitures, Greene King is able to concentrate on the development of Peatling Direct mail order and wholesale trade (Financial Times, 1996). Early mature firms also undertake divestitures to reduce debt. Rexam (the packaging group), a company in the early mature stage, divested Rexam Release (papers and coated films division) to UPM-Kymmene. The divestiture proceeds were used to reduce its debt (Financial Times, 2000). Table 6.19 on page A-70 shows the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns from day -60 to day +60 in the early maturity stage. The highlighted area shows positive and significant AR (AR is 0.00507 and significant at the 1% level) for the divesting firms on the announcement day. This result indicates that investors have a more positive reaction to divesting companies (in the early maturity stage of the life-cycle) around the announcement day. There are no significant results (for ARs and CARs) on day -1 and day +1, which suggests that there is no information leakage. The positive return on the announcement day may be related to refocusing benefits and reducing debts benefits. The market appears to welcome firms that are more focused.  
Mature/decline stage – Abnormal returns 
Firms in the mature/decline stage experience few investment opportunities and suffer financial losses. This poor financial performance could motivate the companies to undertake divestitures, as suggested by Duhaime and Grant (1984), Montgomery et al. (1984), Hamilton and Chow (1993), Sudarsanam (1995), Johnson (1996) and Schlingemann et al. (2000). One example of divestiture to focus on core business was Imperial Chemical Industries, which divested the household and consumer products business Grow Group to US-based Sherwin-Williams in order to focus on their core paint business (Green, 1996). In certain situations, refocusing divestitures might be undertaken by unprofitable businesses or those who have mistakenly diversified. Delta is one of the author’s divesting companies in the mature/decline stage. Delta sold its US cable subsidiary (Surprenant Cable) to the Marmon Group in order to focus on its specialist engineering and high technology cables business (Financial Times, p.9, Companies and Finance: Delta sells lossmaker, 1996). Furthermore, another company in the mature/decline stage, Pilkington, sold its contact lens business (Barnes Hind). This unsuccessful and costly diversification resulted in Pilkington’s  divestment (The Financial Times, p.21, Pilkington sale ends contact lens foray, 1996). Some mature/declining companies are likely to have loss-making businesses or to have made mistakes in diversification, and divestment is one of the ways to dispose of these units.  Generally, mature/decline firms are likely to be in a poor position (as they have limited market potential), and need to divest unprofitable units in order to slow the declining status of the company. In a further example, Cordiant (the advertising group) sold its National Research Group (film industry) to VNU, using the proceeds to decrease borrowings (Smith, 1997), another reason for divesting. 






Table 4.5 Cumulative abnormal returns—late expansion stage
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Table 4.6 Cumulative abnormal returns—early maturity stage	
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Table 4.7 Cumulative abnormal returns—mature/decline stage
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For the late expansion firms, Table 4.5, above, shows the cumulative returns for different short event windows, including pre- and post-event windows. For more detail, please refer to Table 6.21 on page A-76. Table 4.5 shows that the market has a positive view of divesting companies from (0, +5) and (0, +10) event windows. There are positive CARs (significant at the 1% level) in the short term post announcement period. At this stage, companies undertake divestitures in order to focus (for development reasons) on core units, which can enhance the opportunities for these companies to expand. The advantages of divestiture can be realized during the short term post-announcement period, so the market is likely to welcome such moves. Furthermore, as seen in Table 6.21 on page A-76, there are positive and significant cumulative returns (0.00363, significant at the 5% level) for the (-40,+40) window, finding that the market reacts positively.
For the early mature firms, Table 4.6 above shows the cumulative returns for short event windows, including pre- and post-event windows. For detailed event windows, please refer to Table 6.22 on page A-77. The Table shows that there are significant positive CARs for event window day (-10, 0), day (-5, 0) and day (-1, 0). The results indicate that the market has a positive reaction to divestitures prior to the announcement day. The investors have good expectations for these divestitures (undertaken by early mature companies) before the announcement day. 

Table 4.7 shows cumulative returns for short event windows, such as pre- and post-event windows, in the mature/decline stage. For detailed event windows, please refer to the Table 6.23 on page A-78. Table 4.7 shows significant positive CARs for pre-event windows (-1, 0), (-5, 0) and (-10, 0). Additionally, there are significant positive CARs for post-event windows (0, +1), (0, +5) and (0, +10). Some of the main factors for mature/decline companies to divest are to focus on the core business (Green, 1996) and reduce borrowings (Smith, 1997). In the short term, the market is encouraged, as this will have a good impact on the mature/decline companies, so there is a positive market reaction for the pre- and post-announcement periods in the short term.

However, Table 4.7 shows that there are significant negative cumulative returns in the longer post-announcement period, including day (0, +60). This negative market view suggests that the divestiture’s benefits are not likely to be realized in the longer-term post-announcement period. This may be related to divestitures (undertaken by mature/decline companies) on the announcement day. Divestitures on the announcement day do not provide longer-term benefits in the post-announcement period. Additionally, Table 6.23 on page A-78 shows positive significant cumulative returns (0.00275 and significant at the 10% level) for the (-10, +10) event window. When markets reach the maturity stage of the life-cycle, companies have to fight for the limited market share (Lynch, 2000). If the mature/decline companies could undertake some “turnaround” strategies in order to reverse the “declining status” of the companies (e.g. undertaking divestitures in order to turn the company around in the longer term), the post-announcement returns for the divesting companies (in the mature/decline stage) may be improved.
4.4	Contribution and Analysis 
Contribution
The above section has illustrated the market reaction and cumulative returns for each life-cycle stage, including the late expansion stage, early mature stage and mature/decline stage. In order to compare the market reactions of different life-cycle stages, the following section presents a CARs chart and a detailed market reaction table for comparing the life-cycle stages. In other words, the abnormal returns on the announcement day and longer wealth effect on pre- and post-announcement period are presented in the following paragraphs. This author’s research makes two important contributions:

This is the first study to analyse the wealth effect, the abnormal returns on the announcement day, of UK divestitures sampled across different stages of the life cycle in great detail. While most of the empirical studies on the topic of divestitures suggest that there is a significant increase in shareholder wealth for the seller during the divestitures announcement period (Miles and Rosenfield, 1983; Alexander et al., 1984; Montgomery et al., 1984; Rosenfield, 1984; Jain, 1985; Klein, 1986; Tehranian et al., 1987; Afshar et al., 1992; John and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1995; Weston et al., 1998; Hanson and Song, 2000; Boone and Mulherin, 2001; Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001; Bates, 2005), this author seeks to present an in-depth analysis of the wealth effect in order to explain how different investors react to firms in different life cycle stages on the announcement day. In other words, this research introduces the idea that there are different market reactions for different firms across life cycle stages, even though they all have a positive market reaction. This author’s research contributes to understanding how the stock market reacts to different firms in different life cycle stages and then gives a detailed analysis. Overall, the positive stock market reaction could indicate that the market has confidence in these divestitures. The differences in abnormal returns on the announcement day for different firms, in different life cycle stages, are presented in later paragraphs.

This is a pioneering study to analyse, in detail, the longer wealth effect and abnormal returns in the pre- and post-announcement period, of a sample of UK divestitures in different life cycle stages. The author’s research contributes to understanding the wealth effect for the pre-announcement period (from day -20 to day 0), short term post-announcement period (from day 0 to day 5/day 10) and longer term post-announcement period (from day 5/day 10 to day 60). The details of these wealth effects are presented in later paragraphs. The analysis seeks to understand investor confidence around the announcement day. In other words, the pre- and post-announcement period is important for illustrating whether the market will have confidence before and after divestitures. Therefore, it is worthwhile undertaking the analysis in order to identify differences for pre- and post- wealth effects for divestitures across the life cycle. Overall, the author’s research is the first study to undertake a very detailed analysis for pre- and post-announcements of different firms in different life cycle stages.
Analysis

Table 4.8 AARs on the announcement day (for each life-cycle stage)
 	Late expansion stage	Early maturity stage	Mature/ decline stage
Sample size	69	89	85
 	 		 
Average abnormal returns(AARs) on the	 		 
announcement day	0.35%	0.51%	0.87%
AARs on the announcement day (trend)	Low	Middle	High
 	 		 
Long-run return: day 0 to day +60 (trend)	High	Middle	Low


Table 4.8, above, shows the AARs for different life cycle stages. This Table shows AARs of the companies remaining after the deletion of main and minor outliers and after the use of a thin-trading adjustment – approach 2. AAR is 0.35%, 0.51% and 0.87% for the late expansion, early maturity and mature/decline stages. In other words, the stock market reacts more positively to selling firms later in the life cycle stages. On the announcement day, the late expansion firms are likely to undertake divestitures for development reasons, there being a lot of development opportunities for young firms. When firms become more mature, they are likely to undertake divestitures for reasons of over-diversification, as they are likely to have over-diversified previously. 
Summary
Abnormal returns on the announcement day
Late expansion firms
Table 6.18 on page A-67 suggests that there are positive market reactions for late expansion firms on the announcement day. This reflects the fact that investors have an optimistic view of divestitures undertaken by late expansion firms. When late expansion firms announce divestitures, they are likely to use them as opportunities to enhance their future development potential. Buchholtz et al. (1999) suggest that organizational stability and growth (positive performance context) can encourage companies to undertake “proactive” divestitures. In other words, young companies could divest unwanted units in order to achieve further growth in the life cycle. Generally, the market has a positive reaction to these divestitures as they can help young firms to better growth in the life cycle. 
Mature/decline firms
Table 6.20 on page A-73 shows that there are strong positive ARs for mature/decline firms on the divestitures announcement day. Mature/decline firms are likely to have over-diversified previously, and may have suffered from poor financial characteristics, such as high debt and low growth potential. Therefore, investors may have formed a negative view of over-diversified companies. 

A firm’s poor financial performance can motivate the company to undertake divestitures as suggested by Duhaime and Grant (1984), Hamilton and Chow (1993), Sudarsanam (1995) and Schlingemann et al. (2000). A firm is likely to sell off a unit when it experiences high operating overheads and high levels of debt. Substantial funds can be obtained through selling off loss-making activities. In other words, when these companies announce that they are divesting, investors may be more enthusiastic about this news, as the proceeds of divestitures may be used to enhance their performance. Montgomery et al. (1984) suggest that divestitures motivated by a firm’s poor financial situation can send a positive signal to the market. This could be because divestitures can turn the company around. Afshar et al. (1992) suggest that the market tends to have a positive view of “performance improvement” divestitures undertaken by a financially weak company. This could be due to the firm’s willingness to improve future performance. Harrigan and Porter (1983) and Hax and Majluf (1984) suggest that divestment is an appropriate strategy for firms in a mature environment. In investors’ eyes, news of divestiture could have a greater impact on mature/decline firms than late expansion firms. Mature/decline companies make the right decisions by ridding themselves of low-prospect businesses, thus boosting investor confidence. The market welcomes news of restructuring and expects mature/decline companies to show significant improvement. This excitement in the market could make for significant positive returns for mature/decline firms on announcement day, and explain why there is stronger stock market reaction towards mature/decline firms. 













Longer wealth effect in pre and post announcement period
Figure 4‑1, above, shows pre- and post-announcement CARs after announcement day, illustrating the differences between late expansion firms and firms in the later life-cycle stages (e.g. early maturity firms and mature/decline firms). The following paragraphs examine different pre- and post-announcement periods in detail.
Pre-announcement period (From day -20 to day 0) 





Short term post announcement period (From day 0 to day 5 / day 10)
Day 0 to day +5 of the post-announcement period, for example, is the short term period after announcement day. The very strong announcement effect on announcement day could still last for only a short period, for example 5 to 10 days.  For the late expansion firms, there is a very deep increasing trend from day 0 to day +5, which reflects that the market still has a strong reaction after the announcement news. This may be related to the fact that day +5 is still only a few days after the announcement. The real potential of a divestment announcement for an expansion firm is still reflected a few days after the announcement. This is consistent with Montgomery et al. (1984), which shows that there is increasing market reaction after a strategic divestitures announcement. For the mature/decline firm, there is a very deep decreasing trend from day 0 to day 10. The market may not be confident that strong positive ARs on announcement day can be realised in the longer term. This explains the deep decreasing trend for mature/decline firms.

Longer term post announcement period (From day 5 / day 10 to day 60)
As was mentioned previously, on announcement day there is a significantly strong market reaction to late expansion firms, early mature firms and mature/decline firms. Divestiture within these companies is good news for the market and inspires confidence in investors. However, this reaction is likely to taper off during the post-announcement period. With the passage of time, the positive effect of the announcement could wear off and return investor confidence to its normal level, an occurrence quite common for most announcement news. Moreover, this effect could be faster for some companies than others, depending on how investors view these companies in the post-announcement period. The post-announcement period in this research is from a few days after announcement day to 60 days thereafter. During the post-announcement period, investors may pay more attention to real company potential. Investors are likely to be more interested in financial characteristics than the immediate announcement impact of divestitures news. This research aims to provide an explanation of the longer term wear-off effect  using the life cycle framework.
Late expansion firm
For late expansion firms, the strong positive market announcement reaction starts to wear off from day 5 until day 60. In other words, the market tries to return to normal. For example, stock markets try to adjust their market reactions to those of normal trading days. The wear-off effect takes time to return the market reaction to the norm, so it generally lasts from day 5 until day 60. On normal trading days, the market generally believes that late expansion companies in the earlier life cycle stages are in a better position, so there is a generally positive market reaction to expansion firms from day 5 to day 60. In other words, on normal trading days the market generally has a positive valuation of late expansion firms. Moreover, the general positive market reaction to late expansion firms on normal trading days can also be explained by the author’s previous research findings detailed in Chapter 3. Table 4.9, below, summarises Figure 3‑4 to Figure 3‑10. The aim is to use the author’s sample characteristics to support the author’s explanation of the different stock market reactions to different firms in different life cycle stages.   

Table 4.9 Summary of financial characteristic	










For a detailed literature explanation, please see Figure 3‑4 to Figure 3‑10. Firstly, growth potential may be a factor. As shown in Table 4.9 above, cluster 1 (the late expansion stage) has the highest growth potential compared with other clusters (the other life cycle stages). The highest mean values are for two growth variables: sales revenue and Tobin’s Q. This could imply that a young divesting company’s development potential is strong. The market realizes that young companies are better able to obtain growth in an expanding market. Secondly, as in Table 4.9 above, the highest mean values are for profitability in the late expansion stage and this suggests that the late expansion stage has the highest profitability compared with cluster life cycle stages. Investors believe that young firms have a better ability to gain greater profits.  Thirdly, as in Table 4.9 above, the lowest mean values for debt occur in the late expansion stage. This suggests the lowest levels of debt are in late expansion firms compared with firms in other stages. Investors have confidence in the lowest level of these young firms. Fourthly, Table 4.9 above shows that late expansion firms have the highest sales generating ability compared to firms in other life cycle stages. This suggests that late expansion firms have good potential for higher earnings and could use these earnings for further company development. In other words, the earning power of young firms can help them to a better competitive position in the life cycle. Overall, the above factors may explain why the market has confidence in young firms; this happens in both pre and post announcement periods. The market realizes the benefits of divestitures in the longer term. 
Early mature firms
There is a general declining CARs trend for early mature companies in the post-announcement period, such as after day +3. Investors have a negative reaction to these divestitures, which could be related to their relatively poor financial position in the life cycle. Although early mature firms have not reached the decline stage, they still need to put a lot of effort into turning around performance in order to avoid further decline. On the whole, investors do not support the idea that strong positive abnormal returns on the announcement day continue during the post-announcement period. In other words, the positive market reaction wears off in the post-announcement period. Growth potential could also be a reason why investors’ confidence is lowered. Table 4.9 above shows a medium level of growth potential for early mature firms, which implies that there are relatively limited development opportunities for these firms, as the market is already quite mature. While growth potential could be a key factor for investors to decide whether the company will be successful in the longer term, the limited growth potential of early mature firms could result in the declining trend of CARs in the post-announcement period. 
Mature/decline firms
The same wear-off effect also applies to mature/decline firms. Market reactions try to return to normal on normal trading days and wear-off happens after day +10. The market generally believes that mature/decline firms are in the later life cycle stage, and do not have a very good position in the life cycle. Therefore, there are decreasing market reaction trends for this normal trading day period, including after day 10. Furthermore, the downward CARs trend for mature/decline firms in the post-announcement period implies that investors lack confidence in these firms in the longer term and the strong, positive confidence of the divestitures announcement day is missing. The lack of confidence could be for the following reasons: firstly, mature/decline firms are likely to suffer from poor financial performance and are likely to use the divestiture proceeds to survive. This could weaken investors’ longer term confidence and result in the decreasing trend of CARs; secondly, once the excitement and strong confidence on announcement day has passed, investors realise that there is limited development potential and opportunity for profit (as the market could be saturated) for mature/decline firms. In other words, in the investors’ eyes, the real potential for these firms in the longer term is not as good as on announcement day. 


The above section has presented a detailed analysis of different event windows. We can see that investors have a positive view of the late expansion firms on the pre-announcement normal trading days, then deep increasing positive market reaction for day 0 to day +5 and then a positive view for the longer post-announcement normal trading days period (day +5 to day +60). This suggests that investors have a generally positive confidence in late expansion firms on normal trading days but a stronger positive market reaction after the divestitures announcement day. Overall, young firms are likely to have a good market reaction in the pre and post-announcement periods, consistent with the findings of Montgomery et al. (1984) that there is an increasing trend for CARs from the pre-announcement period to the post-announcement period. They suggest that strategic divestitures are viewed positively by the market.












Chapter 5:	Determinants of divestment ARs: life-cycle and governance factors
5.1	Introduction
The previous chapter examined the stock market reactions to different selling firms across the life cycle. It is worthwhile investigating the reasons behind the positive market reaction to these firms. Generally, good corporate governance in a company can send a positive signal to the market, resulting in investor confidence. In other words, corporate governance is likely to explain the determinants of the wealth effect for divesting firms. Prior corporate governance research has begun to look at the relation between corporate governance characteristics and divestment (Lang et al., 1995; Hanson and Song, 2000; Haynes et al., 2000). However, relatively little work has been conducted into the specific stage of the corporate governance life cycle and divestment performance. Lang et al. (1995) examined the relationship between managerial ownership and ARs for their sample of 93 divestitures from 1984 to 1989 and found that there is a higher AR for companies when they have higher managerial ownership. Haynes et al. (2000) also investigated the impact of board composition on divestment and they found a significant and positive relationship between them. Additionally, Hanson and Song (2000) examined the influence of outside directors on shareholder gains. They found that the board structure of the divesting company could affect shareholder gains. While Mueller (1972) suggests that the agency problem increases across the life cycle, this agency concept (different levels of agency problems across the life cycle) can also be applied to divestment. When managers make decisions on divestment, they may consider their own interests or the interests of their companies. Generally, management’s divestment decisions are related to the divesting company’s position. For example, the late expansion stage may create divestment opportunities for companies and the mature/decline stage may pressurize them into undertaking divestitures (e.g. divesting a loss-making unit).
5.2	Objective and structure
This chapter hopes to provide a detailed understanding of the relationship between corporate governance, life cycle and abnormal returns of divestitures firms. It is useful to investigate different agency variables (blockholders’ ownership, managerial ownership, the percentage of non-executive directors, debt, the size of the divested segment and the size of the company) for divestitures firms. In general, a strong management control system could minimise the agency problem, enhancing the confidence of investors, and ensuring a more positive reaction in the market to these divestitures (as they are unlikely to be linked to agency motives). In order to analyse the impact of the agency problem on shareholder wealth for UK divesting companies in different life cycle stages, this study uses regression analysis to examine the impact of different agency variables on the stock market reaction to these divesting companies on the announcement day. Previous literature has not examined the corporate governance impact on divestment shareholder wealth in the life cycle stages. For example, Filatotchev et al. (2006) suggested the idea that monitoring level increases proportionally with the maturity of a company.  However, some of the most important corporate governance variables, such as non-executive directors, debt, blockholders and managerial ownership, were not analysed in regression.  The advantage of having this detailed regression is that the impact of the individual corporate governance variable on divestment shareholder wealth can be easily analysed in life cycle stages. Through this detailed analysis, different corporate governance variables can be compared. This study gives a full picture for corporate governance, divestment shareholder wealth and life cycle.  

This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.3 presents the criteria for choosing the right data for this regression chapter. Furthermore, different definitions for explanatory, corporate governance, variables are also presented. Section 5.4 shows different hypotheses and regression models. This section expands on the reasons for using different explanatory variables for regression. Section 5.4 also presents different regression results. Different regression models are presented and these models show the relationship between different explanatory variables and the wealth effect of selling firms. Section 5.5 gives the conclusion. 
5.3	Data 




Table 5.1 Regression variables	

 	Regression Variables	Calculation	 	name
1	Total Blockholders’ ownership	Total percentage of all the blockholders' ownership	lblock
2	Managerial ownership	Number of ordinary shares owned by executive managers divided by total 	lman
 	 	 	ordinary shares from a company	 
3	The percentage of non-executive directors	Number of non  executive directors divided by total number of all the directors 	nonexe
4	Debt	 	Total debt divided by total equity	debt
5	Size of the divested unit	Announcement price of divestitures divided	ssidivest
 	unit	 	by market value on -41 day	 	 
6	Firm size	 	Market value of the firm	 	smv
7	Market share	 	Total sales for a company divided by total 	lms
 	 	 	sales for the industry	 	 	 
8	Life cycle stage	 	Dummy variables for life cycle stages	stage1 (late expansion stage)
 	 	 	 			 	stage2 (early mature stage)
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	stage3 (mature/decline stage)












It is of value to gain an understanding of all regression variables. Table 5.1 above shows that the total block shareholders’ ownership is the regression variable, calculated according to the total percentage of all block shareholders’ ownership. This could provide an insight into the aggregate percentage of all block shareholders that might monitor company performance. Managerial ownership is the regression variable,  calculated by dividing the number of ordinary shares owned by managers divided by total ordinary shares to give a picture of the number of shares owned by the managers in a company. The percentage of non-executive directors is the regression variable, calculated by dividing the number of non executive directors by the total number of directors. This variable can provide an idea of how many non-executive directors are on the board, to provide a monitoring function for a company. Total debt is calculated by dividing the total debt by total equity. This variable can indicate whether a company is heavily in debt. The size of the divested unit is calculated by dividing the announcement price of the divestiture by the market value. This variable can show the proportion of the selling company represented by the unit divested. The size of the firm is calculated by its market value. Market share is calculated by the total sales for a firm divided by total sales for the industry. This variable shows the proportion of the market owned by the company. Life cycle stage variables include dummy variables for the late expansion stage (stage 1), early mature stage (stage 2) and mature/decline stage (stage 3). This variable shows the growth rate of the divesting firm. Industry variables include basic industry, cyclical industry (cyclical consumer and cyclical services industry), general industrials industry, noncyclical industry (non-cyclical consumer and non-cyclical services) and resources (resources and utilites) industry. Interaction variables show the interaction between life cycle stage and corporate governance variable. 

5.4	Hypothesis and regression models 
First hypothesis




H0(null hypothesis):	The size of the divested units is independent of the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.
H1(alternative hypothesis):	The size of the divested units is positively related to the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.
Second hypothesis –Corporate Governance 
The objective of this second regression hypothesis is to present the relationship between different corporate governance variables and divestment ARs on the announcement day. The discussion in the previous section suggests that blockholder ownership, the percentage of non-executive directors, debt and  managerial ownership, are management control variables that can have a positive impact on monitoring management performance. For example, a strong corporate governance system, such as blockholders and a large percentage of non-executive directors, can send a positive signal to investors, enhancing investor confidence. Debt can also motivate managers to reduce self-interested activity and enhance the firm’s value. Managerial ownership can be an effective corporate governance variable to motivate managers to make better divestment decisions, sending a positive management control signal to the market and enhancing the value of the divesting company. This study expects there to be a positive relationship between the following corporate governance variables and the wealth effect of divesting firms.
Total blockholder percentage

H0 (null hypothesis):	The total blockholder percentage would have no impact on the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day. 
H1(alternative hypothesis):	The total blockholder percentage would have a positive impact on the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.

The percentage of the non-executive directors
H0 (null hypothesis):	The percentage of non-executive directors is not associated with the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.
H1(alternative hypothesis):	The percentage of non-executive directors is associated (positively) with the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.

Debt
H0 (null hypothesis):	The debt is not related to the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.
H1(alternative hypothesis):	The debt is positively related to the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.
Managerial ownership
H0 (null hypothesis):	Managerial ownership would have no influence on the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the announcement day.
H1(alternative hypothesis):	Managerial ownership would have a positive influence on the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the announcement day.

Third hypothesis - Joint Effects
The third hypothesis enables further investigation of the impact of interaction variables (more detailed specific relationships between the life cycle stage variable and the corporate governance variable) on divestment ARs. While companies in different life cycle stages need to survive in a competitive business environment, strong corporate governance systems can greatly enhance company performance, giving investors a positive view of these companies. This study expects that the interaction variables, such as life cycle stage and total blockholders’ percentage, life cycle stage and percentage of non-executive directors, life cycle stage and debt, the life cycle stage and managerial ownership, will have a positive impact on ARs of divesting firms.
Life cycle stage and total blockholders’ percentage
H0 (null hypothesis):	Life cycle stage and total blockholders’ percentage would have no impact on the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day. 
H1(alternative hypothesis):	Life cycle stage and total blockholders’ percentage would have positive impact on the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.

Life cycle stage and the percentage of non-executive directors
H0 (null hypothesis):	Life cycle stage and the percentage of non-executive directors is not associated with the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.
H1(alternative hypothesis):	Life cycle stage and the percentage of non-executive directors is positively associated with the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.
Life cycle stage and debt
H0 (null hypothesis):	Life cycle stage and debt would have no impact on the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day. 
H1(alternative hypothesis):	Life cycle stage and debt would have positive impact on the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day.

Life cycle stage and Managerial ownership
H0 (null hypothesis):	Life cycle stage and managerial ownership would have no impact on the shareholders’ wealth of the divesting firms on the divestiture announcement day. 







The following models examine the impact of different variables on ARs. 
First proposition
The first regression model for the first proposition focuses on examining control variables:  
 = α  + smv + lms  + Ind  + εi                                                    (1)      
                               
where  = ARs on the announcement day, smv is the square root of size of the divesting company, lms is the log of market share and Ind are industries dummies for all industries, cyclical, general industrials, noncyclic and resources. Basic industry acts as a comparison dummy variable.
Control variable – Firm size
The size of divesting companies could be another important factor for divestitures. There is a significant positive relationship between company size (log of sales) and divestment (Haynes et al., 2005), which could be related to market confidence. If the divesting company is bigger, it is more significant in that industry and more likely to have a greater impact. Big companies may be more powerful companies, as their divestiture decisions may have an important impact on other companies in that industry.

In this study, the size of the company acts as the control variable in this regression. The reason for having a control variable is to control the size effect in the regression. Although this study’s sample is focused on the 500 top companies (according to Datastream’s Market Value ranking), there may be a size difference between the top 50 companies and the bottom 50 companies in the list. Varying company sizes can result in different market reactions. For example, investors may have a greater reaction to the biggest company undertaking divestitures, which may be related to the fact that the biggest companies get more attention in the stock market, but react differently when divestitures are undertaken by smaller companies. In other words, the size of a company can create a different impact on the stock market. In order to present objective regression, the researcher has used the size of the divesting companies as the control variable.
Control variable – market share
Market share acts as a control variable. The reason for having this variable is to control the market share effect in the regression. Market share shows the proportion of the market serviced by the company. Market share can also show if a firm is dominant or has obtained a significant share in the market as well as the firm’s competitive strength in the market. The changes in market share for a company could show how well a firm is performing. An increase in market share could show that a company has used a development strategy to gain more of the market share. Equally, a decrease in the market share could show a firm was using relatively fewer development strategies. Therefore, market share has been added in the regression as a control variable. 

Control variable--Industries dummies
An Industry variable has been put into this regression as the dummy variable.  There are different divestitures in different industries. It is possible that all divestitures are influenced by a common divestitures factor across all industries. It may be the case that different industries are affected by the most common trend in divestment rather than a reason specific to a certain industry. This study has 5 industry dummy variables (cyclical, general industrials, non-cyclical, resources and basic industry). The industry classifications are obtained from Datastream. In STATA, 4 main dummies (with the exception of basic industry) are put into a regression. One dummy variable, (in this case, basic industry) needs to be excluded to serve as a comparison. 
 The second regression model for the first proposition:
The second regression model for the first proposition focuses on examining the size of divested unit, life cycle stage and control variables:

 = α  + ssidivest + stage2  + stage3  +  smv +  lms 
           +  Ind  + εi                                                                                           ( 2)                                                                                    

where  = ARs on the announcement day, ssidivest is the square root of the size of the divested unit, stage 2 is a dummy variable for early mature firms, stage 3 is a dummy variable for mature/decline firms, smv is the square root of the size of the divesting company, lms is the log of market share and Ind are industries dummies for all industries, cyclical, general industrials, noncyclic and resources. Basic industry acts as a comparison dummy variable.
Size of the divested units
The size of divested unit variable is explained in the previous chapter.
Life cycle stage dummies
A stage 2 dummy —early mature stage, and stage 3 dummy —mature/decline stage have been put into this regression hypothesis. Stage1 is a comparison dummy variable (to be compared with the other dummy variables: stage 2 dummy —early mature stage and stage 3 dummy —mature/decline stage). The reason for adding the comparison dummy is to compare the difference between the AR of stage 1 and the AR of stages 2 & 3. This study seeks to examine which stage has the highest ARs. For example, the AR of stage 3 is greater than those of stage 1, and the AR of stage 2 is higher than that of stage 1.
Control variable--Industries dummies, market share and firm size
These variables are explained in the previous section.
Second proposition (Corporate governance)
The first regression model for the second proposition focuses on examining control variables:

 = α  + smv + lms  + Ind  + εi                                                        (3)      

The second regression model for the second proposition focuses on examining corporate governance and control variables. Hierarchical regression analysis is used. One corporate governance variable is added for different regressions.

 = α  +   lblock +  smv +  lms  +  Ind + ε i                               (4)
                                  
 = α  +   lblock +  nonexe +   smv   +  lms  +  Ind               (5)
                                   
 = α  +   lblock +  nonexe +   debt   +  smv +  lms               (6)   
           + Ind  + ε i                                   

 = α  +   lblock +  nonexe +   debt   +  lman + smv              (7)    
           + lms +  Ind +  ε i                                   


where  = ARs on the announcement day, lblock is the log of blockholders’ ownership, nonexe is the percentage of non-executive directors, debt is debt, lman is the log of managerial ownership.

Third proposition (Joint Effects: life cycle and corporate governance)
The first regression model for the third proposition focuses on examining control variables:

 = α  + smv + lms  + Ind  + εi                                                        (8)      

The second regression model for the third proposition focuses on examining all variables:

 = α  +  ssidivest + stage 2 +  stage 3 +  stage3_lblock + 
 stage3_nonexe +  stage3_debt   +  stage3_lman +  smv +  lms 
+  Ind + ε i                                                                                                       (9)

                              





Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics	














Before transformation, the kurtosis for some variables is very high. For example, kurtosis of mv is 25.168, sidivest is 18.887 and ms is 18.198 (not shown in this thesis). As kurtosis for these variables is high, transformation is needed. Transformation is achieved using the “ladder” and “gladder” commands from STATA 9.0 in order to determine the most appropriate method. The square root transformation is best for the size of the company and the size of the divested unit. Log is the best transformation for block shareholders, managerial ownership and market share. After transformation, the kurtosis problem for these variables is reduced. Table 5.2 above shows the descriptive statistics for variables. For example, for the kurtosis of variable smv, the transformed value is 8.137; for the kurtosis of variable ssidivest, the transformed value is 6.386; for the kurtosis of variable lblock, the transformed value is 2.296; for the kurtosis of variable lman, the transformed value is 4.152, for the kurtosis of variable lms, the transformed value is 3.665. 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics for different industries































The above table shows the descriptive statistics for different industries (basic=basic industry, cyclical= cyclical industry, general industrials = general industrials industry, non-cyclical = non-cyclical industry, resources = resources industry). The highest numbers of divestitures are in the cyclical industry and the lowest numbers of divestitures are in the general industrials industry. For the corporate governance variable, the percentage of non-executive directors (nonexe) is quite similar across the different industries, ranging from 42.5 per cent to 50.9 per cent. For the size variable, divesting companies are large in the non-cyclical industry, and the size of the divested unit is large in the resources industry. While the market has a positive view of divestitures in most industries (there are positive ARs for most industries), investors have most confidence in resources divestitures, where there are the highest ARs = +0.010). After examining the descriptive statistics, it is appropriate to move on to regression results. The following section show details of correlation tables in order to help the reader understand correlation coefficients of variables. Also, the following section shows regression analysis results in order to help the reader understand the relationship between variables.

Regression Analysis: Correlation
Hypothesis 1  (control variables)



















Table 5.4 shows all the correlation coefficients for all variables, including control variables, such as firm size (smv), market share (lms) and industry variables, such as cyclical industry (cyclical), general industry(general), non-cyclic industry (noncyclic) and resources industry (resources). For each of the variables, the first row is correlation coefficient and the second row is p-value. The correlation coefficients are all below 0.5 in this Table 5.4.


Hypothesis 1  (Size of divested unit, life cycle stage and control variables)
Table 5.5 Correlation Coefficients 






























Table 5.6 Correlation coefficients
































Hypothesis 1  (Size of divested unit, life cycle stage and control variables)
Table 5.5 shows all the correlation coefficients for the regression models, including size of divested unit, life cycle stage variables and control variables. The correlation coefficient is -0.584 between variable stage2 and variable stage3.
This correlation coefficient is higher than 0.5, so a correlation is deemed to exist between stage 2 and stage 3. In order to reduce the correlation between variables for regression, one of these variables needs to be deleted. It is more important to study stage 3, which is the final stage of the life cycle, as this may establish a stronger difference between the earliest (stage 1) and final life cycle (stage 3) stage in this study, so variable stage 3 is retained and variable stage 2 is deleted. Table 5.6 shows the correlation coefficient for all variables after deleting the stage 2 variable. The correlation coefficients for all the variables are below 0.5, so there is no correlation relationship for all these variables. This is likely to enhance the reliability of the regression results.


Table 5.7 Regression Model	




































Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, resepectively.








Hypothesis 2  (Corporate governance and control variables)
Table 5.8 Correlation coefficients	

































Table 5.9 Regression Model











































Table 5.9 shows the regression result for all corporate governance and control variables. The regression model 3 shows coefficients and p-values for all control variables. For regression model 5, 6 and 7, the percentage of non-executive directors (nonexe) is positively significant related to AR for divesting firms. This result suggests that non-executive directors can have a positive monitoring function on managers of divesting firms, and that investors believe that this positive monitoring function can enhance a firm’s value. This result is in line with discussion in previous literature section. However, none of the other agency variables have significant relationship with the AR of divesting firms. This result shows that other corporate governance variables are not appropriate for explaining AR for divesting firms in this study. 





Table 5.10 Correlation coefficients


































Table 5.11 Correlation Coefficients


























Hypothesis 3  Interaction (Corporate governance and life cycle stage)




















































 	Market value (m)	Market value (m)	Market value(m)	 
 	 	 	 	 
 	 	 	 	 


















Table 5.13  shows the sum of all market values for two samples: the 243 original firms from Chapter Four and the 137 firms from Chapter Five. For Chapter Four’s sample, stage 1 has the lowest market values (sum of market values for all firms), stage 2 has the middle level of market values and stage 3 has the highest level of market values. For Chapter Five’s sample, stage 2 has the highest market values and stages 1 and 3 have similar levels. The third column shows the difference (sum of all market values) between these 2 samples, illustrating a significant drop in terms of market value for each stage of the life cycle. There is a decrease in market values in stage 1, a greater decrease in stage 2 and a very large drop in market values in stage 3. Given that the number of firms deleted for each life cycle are very similar, this Table shows a large decrease in market value for stage 3.  













This thesis is a pioneering study which examines divestment through the lens of corporate governance and the life cycle paradigm. In order to address the literature gap and understand the growth factor in the life cycle, this thesis contributes to the study of the following issues: The importance of the growth factor is highlighted in this research. Indeed, growth is significant for the life cycle. Tobin’s Q is being used as a pioneering classification variable to classify different divestitures into different growth stages. The growth factor can help readers to understand divestitures in detail. Most of traditional literature presents the wealth effect and divestment without including the growth factor. This research contributes to the study of divestment in a new dimension. In order to address the ignorance of the growth factor issue, this research studies different wealth effects of divestitures across different growth stages in great detail. One of the key contributions of this research is to present a detailed picture of the stock market reaction. In other words, this research illustrates how different markets react to divestitures across different life cycle stages. This can help investors to understand more about the growth status of firms and then make relevant investment decisions.

Another contribution is to understand the relationship between corporate governance and the wealth effect of divestitures. For example, which corporate governance factor/factors could explain the stock market reaction? To sum up, this research brings out the importance of the growth factor and its role in divestitures. It contributes to readers’ understanding of divestitures through a new dimension: divestitures, growth stages across the life cycle and corporate governance. Chapters Three, Four and Five have presented the empirical results, i.e. the methodology, sample criteria, research findings and explanation for the findings. It is now appropriate to sum up this research in order to give a brief review, or reminder of the main summary. Overall, this has been a study of divestment from three main angles: company classification; the market reaction to divestments; and management. The first step was to classify different UK companies into their life cycle stages, in order that the relevant divesting firms fall into the relevant groups. The second phase was the study of market reactions to each specific life cycle stage, in order to understand investors’ confidence in firms across the life cycle. The final stage was to study the reason behind the market reactions from the corporate governance perspective. In other words, this research has tried to explain the share price analysis from a management point of view. Generally, this research hopes to provide an in-depth analysis for UK divesting firms across the life cycle, thereby helping the reader to a better understanding of specific characteristics for specific life cycle stages. 

In Chapter Three, the classification of a sample of divesting firms was examined using factor and cluster methodology. This has enhanced the work of previous research by focusing on the analysis of more variables.  For example, growth and concentration ratio variables are examined in detail in Chapter Three.  In Chapter Four, the abnormal returns for divesting firms were examined using the market model. The stock market reaction to different firms in different life cycle stages was also investigated. Two t-tests are used in this chapter in order to ensure the robustness of the statistical tests. Chapter Five discussed the influence of corporate governance on divesting firms in different stages of the life cycle by using regression.    
6.2	Discussion and findings
After the brief review, it is appropriate to move to a discussion of the findings of this research, so that the reader can have an overview of the main findings in all chapters. There is a major finding in Chapter Three. The main part of the research is to improve on previous research by adding two variables, revenue growth and concentration ratio, and using Tobin’s Q to determine the clusters. The factor analysis obtained four factors, including market power, liquidity, sales generating and profit. The cluster analysis found three clusters and they were determined by the value of Tobin’s Q as early expansion, late expansion and mature/decline. 

My research then studied the market reaction in order to understand the specifics of investor confidence for specific life cycle stages.  In Chapter Four, the event study chapter, the stock market reaction to divesting firms was examined using the market model, including two different test statistics methods (Brown and Warner (1985) and Dodd and Warner (1983)). On the announcement day, the positive abnormal returns are found to increase in value across all three stages of the life cycle. Firms in different stages of the life cycle undertake divestiture for different reasons. Late expansion firms are likely to undertake divestitures for the reason of further development. However, the mature/decline companies are likely to undertake divestitures for the reason of over-diversification. In the short term share price analysis, investors are more positive towards divestitures undertaken by mature/decline firms. This could be because the market is generally more appreciative of “signs of improvement” from the mature/decline firms if they correct the previous mistake of over-diversification. 

On the other hand, for the longer post-announcement period, the market appears to have a positive view of divestitures by late expansion firms and a negative view of divestitures by mature/decline firms. This is an interesting finding, as the share reaction trend for the long-term post-announcement period is opposite to the share reaction trend for the announcement day. Late expansion firms are likely to have greater development opportunities and investors prefer the potential divestiture benefits in the longer term. However, the market appears skeptical regarding the ability of mature/decline firms to provide benefits in the post-announcement period. This may result in weaker investor confidence for the divestitures of mature/decline companies in the longer run. Once the different stock market reactions across the life cycle have been determined, this research then examines the key factors behind the stock market reaction. In other words, this research has tried to understand the determinant behind the positive market reaction. Chapter Five found significant positive relationships between the size of a divested unit and the stock market reaction to divesting companies on the announcement day. The abnormal returns for divesting firms suggest that investors have confidence in the divestitures and are positive in their view of the size of the divested unit.  Additionally, Chapter Five found a significant positive relationship between the percentage of non-executive directors and the abnormal returns of divesting firms, thus providing support for the corporate governance hypothesis. This result indicates that corporate governance still has a monitoring role on management.
6.3	Limitations and Recommendations
The literature which examines the relationship between divestitures and the life cycle is limited. The improved methodology for classifying each stage of the life cycle using the growth factor, Tobin’s Q, may prove to be a pioneering step. It is hoped that my study can provide a pioneering platform and motivate further research. This thesis has focused on a specific time period within which the life cycle and its effect on divestment have been analysed. Therefore, this research can only focus on the wealth effect of divestment, corporate governance and life cycle. There may be other different and fascinating research areas covering the whole economic spectrum, if more time and funding could be made available in the future, for example, the impact of the life cycle on mergers and acquisitions, and the relationship between economy and the life cycle from the restructuring point of view. 

As this thesis has studied divestitures in the late 1990s, from 1996 to 2000, the main analysis of divestitures is related to this specific period only. Further studies can be developed in the future, such as investigating the difference between divestitures and the life cycle in the early 2000s and in the late 2000s. Over changing time periods, interesting results could be found and developed. Finally, this research provides a study combination of calculation and analysis. Different stages of the life cycle are studied. Further study in the future could focus on one life cycle stage with a detailed analysis.  
6.4	Implications
Implications for research
This research contributes to ideas for the future direction of research in this area. In most of the previous literature, researchers investigated their samples without analysing the stages of the life cycle. The benefit of using the corporate life cycle as a framework is that the research can be more “specific” and “focused”. Through analysing the research sample in different stages of the life cycle, the “specific” characteristics of that sample in the relevant stages of the life cycle can be examined, increasing the accuracy of the research. This study contributes to the future direction of research in finance, as it could be widely used in many other areas of finance, such as mergers and acquisitions and economy. 
Implications for companies in the finance industry
My research aims to illustrate the clear life cycle framework, including tailor-made and intensive market reactions to the different life cycle stages. Hopefully, this research will be put into practical use, enabling companies to have a better understanding of the life cycle framework. 

Furthermore, my study can contribute to a better understanding of the position of a company. Although there is a general concept for classifying companies using industry or size classification, this does not say much about the actual growth stage of a company. The reason for understanding the growth stage is to help companies plan their current and future decisions. Companies may be more able to enhance their position by using the right life cycle strategy.  
Implications for individual investors
Most investors have aspirations to become winners in the stock market. However, there are many investment options in the stock market.  Is there a framework that may help investors to understand their companies’ positions in more detail, and make more appropriate investment choices?

It is hoped that this life cycle research will encourage investors to think more about the growth status of their stock. It may be a general conception that blue chip shares are relatively stable, but this is not necessarily the case. Although blue chip companies do have relative stability, there are different growth stages, such as expansion, maturity or decline, within blue chip companies. Investors can choose the shares that are most suited to their investment strategy. For example, investors with a cautious strategy can buy shares that have relatively stable growth positions. Investors with an aggressive strategy can buy shares that have fast-growing positions. By understanding the life cycle, investors can fully understand and analyse share positions. Chapter Four provides a detailed analysis of different market reactions to different divestment companies, relative to the different stages in the life cycle. This research hopes to provide valuable assistance to investors, in order to help them make more appropriate investment decisions.
             

Appendix A:	Appendix for Chapter 4 
The previous chapter (Chapter 3: Classification), includes 300 divestiture companies. In other words, these 300 companies act as the original companies for this event study chapter. There are also outliers (major and minor outliers are highlighted and deleted) for the Brown and Warner (1985) and Dodd and Warner (1983) tests, leaving 243 companies for the BW test and 207 companies for the DW test. 
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Comparison of multi-announcement companies (49 divestitures companies) and original companies (300 divestitures companies)



























































































































































































































































Table 6.4 Multi-announcement companies (49 divestitures companies) 
 	 	 	 	 	Event variance	 	Estimation variance	 






































Table 6.5 Original companies (300 divestitures companies)
 	 	 	 	 	Event variance	 	Estimation variance	 






































Table 6.2 examines the share price performance, including ARs and CARs, for multi-announcement companies, and Table 6.3 investigates ARs and CARs for the original companies. From Table 6.2, there are significant positive abnormal returns (AR is 0.00833, significant at the 1% level) for the multi-announcement companies on the announcement day. From Table 6.3, there are significant positive abnormal returns (AR is 0.00309, significant at the 5% level) for the original companies on the announcement day. Both groups of companies show significant positive share price performance on the announcement day, and also show that there are insignificant CARs for around the announcement periods.

Table 6.4 presents the pre- and post-event windows for multi-announcement companies and Table 6.5 shows the pre- and post-event windows for the original companies. Both of these tables show a similar share price performance pattern. Table 6.4 shows that there are significant positive CARs for nearly all pre-event windows and Table 6.5  shows significant positive share price performance for most of the pre-event windows, such as days (-2,0), days (-3,0), days (-4,0), days (-5,0), days (-10,0), days (-30,0), days(-50,0) and days (-60,0). In other words, these two samples show similar positive share price performance patterns before the announcement day (e.g. during the pre-announcement period).     

For the post-announcement period, Table 6.4 shows that there are significant positive CARs for the shorter post-announcement period, such as days (0,+1), days (0,+2), days (0,+3), days (0,+4), days (0,+5) and days (0,+10). For the longer post announcement period, such as days (0,+30), days(0,+40), days(0,+50) and days (0,+60), there are negative significant CARs. 

Table 6.5 shows a significant positive share price pattern for the shorter post-announcement period, such as (0,+2), days (0,+3), days (0,+4), days (0,+5) and days (0,+10). There is also a significant negative share price performance for the longer post-announcement period, such as days (0,+10), days (0,+20), days (0,+30), days(0,+40), days(0,+50) and days (0,+60). In other words, these two groups (multi-announcement companies and original companies) show a similar positive stock market reaction for the shorter post-announcement period and a negative share price trend for the longer post-announcement period. 

Figure 6‑1 CARs graph

Figure 6‑1, above, shows the CARs pattern for both the original 300 companies and selected companies (49 companies with multi-announcement effects) during days -60,+60 period. The x-axis is the number of event days and the y-axis is the CARs. Both of the CARs lines show a very similar pattern, having the first CARs peak on around day -45. These lines then have another CARs peak on around day -18 and CARs bottom on around day -7, with an increasing CARs trend from day -7 to announcement day and then decreasing from announcement day to day +37. 
Although these two lines have different levels of CARs ups and downs, they have very similar CARs trends during days -60,+60. In other words, these two groups of companies show a very similar share price pattern. 


Equation 1	Dodd and Warner
According to Dodd and Warner (1983), for each of the security j, cumulative prediction error (CPE) is defined as the measure of abnormal performance between the two dates ( and ).
			            				(1)
The expected value of CPE = 0 when there is no abnormal performance. 
The mean cumulative prediction error (CPE) is defined as the measure of abnormal performance between two dates for the sample of N securities.
								 (2)
The expected value of mean CPE = 0 when there is no abnormal performance.
For each security j, the standardized prediction error () is defined as the standardization of prediction error by the square root of its estimated forecast variance.


	              				(3)
where
 ², 300
 is the estimated residual variance for security j.
 is the average market return for the control period.
 is the return to FTSE all share index at day t.
For each security j, the standardized cumulative prediction error is calculated as:
The summation of the standardized prediction errors  for each of the days.  
						    (4)
For the sample of N securities, the test of significance of average standardized cumulative prediction error is calculated as: 
 									              (5)
















Table 6.6 Late expansion stage (industry classification)	
 	Company name	Industry (INDM3)	Industry (INDM5)
1	British Steel PLC	BASIC INDUSTRIES	STEEL
2	De La Rue               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
3	Burmah Castrol          	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
4	Reuters Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
5	EMAP                    	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
6	Boots Group             	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, MULTI DEPT
7	Marks & Spencer         	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, MULTI DEPT
8	Burmah Castrol          	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
9	Polypipe                	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
10	IMI       	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
11	Vodafone Group          	NON-CYCLICAL SERVICES	TELECOM WIRELESS
12	Wassall                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRY
13	BTP                     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
14	EMAP                    	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
15	BPB                     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
16	TI Group                	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
17	Unilever                	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
18	SmithKline Beecham      	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	PHARMACEUTICALS
19	Bunzl                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
20	Premier Farnell         	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT(ELECTRONICS)
21	Kingfisher              	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, MULTI DEPT
22	Unilever                	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
23	Tomkins                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
24	SmithKline Beecham      	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	PHARMACEUTICALS
25	Sema                    	INFORMATION TECHNO.	COMPUTER SERVICES
26	Exel   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RAIL, ROAD, FREIGHT
27	AGA Foodservice         	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
28	Capital Radio           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	TV, RADIO AND FILM
29	Bodycote International  	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
30	Tomkins                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
31	Davis Service Group     	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT (TEXTILE)
32	SmithKline Beecham      	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	PHARMACEUTICALS
33	Barratt Developments    	BASIC INDUSTRIES	HOUSE BUILDING
34	EMAP                    	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
35	GUS                     	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, MULTI DEPT
36	Tomkins                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
37	Body Shop International 	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
38	Unilever                	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
39	Spirent                 	INFORMATION TECHNO.	TELECOM EQUIPMENT
40	Wolseley                	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDERS MERCHANTS
41	Smith (W.H.)            	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
42	BTP                     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
43	Wolseley                	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDERS MERCHANTS
44	Serco Group             	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
45	BTP                     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
46	Tomkins                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
47	Alliance UniChem        	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	PHARMACEUTICALS
48	Bunzl                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
49	Smith (W.H.)            	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
50	Vickers                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
51	McKechnie Group         	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	AEROSPACE
52	EMAP                    	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
53	GKN                     	CYCLICAL CONSUMER	AUTO PARTS
54	Amersham                	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	MED EQUIP + SUPPLIES
55	Wolseley                	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDERS MERCHANTS
56	Hays                    	CYCLICAL SERVICES	EDUCATION + TRAINING
57	Marconi                 	INFORMATION TECHNO.	TELECOM EQUIPMENT
58	Smith (W.H.)            	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
59	Britax International    	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	AEROSPACE (AUTOMOTIVE)
60	National Express Group  	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RAIL, ROAD, FREIGHT
61	Serco Group             	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
62	Boots Group             	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, MULTI DEPT
63	Sema                    	INFORMATION TECHNO.	COMPUTER SERVICES
64	N. Brown Group          	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
65	GKN                     	CYCLICAL CONSUMER	AUTO PARTS
66	Carpetright             	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
67	BTP                     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
68	Misys                   	INFORMATION TECHNO.	SOFTWARE
69	Cadbury Schweppes       	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
70	Reuters Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
71	Unilever                	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
72	Pearson                 	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
73	AstraZeneca             	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	PHARMACEUTICALS
74	Arriva                  	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RAIL, ROAD, FREIGHT
75	Jarvis                  	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT (RAIL)
76	Johnson Matthey         	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
77	Hepworth                	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
78	De La Rue               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
79	Wolseley                	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDERS MERCHANTS
80	Smith & Nephew          	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	MED EQUIP + SUPPLIES
81	Rentokil Initial        	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
82	United Business Media   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
83	BBA Group               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	AIRLINES + AIRPORTS
84	Alliance UniChem        	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	PHARMACEUTICALS
85	United Business Media   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING






Table 6.7 Early maturity stage (industry classification)	
 	Company name	Industry (INDM3)	Industry (INDM5)
1	Lonmin      	RESOURCES 	OTHER MINING
2	Stakis                  	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
3	Greene King             	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RESTAURANTS AND PUBS
4	Allied Domecq           	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
5	Medeva                  	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	PHARMACEUTICALS
6	First Leisure Corpn.    	CYCLICAL SERVICES	GAMBLING
7	Reckitt Benckiser       	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTS
8	Whitbread               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RESTAURANTS AND PUBS
9	BTR                     	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
10	De Vere Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
11	BOC Group               	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, COMMODITY
12	Hilton Group            	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
13	United Business Media   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
14	Cadbury Schweppes       	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
15	BP 	RESOURCES 	OIL INTEGRATED
16	Allied Domecq           	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
17	Croda International     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
18	United Business Media   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
19	Antofagasta  	RESOURCES 	OTHER MINING
20	Hyder                   	UTILITIES 	WATER
21	Thames Water            	UTILITIES 	WATER
22	BG Group                	RESOURCES 	OIL INTEGRATED (UTILITIES)
23	De Vere Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
24	Peninsular & Oriental   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	SHIPPING AND PORTS
25	Hilton Group            	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
26	Johnston Press          	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
27	Scottish Power          	UTILITIES 	ELECTRICITY
28	United Utilities        	UTILITIES 	WATER
29	Rank Group              	CYCLICAL SERVICES	LEISURE FACILITIES
30	Rentokil Initial        	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
31	Scot. & Southern Energy 	UTILITIES 	ELECTRICITY
32	Cable & Wireless        	NON-CYCLICAL SERVICES	TELECOM FIXED LINE
33	Tate & Lyle             	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
34	Rank Group              	CYCLICAL SERVICES	LEISURE FACILITIES
35	Rio Tinto               	RESOURCES 	OTHER MINING
36	Reckitt Benckiser       	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTS
37	Scapa Group             	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMS.ADVANCED MATS.
38	Cable & Wireless        	NON-CYCLICAL SERVICES	TELECOM FIXED LINE
39	De Vere Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
40	Blue Circle Industries  	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
41	Whitbread               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RESTAURANTS AND PUBS
42	Spectris                	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
43	British Airways         	CYCLICAL SERVICES	AIRLINES + AIRPORTS
44	United Utilities        	UTILITIES 	WATER
45	Lonmin                  	RESOURCES 	OTHER MINING
46	Tesco                   	NON-CYCLICAL SERVICES	FOOD + DRUG RETAILERS
47	Ashtead Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT (INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT )
48	BOC Group               	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, COMMODITY
49	Lonmin                  	RESOURCES 	OTHER MINING
50	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
51	Charter                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
52	SmithKline Beecham      	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	PHARMACEUTICALS
53	Allied Domecq           	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
54	Hanson                  	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
55	Mirror Group            	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
56	Croda International     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
57	De Vere Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
58	Pearson                 	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
59	Lonmin                  	RESOURCES 	OTHER MINING
60	Wetherspoon (J.D.)      	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RESTAURANTS AND PUBS
61	Diageo                  	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
62	McKechnie Group         	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	AEROSPACE
63	Whitbread               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RESTAURANTS AND PUBS
64	Kelda Group             	UTILITIES 	WATER
65	Diageo                  	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
66	First Leisure Corpn.    	CYCLICAL SERVICES	GAMBLING
67	Invensys                	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
68	International Power     	UTILITIES 	ELECTRICITY
69	Allied Domecq           	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
70	Asda Group              	NON-CYCLICAL SERVICES	FOOD + DRUG RETAILERS
71	Morgan Crucible         	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
72	BG Group                	RESOURCES 	OIL INTEGRATED (UTILITIES)
73	Croda International     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
74	REXAM                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT (PACKAGING)
75	Allied Domecq           	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
76	Whitbread               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RESTAURANTS AND PUBS
77	Hanson                  	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
78	BP   	RESOURCES	OIL INTEGRATED
79	Diageo                  	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
80	Allied Domecq           	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
81	REXAM                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
82	Powergen                	UTILITIES 	ELECTRICITY
83	Allied Domecq           	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	DISTILLERS + VINTNERS
84	Swallow Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
85	Hyder                   	UTILITIES 	WATER
86	British Airways         	CYCLICAL SERVICES	AIRLINES + AIRPORTS
87	TI Group                	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
88	Mayflower Corporation   	CYCLICAL CONSUMER	AUTO PARTS
89	Hanson                  	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
90	International Power     	UTILITIES 	ELECTRICITY
91	Spirent                 	INFORMATION TECHNO.	TELECOM EQUIPMENT
92	Rank Group              	CYCLICAL SERVICES	LEISURE FACILITIES
93	REXAM                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
94	Laporte                 	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
95	Scottish & Newcastle    	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	BREWERS
96	BT Group                	NON-CYCLICAL SERVICES	TELECOM FIXED LINE
97	Trinity Mirror          	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
98	Stagecoach Group        	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RAIL, ROAD, FREIGHT
99	REXAM                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
100	Invensys                	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
101	Kelda Group             	UTILITIES 	WATER
102	United Utilities        	UTILITIES 	WATER
103	Powergen                	UTILITIES 	ELECTRICITY
104	National Grid Transco   	UTILITIES 	MULTI-UTILITIES
105	Kelda Group             	UTILITIES 	WATER
106	Hanson                  	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
107	Hilton Group            	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
108	REXAM                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
109	Powergen                	UTILITIES 	ELECTRICITY
110	Associated British Ports	CYCLICAL SERVICES	SHIPPING AND PORTS


Table 6.8 Mature/decline stage (industry classification)	
 	Company name	Industry (INDM3)	Industry (INDM5)
1	Booker                  	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
2	Inchcape                	CYCLICAL CONSUMER	VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION
3	Hillsdown Holdings      	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
4	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
5	REXAM                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
6	Albert Fisher Group     	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
7	Mothercare              	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, MULTI DEPT
8	Delta                   	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY (ENGINEERING)
9	Pilkington              	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
10	Uniq                	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
11	Smith (W.H.)            	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
12	Elementis plc 	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
13	Powell Duffryn          	CYCLICAL SERVICES	SHIPPING AND PORTS
14	Pilkington              	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
15	Inchcape                	CYCLICAL CONSUMER	VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION
16	Lonmin                  	RESOURCES 	OTHER MINING
17	Balfour Beatty          	BASIC INDUSTRIES	OTHER CONSTRUCTION
18	Cookson Group           	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
19	Powell Duffryn          	CYCLICAL SERVICES	SHIPPING AND PORTS
20	Racal Electronics       	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
21	Booker                  	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
22	Rugby Group PLC	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
23	Inchcape                	CYCLICAL CONSUMER	VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION
24	Lonmin                  	RESOURCES 	OTHER MINING
25	Christian Salvesen      	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RAIL, ROAD, FREIGHT
26	Hepworth                	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
27	Rolls Royce             	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	AEROSPACE
28	Laporte                 	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
29	Lonmin                  	RESOURCES 	OTHER MINING
30	Hillsdown Holdings      	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
31	Rolls Royce             	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	AEROSPACE
32	Powell Duffryn          	CYCLICAL SERVICES	SHIPPING AND PORTS
33	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
34	RAC                     	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT (AUTOMOTIVE)
35	BAE Systems             	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	DEFENCE
36	Vickers                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
37	Sears                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
38	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
39	Cordiant Comms. Group   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	MEDIA AGENCIES
40	BP     	RESOURCES	OIL INTEGRATED
41	Meyer International     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDERS MERCHANTS
42	United Biscuits         	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
43	Vickers                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
44	Arcadia Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
45	Low & Bonar             	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
46	Racal Electronics	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
47	Rolls Royce             	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	AEROSPACE
48	Exel             	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RAIL, ROAD, FREIGHT
49	Unilever                	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
50	Sears                   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
51	RMC Group               	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
52	TI Group                	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
53	Arjo Wiggins Appleton   	BASIC INDUSTRIES	PAPER
54	Meyer International     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDERS MERCHANTS
55	Elementis               	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
56	Powell Duffryn          	CYCLICAL SERVICES	SHIPPING AND PORTS
57	Booker                  	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
58	Enterprise Oil          	RESOURCES 	OIL + GAS EXPL/PROD.
59	De La Rue               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
60	Johnson Matthey         	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
61	Elementis               	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
62	LASMO                   	RESOURCES 	OIL + GAS EXPL/PROD.
63	Unilever                	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
64	De La Rue               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
65	Inchcape                	CYCLICAL CONSUMER	VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION
66	Racal Electronics       	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
67	Hazlewood Foods         	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
68	Babcock International   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT (SUPPORT SERVICES)
69	Rolls Royce             	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	AEROSPACE
70	TI Group                	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
71	Hillsdown Holdings      	NON-CYCLIC CONSUMER	FOOD PROCESSORS
72	Inchcape                	CYCLICAL CONSUMER	VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION
73	BP       	RESOURCES	OIL INTEGRATED
74	Burmah Castrol          	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY
75	De La Rue               	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT
76	Taylor Woodrow	BASIC INDUSTRIES	OTHER CONSTRUCTION
77	De Vere Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
78	RAC                     	CYCLICAL SERVICES	BUSINESS SUPPORT (AUTOMOTIVE)
79	Shell Transport & Trad. 	RESOURCES 	OIL INTEGRATED
80	Meyer International     	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDERS MERCHANTS
81	Shell Transport & Trad. 	RESOURCES 	OIL INTEGRATED
82	BAE Systems             	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	DEFENCE
83	Morgan Crucible         	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
84	De Vere Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	HOTELS
85	United Business Media   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
86	Senior                  	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
87	Cable & Wireless        	NON-CYCLICAL SERVICES	TELECOM FIXED LINE
88	Arcadia Group           	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAILERS, SOFT GOODS
89	Blue Circle Industries  	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
90	Peninsular & Oriental   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	SHIPPING AND PORTS
91	EMAP                    	CYCLICAL SERVICES	PUBLISHING + PRINTING
92	MFI Furniture Group     	CYCLICAL SERVICES	RETAIL, HARDLINES
93	Morgan Crucible         	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
94	Vodafone Group          	NON-CYCLICAL SERVICES	TELECOM WIRELESS
95	Tomkins                 	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	ENGINEERING, GENERAL
96	Carlton Communications  	CYCLICAL SERVICES	TV, RADIO AND FILM
97	Peninsular & Oriental   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	SHIPPING AND PORTS
98	Rank Group              	CYCLICAL SERVICES	LEISURE FACILITIES
99	Peninsular & Oriental   	CYCLICAL SERVICES	SHIPPING AND PORTS
100	BAE Systems             	GENERAL INDUSTRIALS	DEFENCE
101	RMC Group               	BASIC INDUSTRIES	BUILDING MATERIALS
102	Sainsbury, J            	NON-CYCLICAL SERVICES	FOOD + DRUG RETAILERS
103	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	BASIC INDUSTRIES	CHEMICALS, SPECIALITY




Table 6.9 Late expansion stage (Descriptive statistics)	

col 1	col 2	col 3	col 4	col 5	col 6	col 7	col 8	col 9	col 10
				Company	Company	Market 	Market		 
		Alpha 	Beta 	Actual Returns	Actual Returns	Actual Returns	Actual Returns		 
	Company Name	Before Applying	Before Applying 	(Average For 	(Averge For	(Average For	(Average For 	Durbin-	Auto-
	 	Dimson's Thin Trading	Dimson's Thin Trading	Estimation Period)	 Test Period)	 Estimation Period)	Test Period)	Watson	Correlation Problem?
1	British steel	0.00006	0.82443	0.00063	0.00125	0.00069	0.0007	1.538	yes
2	De La Rue               	-0.00093	0.79594	-0.00036	-0.00172	0.00072	0.00095	1.818	no
3	Burmah Castrol          	0.00097	-0.02619	0.00095	0.00099	0.00076	0.00075	1.669	yes
4	Reuters Group           	-0.00005	1.46635	0.00128	0.00174	0.00091	0.00072	1.738	yes
5	EMAP                    	0.00122	0.25251	0.00142	0.00207	0.00079	0.00102	1.587	yes
6	Boots Group             	-0.00027	1.26857	0.00082	0.00046	0.00086	0.00068	1.751	yes
7	Marks & Spencer         	-0.0004	1.286	0.00068	0.00049	0.00084	0.00071	1.671	yes
8	Burmah Castrol          	0.00005	0.65332	0.00068	0.00109	0.00096	0.00057	1.809	no
9	Polypipe                	0.00094	0.79473	0.00167	0.00043	0.00092	0.00047	1.897	no
10	IMI                     	-0.00015	0.52808	0.00038	0.00166	0.00101	0.0004	1.965	no
11	Vodafone Group          	-0.00056	1.37156	0.00069	0.00097	0.00092	0.00047	1.97	no
12	Wassall                 	-0.00029	0.5721	0.00033	0.00013	0.00108	0.00019	1.77	yes
13	BTP                     	0.00046	0.4414	0.00081	0.00043	0.00078	0.00057	1.574	yes
14	EMAP                    	0.00145	0.27386	0.00166	0.00137	0.00078	0.0007	1.54	yes
15	BPB                     	-0.00004	0.97563	0.0008	0.00161	0.00085	0.00057	1.438	yes
16	TI Group                	0.00093	0.83951	0.00138	-0.00008	0.00054	0.0006	2.004	no
17	Unilever                	-0.00025	0.53992	0.00003	0.00115	0.00053	0.00073	1.546	yes
18	SmithKline Beecham      	0.00017	1.38108	0.00088	0.00148	0.00052	0.00087	1.75	yes
19	Bunzl                   	0.00023	0.752	0.00077	-0.00065	0.00071	0.00059	1.372	yes
20	Premier Farnell         	-0.00018	0.64491	0.00026	-0.0021	0.00069	0.00091	1.501	yes
21	Kingfisher              	0.00071	0.96917	0.00133	0.00024	0.00064	0.0008	1.777	yes
22	Unilever                	0.00013	0.69347	0.00056	0.00133	0.00062	0.00102	1.558	yes
23	Tomkins                 	-0.0007	1.26346	0.00009	0.00085	0.00063	0.00062	1.827	no
24	SmithKline Beecham      	-0.00033	1.54617	0.00053	0.00156	0.00056	0.0007	1.726	yes
25	Sema                    	0.00257	0.42528	0.00277	0.00191	0.00047	0.00106	1.764	yes
26	Exel                    	0.00098	0.51236	0.00125	0.00127	0.00053	0.00115	1.824	no
27	AGA Foodservice         	0	0.89819	0.0004	-0.00175	0.00045	0.00124	1.557	yes
28	Capital Radio           	-0.00108	0.35243	-0.00086	0.00012	0.00065	0.00086	1.396	yes
29	Bodycote International  	0.00252	0.4817	0.0028	-0.00001	0.00057	0.00099	1.367	yes
30	Tomkins                 	-0.00024	1.25304	0.00036	0.00115	0.00047	0.00114	1.996	no
31	Davis Service Group     	0.0003	0.384	0.00054	0.00087	0.00061	0.00092	1.413	yes
32	SmithKline Beecham      	0.0006	1.55241	0.0015	0.00224	0.00058	0.00143	1.73	yes
33	Barratt Developments    	-0.00088	0.92053	-0.00014	0.00045	0.00081	0.0005	1.983	no
34	EMAP                    	0.00027	0.4621	0.00061	0.00143	0.00073	0.00106	1.589	yes
35	GUS                     	-0.00104	1.13086	0	0.00095	0.00092	0.00033	1.731	yes
36	Tomkins                 	-0.00075	1.04363	0.00026	0.00178	0.00097	0.0007	1.989	no
37	Body Shop International 	-0.0014	0.38596	-0.00107	-0.00139	0.00086	0.00071	1.49	yes
38	Unilever                	0.00044	1.02133	0.00129	0.0018	0.00083	0.00082	1.47	yes
39	Spirent                 	-0.00145	0.21398	-0.00127	0.00212	0.00088	0.00071	1.235	yes
40	Wolseley                	-0.00052	1.13718	0.0006	-0.00046	0.00099	0.0005	1.708	yes
41	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.00212	0.79059	-0.00135	0.00179	0.00097	0.00042	1.624	yes
42	BTP                     	-0.00039	0.58456	0.00015	0.00112	0.00093	0.00115	1.56	yes
43	Wolseley                	-0.00047	1.08746	0.00049	-0.00123	0.00089	0.00164	1.813	no
44	Serco Group             	0.00063	0.40129	0.00108	0.00377	0.00114	0.00124	1.962	no
45	BTP                     	0.00012	0.59426	0.00082	0.00118	0.00118	0.00117	1.484	yes
46	Tomkins                 	0.00036	0.65046	0.00078	0.0015	0.00064	0.00201	1.896	no
47	Alliance UniChem        	0.00035	0.26441	0.00066	0.00353	0.00114	0.00115	1.657	yes
48	Bunzl                   	0.00024	0.53745	0.00066	0.00106	0.00077	0.00159	1.821	no
49	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.00078	0.71256	-0.00024	0.00346	0.00075	0.00161	1.675	yes
50	Vickers                 	-0.0009	0.89646	-0.00023	0.00004	0.00075	0.00126	1.785	no
51	McKechnie Group         	-0.00139	0.5893	-0.00091	0.00008	0.00081	0.00108	1.481	yes
52	EMAP                    	0.00126	0.26608	0.0015	0.00123	0.0009	0.00059	1.464	yes
53	GKN                     	0.0007	0.64873	0.00129	0.00098	0.0009	0.00059	1.593	yes
54	Amersham                	0.00167	0.7731	0.00249	-0.00016	0.00107	-0.00006	1.548	yes
55	Wolseley                	-0.00102	1.08784	0.00018	-0.00373	0.00111	-0.00024	2.173	no
56	Hays                    	0.00171	0.87908	0.00273	-0.00183	0.00116	-0.00145	2.133	no
57	Marconi                 	0.0005	0.85958	0.00142	-0.00068	0.00107	-0.00193	1.672	yes
58	Smith (W.H.)            	0.00048	0.48343	0.00102	-0.00117	0.00112	-0.00149	1.827	no
59	Britax International    	0.00212	0.26348	0.00241	-0.00352	0.00109	-0.00078	1.663	yes
60	National Express Group  	0.00361	0.27353	0.00391	-0.00045	0.0011	-0.00072	1.919	no
61	Serco Group             	0.00229	0.3499	0.0027	-0.00239	0.00119	-0.00087	1.639	yes
62	Boots Group             	0.00041	0.82455	0.00139	0.00015	0.00119	-0.00087	1.879	no
63	Sema                    	0.00241	0.46458	0.0028	-0.00259	0.00084	-0.00059	1.697	yes
64	N. Brown Group          	-0.00047	0.16247	-0.00032	-0.00164	0.00087	-0.0005	1.604	yes
65	GKN                     	0.00136	0.73457	0.00199	-0.00093	0.00086	-0.00036	1.76	yes
66	Carpetright             	-0.00312	0.5178	-0.00271	-0.00073	0.0008	-0.00012	1.818	no
67	BTP                     	0.00135	0.38291	0.00159	-0.00287	0.00061	0.00013	1.736	yes
68	Misys                   	0.00262	0.68273	0.00298	0.00005	0.00053	0.00019	1.902	no
69	Cadbury Schweppes       	0.00144	0.74558	0.00139	0.00096	-0.00007	0.00154	2.034	no
70	Reuters Group           	-0.00132	1.17922	-0.00128	0.00543	0.00003	0.00222	1.666	yes
71	Unilever                	0.00061	1.27093	0.00085	0.00014	0.00019	0.00195	1.475	yes
72	Pearson                 	0.00104	0.98339	0.00164	0.00071	0.00061	0.00072	1.954	no
73	AstraZeneca             	-0.00012	1.01345	0.00006	-0.00113	0.00018	0.0005	2.031	no
74	Arriva                  	-0.00071	0.41372	-0.00066	-0.00138	0.00012	0.00054	1.625	yes
75	Jarvis                  	-0.00066	0.64989	-0.00044	-0.00491	0.00035	0.00012	1.795	no
76	Johnson Matthey         	-0.00092	0.81138	-0.00065	0.00119	0.00033	-0.00041	1.38	yes
77	Hepworth                	-0.00161	0.45259	-0.00147	0.00218	0.00031	-0.00037	1.679	yes
78	De La Rue               	0.00077	0.62142	0.00098	-0.00095	0.00034	0.00032	1.493	yes
79	Wolseley                	-0.00061	0.51013	-0.00043	0.00009	0.00036	0.00042	1.609	yes
80	Smith & Nephew          	0.00066	0.29147	0.00069	0.0028	0.00012	0.00005	1.936	no
81	Rentokil Initial        	-0.00427	0.25096	-0.0042	0.00159	0.0003	0.00045	1.814	no
82	United Business Media   	0.0009	1.00215	0.00101	0.00028	0.00011	0.00022	1.915	no
83	BBA Group               	-0.00043	0.14397	-0.00041	-0.00083	0.00011	0.00022	1.871	no
84	Alliance UniChem        	0.00029	0.0089	0.0003	0.00213	0.00025	0.00009	1.642	yes
85	United Business Media   	0.00105	0.89799	0.00156	-0.00043	0.00057	-0.00045	2.088	no





Table 6.10 Early mature stage (Descriptive statistics)	
col 1	col 2	col 3	col 4	col 5	col 6	col 7	col 8	col 9	col 10
  	 	 	 	Company	Company	Market 	Market	 	 
		Alpha 	Beta 	Actual Returns	Actual Returns	Actual Returns	Actual Returns		 
	Company name	Before Applying	Before Applying 	(Average For 	(Averge For	(Average For	(Average For 	Durbin-	Auto-
	 	Dimson's Thin Trading	Dimson's Thin Trading	Estimation Period)	 Test Period)	 Estimation Period)	Test Period)	Watson	Correlation Problem?
1	Lonmin                  	-0.00006	0.47139	0.00026	0.00256	0.0007	0.00081	1.937	no
2	Stakis                  	-0.00076	0.409	-0.00046	0.00351	0.00074	0.00111	2.094	no
3	Greene King             	0.00078	0.09832	0.00085	0.00035	0.00074	0.00086	1.445	yes
4	Allied Domecq           	-0.0011	1.08865	-0.00024	0.00062	0.00079	0.00099	1.864	no
5	Medeva                  	0.00182	0.40581	0.00218	-0.00057	0.00088	0.00095	1.888	no
6	First Leisure Corpn.    	0.00063	0.41457	0.00104	0.00035	0.00098	0.00036	1.531	yes
7	Reckitt Benckiser       	-0.00027	0.86957	0.00052	-0.00011	0.0009	0.00039	1.806	no
8	Whitbread               	0.00028	0.81373	0.00105	0.00043	0.00096	0.00042	1.714	yes
9	BTR                     	-0.00082	0.98265	0.0002	-0.00207	0.00104	0.00017	1.933	no
10	De Vere Group           	0.00111	0.51911	0.00168	-0.00032	0.00111	0.00011	1.626	yes
11	BOC Group               	0.00058	0.79704	0.0013	-0.00009	0.00091	0.0004	1.732	yes
12	Hilton Group            	-0.00074	1.14622	0.00033	0.00085	0.00094	0.00047	1.748	yes
13	United Business Media   	0.00079	0.46895	0.00128	0.00029	0.00105	0.00019	1.821	no
14	Cadbury Schweppes       	-0.00006	1.0678	0.00077	0.00011	0.00082	0.00056	2.012	no
15	BP                      	0.00026	1.15768	0.00115	0.00096	0.00077	0.00032	1.759	yes
16	Allied Domecq           	-0.00097	0.86626	-0.00028	-0.00056	0.0008	0.00044	1.861	no
17	Croda International     	-0.00017	0.1475	-0.00006	0.00067	0.00076	0.00055	1.635	yes
18	United Business Media   	0.0015	0.38393	0.0018	-0.00071	0.00078	0.00043	1.695	yes
19	Antofagasta             	0.00016	-0.02958	0.00014	0.00076	0.00067	0.00058	1.58	yes
20	Hyder                   	-0.00027	0.31509	-0.00011	0.00082	0.00052	0.00087	1.612	yes
21	Thames Water            	0.00005	0.71202	0.00044	0.00084	0.00054	0.00072	1.752	yes
22	BG Group                	-0.00129	1.07168	-0.00056	0.0022	0.00068	0.00086	1.7	yes
23	De Vere Group           	0.0003	0.56436	0.00067	0.0002	0.00064	0.00079	1.86	no
24	Peninsular & Oriental   	0.00056	0.80229	0.00111	0.00147	0.00069	0.00084	1.731	yes
25	Hilton Group            	0.00015	1.26765	0.00094	0.00141	0.00063	0.0009	1.811	no
26	Johnston Press          	0.00044	0.3084	0.00064	0.00115	0.00063	0.00061	1.604	yes
27	Scottish Power          	-0.00045	0.86311	0.00007	0.00132	0.00061	0.00091	1.695	yes
28	United Utilities        	0.00019	0.83187	0.00063	0.00065	0.00054	0.00091	1.72	yes
29	Rank Group              	-0.00072	1.02969	-0.00018	-0.00086	0.00053	0.00093	2.005	no
30	Rentokil Initial        	0.00077	0.91277	0.00148	-0.00088	0.00077	0.0009	1.876	no
31	Scot. & Southern Energy 	0.00021	0.721	0.0007	0.00171	0.00068	0.00096	1.473	yes
32	Cable & Wireless        	-0.00098	1.2436	-0.00008	0.00078	0.00072	0.00065	1.902	no
33	Tate & Lyle             	-0.00027	0.00762	-0.00026	-0.0004	0.00072	0.00065	1.837	no
34	Rank Group              	-0.00133	0.97987	-0.00062	-0.0014	0.00072	0.00065	1.958	no
35	Rio Tinto               	-0.00079	0.98119	-0.00024	0.00049	0.00056	0.00153	1.969	no
36	Reckitt Benckiser       	0.00047	0.77981	0.00096	0.00169	0.00063	0.00146	1.63	yes
37	Scapa Group             	-0.00044	0.32663	-0.00026	0.00094	0.00056	0.00153	1.695	yes
38	Cable & Wireless        	0.00024	1.35376	0.00145	-0.00075	0.00089	0.00036	1.855	no
39	De Vere Group           	-0.00125	0.52368	-0.00078	-0.0017	0.00089	0.00036	1.697	yes
40	Blue Circle Industries  	-0.00025	1.18846	0.00086	-0.00194	0.00093	0.00082	1.767	yes
41	Whitbread               	-0.00023	0.70597	0.00041	0.00066	0.0009	0.00035	1.677	yes
42	Spectris                	-0.00166	0.42993	-0.0013	0.00014	0.00082	0.00052	1.554	yes
43	British Airways         	0.00032	0.9506	0.00121	-0.00149	0.00093	0.00052	1.861	no
44	United Utilities        	0.00036	1.03778	0.00127	0.00052	0.00088	0.00071	1.861	no
45	Lonmin                  	-0.00228	0.90672	-0.00138	-0.00268	0.00099	0.0005	2.111	no
46	Tesco                   	0.00076	0.83659	0.00141	0.00147	0.00077	0.00138	1.92	no
47	Ashtead Group           	0.0007	0.31172	0.00095	0.0035	0.00081	0.0012	1.486	yes
48	BOC Group               	0.00004	0.92702	0.00077	-0.00045	0.00079	0.00159	1.696	yes
49	Lonmin                  	-0.00134	0.73379	-0.00069	-0.0001	0.00089	0.00164	2.025	no
50	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	0.00003	1.0478	0.00123	0.00085	0.00119	0.00103	1.824	no
51	Charter                 	0.00026	0.38373	0.00056	-0.0013	0.00077	0.00159	1.785	no
52	SmithKline Beecham      	0.00055	1.65126	0.00179	0.00092	0.00075	0.00161	2.131	no
53	Allied Domecq           	0.00061	0.71571	0.00122	0.00102	0.00085	0.00131	2.105	no
54	Hanson                  	-0.00029	0.59177	0.00022	0.00222	0.00085	0.00131	1.764	yes
55	Mirror Group            	-0.00073	0.32481	-0.00045	0.00174	0.00085	0.00131	1.635	yes
56	Croda International     	0.00047	0.41425	0.00079	-0.00001	0.00077	0.0012	1.782	no
57	De Vere Group           	-0.00139	0.49252	-0.00098	0.00173	0.00083	0.00095	1.355	yes
58	Pearson                 	0.00001	1.07716	0.00131	0.0009	0.00121	-0.00015	1.91	no
59	Lonmin                  	-0.00191	0.85477	-0.00083	-0.00297	0.00126	-0.00112	1.868	no
60	Wetherspoon (J.D.)      	0.00157	0.04184	0.00162	-0.00586	0.00126	-0.00099	1.357	yes
61	Diageo                  	0.00055	0.88551	0.00161	-0.00333	0.0012	-0.00129	2.067	no
62	McKechnie Group         	0.0006	0.34381	0.00097	-0.00344	0.00107	-0.00103	1.397	yes
63	Whitbread               	0.00029	0.90144	0.00124	-0.00221	0.00105	-0.00109	2.005	no
64	Kelda Group             	0.00058	0.47506	0.00114	0.00123	0.00117	-0.00088	1.794	no
65	Diageo                  	-0.00009	1.03991	0.00079	-0.00134	0.00084	-0.00059	1.917	no
66	First Leisure Corpn.    	0.00112	0.26803	0.00141	-0.00533	0.0011	-0.00057	1.661	yes
67	Invensys                	0	1.12435	0.00127	-0.00338	0.00113	-0.0006	1.6	yes
68	International Power     	-0.00013	0.76867	0.00049	-0.00046	0.00081	-0.00028	1.664	yes
69	Allied Domecq           	0.00066	0.63629	0.00105	-0.00177	0.00061	0.00013	2.204	no
70	Asda Group              	0.00075	0.60151	0.00108	-0.00083	0.00056	0.00065	2.077	no
71	Morgan Crucible         	-0.00171	0.45056	-0.00146	-0.00265	0.00056	0.00065	1.477	yes
72	BG Group                	0.00179	0.60025	0.00183	-0.00069	0.00007	0.00175	2.169	no
73	Croda International     	-0.00195	0.28821	-0.00195	0.00038	0.00002	0.00115	1.479	yes
74	REXAM                   	-0.00222	0.46765	-0.00219	0.00159	0.00007	0.00175	1.476	yes
75	Allied Domecq           	-0.00039	0.81218	-0.00017	0.0005	0.00027	0.00193	2.106	no
76	Whitbread               	-0.00046	0.81955	-0.0001	0.00216	0.00044	0.00128	2.027	no
77	Hanson                  	0.00114	0.33073	0.00122	0.00297	0.00024	0.00197	1.871	no
78	BP                      	0.00011	0.90004	0.00014	0.00225	0.00003	0.00222	2.021	no
79	Diageo                  	0.00018	1.3959	0.00103	0.00011	0.00061	0.00072	1.926	no
80	Allied Domecq           	0.00005	0.81406	0.00033	0.00109	0.00035	0.00114	1.939	no
81	REXAM                   	-0.00101	0.64536	-0.00093	0.00409	0.00012	0.00123	1.497	yes
82	Powergen                	0.00019	0.37616	0.00021	-0.00216	0.00006	0.00083	1.894	no
83	Allied Domecq           	-0.00118	0.74953	-0.00092	0.0024	0.00035	0.00012	1.872	no
84	Swallow Group           	0.00043	0.54485	0.00055	0.00053	0.00022	-0.00006	1.918	no
85	Hyder                   	-0.00064	0.05565	-0.00063	-0.00264	0.00031	0.00003	1.365	yes
86	British Airways         	-0.0014	1.35411	-0.00124	-0.00014	0.00012	0.00054	1.911	no
87	TI Group                	-0.00071	1.22655	-0.0005	0.00099	0.00017	0.00037	2.074	no
88	Mayflower Corporation   	-0.00068	0.43005	-0.00049	0.00145	0.00043	-0.00054	1.786	no
89	Hanson                  	0.00225	0.40169	0.00236	-0.00269	0.0003	-0.00013	1.864	no
90	International Power     	-0.00077	0.41775	-0.00062	-0.00038	0.00036	0.00036	1.886	no
91	Spirent                 	-0.00023	0.30707	-0.00015	0.00401	0.00028	0.00057	1.411	yes
92	Rank Group              	-0.00072	0.89545	-0.00021	-0.00234	0.00057	0.00063	1.917	no
93	REXAM                   	0.00178	0.65811	0.00215	-0.00069	0.00057	0.00032	1.613	yes
94	Laporte                 	0.00134	0.46943	0.00192	-0.00251	0.00123	0.0001	2.176	no
95	Scottish & Newcastle    	-0.00156	0.88365	-0.00092	-0.00077	0.00072	0.00012	1.989	no
96	BT Group                	0.00032	1.70299	0.00156	-0.0019	0.00073	-0.00009	1.853	no
97	Trinity Mirror          	0.00174	0.17849	0.00187	-0.00048	0.00073	-0.00018	1.299	yes
98	Stagecoach Group        	-0.00139	0.32293	-0.00118	-0.00821	0.00065	0.00004	2.165	no
99	REXAM                   	0.00198	0.24306	0.00215	-0.00048	0.00072	-0.00011	1.752	yes
100	Invensys                	0.00048	0.78486	0.00076	-0.00185	0.00036	0.00042	1.949	no
101	Kelda Group             	-0.0022	0.12235	-0.00215	0.00278	0.00038	0.00027	2.132	no
102	United Utilities        	-0.00073	0.79849	-0.00075	0.00148	-0.00002	0.00037	1.962	no
103	Powergen                	0.00021	0.57239	0.00038	0.00042	0.0003	-0.00023	1.921	no
104	National Grid Transco   	0.00126	0.06695	0.0013	0.00071	0.00051	-0.00035	2.05	no
105	Kelda Group             	-0.00002	0.0395	0	0.00079	0.00055	-0.00057	2.085	no
106	Hanson                  	-0.00123	0.74137	-0.001	0.00137	0.00031	-0.00084	1.891	no
107	Hilton Group            	-0.00011	0.98174	0.0002	0.00171	0.00031	-0.00084	2.097	no
108	REXAM                   	-0.00015	0.58782	0.00007	0.00143	0.00038	-0.00064	2.204	no
















Table 6.11 Mature/decline stage (Descriptive statistics)
col 1	col 2	col 3	col 4	col 5	col 6	col 7	col 8	col 9	col 10
  	Mature/Decline Stage	 	 	Company	Company	Market 	Market	 	 
		Alpha 	Beta 	Actual Returns	Actual Returns	Actual Returns	Actual Returns		 
	Company Name	Before Applying	Before Applying 	(Average For 	(Averge For	(Average For	(Average For 	Durbin-	Auto-
	 	Dimson's Thin Trading	Dimson's Thin Trading	Estimation Period)	 Test Period)	 Estimation Period)	Test Period)	Watson	Correlation Problem?
1	Booker                  	-0.00024	0.42704	0.00004	0.00009	0.00065	0.00074	1.643	yes
2	Inchcape                	-0.00208	0.94396	-0.0013	0.00009	0.00082	0.00101	2.135	no
3	Hillsdown Holdings      	-0.00107	0.78886	-0.00041	0.00152	0.00084	0.00066	2.094	no
4	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.00077	1.12606	0.00015	0.00141	0.00081	0.0007	1.774	yes
5	REXAM                   	-0.00162	0.98854	-0.00082	0.00042	0.00082	0.00074	1.688	yes
6	Albert Fisher Group     	0.00078	0.21647	0.00094	-0.00029	0.00075	0.0007	1.873	no
7	Mothercare              	0.00084	0.84977	0.00157	-0.00043	0.00085	0.00057	1.643	yes
8	Delta                   	-0.00096	0.6559	-0.00047	-0.00062	0.00075	0.00071	1.479	yes
9	Pilkington              	0.00008	0.99561	0.00087	-0.00094	0.00079	0.0005	1.933	no
10	Uniq                    	-0.00029	0.649	0.00021	0.00086	0.00076	0.00042	1.625	yes
11	Smith (W.H.)            	0.00134	0.44296	0.00168	-0.00028	0.00077	0.00032	1.886	no
12	Elementis plc	-0.00017	0.73603	0.00045	-0.00101	0.00085	0.00033	2.168	no
13	Powell Duffryn          	-0.00108	0.34054	-0.00086	0.00048	0.00065	0.00054	1.618	yes
14	Pilkington              	-0.00009	1.12228	0.00062	-0.00176	0.00064	0.00058	1.926	no
15	Inchcape                	-0.00115	1.15139	-0.00067	-0.00035	0.00042	0.00087	1.797	no
16	Lonmin                  	0.00004	0.40056	0.00023	-0.00188	0.00048	0.00098	1.829	no
17	Balfour Beatty          	-0.00018	0.99286	0.00036	-0.00099	0.00055	0.0008	1.887	no
18	Cookson Group           	-0.00093	1.07951	-0.00023	-0.00108	0.00064	0.0008	1.738	yes
19	Powell Duffryn          	-0.00116	0.5436	-0.00081	-0.00018	0.00064	0.00094	1.562	yes
20	Racal Electronics       	0.00037	0.68363	0.00078	0.00001	0.0006	0.00089	1.918	no
21	Booker                  	-0.00023	0.74408	0.00025	-0.00059	0.00064	0.0008	2.02	no
22	Rugby Group PLC	-0.00033	0.93366	0.00023	0.00015	0.0006	0.00089	1.966	no
23	Inchcape                	0.00039	1.01572	0.00095	-0.00054	0.00056	0.00071	1.761	yes
24	Lonmin                  	-0.00151	0.70367	-0.00108	0.00051	0.00062	0.00112	1.872	no
25	Christian Salvesen      	0.00036	0.43602	0.00064	-0.00031	0.00065	0.00098	1.641	yes
26	Hepworth                	-0.00065	0.57405	-0.00028	-0.00124	0.00065	0.00086	1.529	yes
27	Rolls Royce             	-0.00053	1.96119	0.00066	-0.00005	0.0006	0.00093	1.939	no
28	Laporte                 	-0.00083	0.58745	-0.00038	0.00138	0.00075	0.00085	1.785	no
29	Lonmin                  	-0.00242	0.93326	-0.0017	-0.00036	0.00077	0.0009	1.871	no
30	Hillsdown Holdings      	-0.00003	0.63436	0.0003	-0.00024	0.00052	0.00114	1.994	no
31	Rolls Royce             	-0.00121	1.89309	-0.0002	-0.00003	0.00053	0.00088	1.752	yes
32	Powell Duffryn          	0.00001	0.5908	0.00044	0.00031	0.00073	0.00076	1.508	yes
33	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.00115	0.71794	-0.00075	0.00316	0.00056	0.00152	1.735	yes
34	RAC                     	-0.00021	0.41851	0.00008	0.00231	0.00069	0.00134	1.459	yes
35	BAE Systems             	0.00131	0.84268	0.00178	0.00221	0.00056	0.00152	1.637	yes
36	Vickers                 	-0.00103	0.88356	-0.00052	-0.00015	0.00058	0.00157	1.62	yes
37	Sears                   	-0.00124	0.43898	-0.00087	-0.00216	0.00085	0.00029	1.921	no
38	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.00017	0.89852	0.00067	0.00123	0.00093	0.00082	1.789	no
39	Cordiant Comms. Group   	0.00031	0.2436	0.00053	-0.00059	0.00087	0.00095	1.421	yes
40	BP                      	0.00026	1.18652	0.00119	-0.00006	0.00078	0.00112	1.666	yes
41	Meyer International     	0.00031	0.30865	0.00056	-0.00224	0.00082	0.00104	1.52	yes
42	United Biscuits         	-0.00013	0.66724	0.00043	0.0017	0.00084	0.00104	2.051	no
43	Vickers                 	-0.00163	1.01945	-0.00062	-0.00006	0.00099	0.0005	1.738	yes
44	Arcadia Group           	-0.00128	0.64673	-0.00076	0.0036	0.00081	0.00126	1.759	yes
45	Low & Bonar             	-0.00319	0.44034	-0.00281	0.00157	0.00085	0.00106	1.301	yes
46	Racal Electronics	-0.00115	0.47411	-0.00077	0.00214	0.00081	0.00126	2.281	yes
47	Rolls Royce             	-0.00148	1.18379	-0.00058	0.00194	0.00076	0.00172	2.02	no
48	Exel                    	-0.00142	0.64117	-0.00085	0.00178	0.00089	0.00164	1.905	no
49	Unilever                	0.0002	1.15112	0.00151	0.00157	0.00114	0.00111	1.457	yes
50	Sears                   	-0.00201	0.42587	-0.00171	0.00035	0.00071	0.0019	1.924	no
51	RMC Group               	-0.00066	0.72194	-0.00009	0.002	0.0008	0.00183	1.811	no
52	TI Group                	-0.001	0.94977	-0.00034	0.00099	0.00069	0.00202	1.645	yes
53	Arjo Wiggins Appleton   	-0.00098	0.91489	-0.00023	0.0036	0.00082	0.00148	1.686	yes
54	Meyer International     	-0.0003	0.292	-0.00005	-0.00038	0.00083	0.00097	1.745	yes
55	Elementis               	0.00027	0.4065	0.00055	0.00175	0.00068	0.00133	1.735	yes
56	Powell Duffryn          	0.00055	0.32077	0.00091	-0.00045	0.00114	-0.00015	1.677	yes
57	Booker                  	-0.0021	1.0129	-0.00087	0.001	0.00122	-0.00032	1.748	yes
58	Enterprise Oil          	-0.00147	0.89687	-0.00034	-0.0031	0.00126	-0.00099	2.034	no
59	De La Rue               	-0.00282	0.43982	-0.00229	-0.00135	0.00121	-0.00015	2.06	no
60	Johnson Matthey         	-0.00028	0.37457	0.00018	-0.00253	0.00122	-0.00032	1.51	yes
61	Elementis               	0.00074	0.52479	0.00132	-0.00477	0.0011	-0.00173	1.687	yes
62	LASMO                   	-0.00068	0.92299	0.00029	-0.0036	0.00105	-0.00126	2.21	no
63	Unilever                	0.0005	1.18328	0.0018	-0.00161	0.0011	-0.00173	1.664	yes
64	De La Rue               	-0.00139	0.4438	-0.00089	-0.00417	0.00114	-0.00116	2.179	no
65	Inchcape                	-0.00217	1.21444	-0.00097	-0.00576	0.00099	-0.00072	1.602	yes
66	Racal Electronics       	0.00119	0.45575	0.00166	-0.00176	0.00103	-0.00088	1.839	no
67	Hazlewood Foods         	0.00272	0.43813	0.00318	-0.00196	0.00105	-0.00109	1.671	yes
68	Babcock International   	-0.00079	0.23348	-0.00059	0.00011	0.0009	-0.0006	1.971	no
69	Rolls Royce             	-0.00061	1.01197	0.00032	-0.00031	0.00091	-0.00063	1.853	no
70	TI Group                	-0.00022	1.1256	0.00102	-0.00382	0.00111	-0.00047	1.905	no
71	Hillsdown Holdings      	0.00007	0.33798	0.00042	-0.00591	0.00103	-0.00053	2.053	no
72	Inchcape                	-0.00249	1.25108	-0.00148	-0.00378	0.00081	-0.00028	1.632	yes
73	BP                      	0.00015	0.92341	0.0003	0.00124	0.00017	0.00163	1.983	no
74	Burmah Castrol          	-0.00072	0.63084	-0.00067	-0.00097	0.00008	0.0013	2.049	no
75	De La Rue               	-0.00395	0.49034	-0.00392	0.0023	0.00007	0.00175	2.215	no
76	Taylor Woodrow	-0.00073	0.48082	-0.00069	0.00055	0.00009	0.00123	1.637	yes
77	De Vere Group           	-0.00005	0.47972	-0.00004	0.00052	0.00002	0.00115	1.571	yes
78	RAC                     	0.00008	0.52662	0.00008	-0.00021	0	0.00143	1.625	yes
79	Shell Transport & Trad. 	-0.00097	1.25488	-0.00101	-0.00043	-0.00003	0.00137	2.039	no
80	Meyer International     	-0.00128	0.33662	-0.00122	0.00351	0.00016	0.00192	1.255	yes
81	Shell Transport & Trad. 	-0.00071	1.20565	-0.00034	0.0013	0.00031	0.00179	2.119	no
82	BAE Systems             	0.00018	1.08178	0.00065	-0.00088	0.00044	0.00128	1.811	no
83	Morgan Crucible         	-0.0017	0.67844	-0.00142	0.00042	0.00042	0.00105	1.572	yes
84	De Vere Group           	-0.00108	0.3127	-0.00098	0.00146	0.00032	0.0012	1.498	yes
85	United Business Media   	-0.00124	0.84249	-0.00101	0.00173	0.00027	0.00101	2.05	no
86	Senior                  	-0.00116	0.63593	-0.00115	0.00007	0.00002	0.00094	1.577	yes
87	Cable & Wireless        	0.00042	1.66461	0.00112	-0.00228	0.00042	-0.00071	1.976	no
88	Arcadia Group           	-0.00222	0.84301	-0.00187	-0.00418	0.00042	-0.00071	1.526	yes
89	Blue Circle Industries  	0.00103	0.72093	0.00163	-0.00172	0.00083	0.00056	1.835	no
90	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.00006	1.08092	0.00068	-0.00015	0.00068	0.00043	1.832	no
91	EMAP                    	-0.00004	0.6091	0.00054	0.00374	0.00096	0.00019	1.679	yes
92	MFI Furniture Group     	0.00053	0.36006	0.00079	0.00283	0.00072	0.00084	1.891	no
93	Morgan Crucible         	-0.00062	1.03595	0.0001	-0.00009	0.00069	-0.0003	1.741	yes
94	Vodafone Group          	0.00158	1.4573	0.0022	-0.00347	0.00042	0.00012	1.821	no
95	Tomkins                 	-0.00043	0.21627	-0.00039	-0.00112	0.00017	0.00017	1.874	no
96	Carlton Communications  	0.00123	1.18443	0.00138	-0.0025	0.00013	0.00043	1.852	no
97	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.00127	0.7088	-0.00119	-0.00063	0.00012	0.0003	1.806	no
98	Rank Group              	-0.00237	0.39839	-0.00226	0.00157	0.00028	-0.00023	2.135	no
99	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.00156	0.3841	-0.00145	0.00053	0.00029	-0.00099	1.922	no
100	BAE Systems             	-0.0006	0.39386	-0.00041	-0.00161	0.00047	-0.00079	1.871	no
101	RMC Group               	-0.00177	0.40826	-0.00159	0.00213	0.00046	-0.00071	2.206	no
102	Sainsbury, J            	0.00028	0.18115	0.00034	0.00012	0.00031	-0.00084	1.88	no
103	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.0016	0.48717	-0.00139	0.0014	0.00044	-0.00073	1.831	no
104	Marconi                 	0.00187	2.39232	0.00277	-0.00693	0.00038	-0.00064	2.111	no
Table 6.12 Late expansion stage 
(Old alpha/beta, no Dimson adjustment)




2	De La Rue               	-0.2199	0.0527	-0.0005	0.0173	-7.2119	83.6059	0.1784	0.0000	0.5506	0.0000
3	Burmah Castrol          	-0.0374	0.0494	0.0000	0.0077	0.5060	6.9932	0.0984	0.0000	0.9141	0.0000
4	Reuters Group           	-0.0434	0.0404	0.0002	0.0115	0.2223	1.1001	0.0661	0.0007	0.9851	0.0009
5	EMAP                    	-0.0348	0.0447	0.0002	0.0083	0.3459	4.2653	0.0946	0.0000	0.9359	0.0000
6	Boots Group             	-0.0287	0.0253	0.0000	0.0087	-0.0377	0.3718	0.0384	0.2000	0.9960	0.4868
7	Marks & Spencer         	-0.0272	0.0631	0.0000	0.0081	1.1191	9.7080	0.0492	0.0353	0.9315	0.0000
8	Burmah Castrol          	-0.0352	0.0492	0.0002	0.0068	0.7505	10.1532	0.0846	0.0000	0.8955	0.0000
9	Polypipe                	-0.0829	0.0496	-0.0003	0.0132	-0.2637	5.6397	0.1025	0.0000	0.9190	0.0000
10	IMI                     	-0.0490	0.0421	0.0005	0.0101	0.2513	4.1653	0.1125	0.0000	0.9317	0.0000
11	Vodafone Group          	-0.1090	0.0467	0.0003	0.0166	-0.7735	4.9613	0.0671	0.0005	0.9550	0.0000
12	Wassall                 	-0.0567	0.0755	0.0001	0.0117	0.8913	7.7933	0.1230	0.0000	0.8908	0.0000
13	BTP                     	-0.0407	0.0594	-0.0001	0.0107	1.5564	7.7669	0.1748	0.0000	0.8401	0.0000
14	EMAP                    	-0.0414	0.0445	-0.0001	0.0088	0.2944	4.6388	0.1020	0.0000	0.9247	0.0000
15	BPB                     	-0.0440	0.0428	0.0004	0.0108	0.2679	2.0608	0.0557	0.0091	0.9734	0.0000
16	TI Group                	-0.0286	0.0276	-0.0005	0.0096	0.1049	0.0404	0.0465	0.0580	0.9957	0.4261
17	Unilever                	-0.0169	0.0538	0.0003	0.0076	1.2703	6.7585	0.0623	0.0018	0.9394	0.0000
18	SmithKline Beecham      	-0.0640	0.0427	0.0000	0.0105	-0.2347	4.5603	0.0660	0.0007	0.9554	0.0000
19	Bunzl                   	-0.0523	0.0493	-0.0004	0.0123	0.2153	3.3488	0.0995	0.0000	0.9387	0.0000
20	Premier Farnell         	-0.1983	0.0350	-0.0008	0.0159	-6.2714	70.0737	0.2044	0.0000	0.5952	0.0000
21	Kingfisher              	-0.0284	0.0351	-0.0004	0.0101	0.2178	0.6485	0.0484	0.0413	0.9903	0.0173
22	Unilever                	-0.0275	0.0554	0.0002	0.0089	1.6667	8.3486	0.0813	0.0000	0.8992	0.0000
23	Tomkins                 	-0.0376	0.0518	0.0003	0.0136	0.4910	1.1223	0.0689	0.0003	0.9810	0.0001
24	SmithKline Beecham      	-0.0625	0.0439	0.0003	0.0113	0.0356	3.6374	0.0695	0.0002	0.9585	0.0000
25	Sema                    	-0.0390	0.0551	-0.0004	0.0105	1.1726	6.2528	0.1670	0.0000	0.8377	0.0000
26	Exel                    	-0.0447	0.0531	-0.0001	0.0082	1.6688	12.3528	0.1508	0.0000	0.8102	0.0000
27	AGA Foodservice         	-0.0386	0.0352	-0.0010	0.0105	-0.1693	1.5944	0.0629	0.0016	0.9751	0.0000
28	Capital Radio           	-0.0446	0.0440	0.0003	0.0090	0.2514	5.3113	0.1567	0.0000	0.8957	0.0000
29	Bodycote International  	-0.0545	0.0754	-0.0010	0.0117	1.3054	9.6496	0.1806	0.0000	0.7972	0.0000
30	Tomkins                 	-0.0400	0.0566	0.0000	0.0144	0.6708	1.3695	0.0765	0.0000	0.9717	0.0000
31	Davis Service Group     	-0.0390	0.0571	0.0001	0.0091	1.0845	9.6140	0.1519	0.0000	0.8271	0.0000
32	SmithKline Beecham      	-0.0347	0.0430	-0.0002	0.0115	0.3268	0.9209	0.0522	0.0195	0.9885	0.0060
33	Barratt Developments    	-0.0682	0.0481	0.0003	0.0123	-0.0552	3.7444	0.0751	0.0000	0.9525	0.0000
34	EMAP                    	-0.0416	0.0414	0.0002	0.0093	0.2983	3.2846	0.1110	0.0000	0.9437	0.0000
35	GUS                     	-0.0669	0.0947	0.0005	0.0141	0.5341	6.8976	0.0700	0.0002	0.9320	0.0000
36	Tomkins                 	-0.0413	0.0566	0.0006	0.0140	0.5027	1.2628	0.0703	0.0002	0.9770	0.0000
37	Body Shop International 	-0.0759	0.0991	-0.0001	0.0144	0.6060	14.5148	0.1475	0.0000	0.7980	0.0000
38	Unilever                	-0.0285	0.0554	0.0002	0.0102	1.3461	5.4716	0.0781	0.0000	0.9177	0.0000
39	Spirent                 	-0.0567	0.0665	0.0011	0.0108	1.2602	11.3567	0.1859	0.0000	0.7868	0.0000
40	Wolseley                	-0.0874	0.0472	-0.0002	0.0156	-0.3492	2.8850	0.0459	0.0648	0.9726	0.0000
41	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.0835	0.0528	0.0012	0.0138	-0.2524	5.0368	0.0932	0.0000	0.9387	0.0000
42	BTP                     	-0.0509	0.0888	0.0003	0.0141	1.2669	8.4445	0.1430	0.0000	0.8566	0.0000
43	Wolseley                	-0.1200	0.0469	-0.0009	0.0179	-1.0492	6.5771	0.0775	0.0000	0.9338	0.0000
44	Serco Group             	-0.0344	0.0544	0.0009	0.0087	1.4073	8.1960	0.1137	0.0000	0.8665	0.0000
45	BTP                     	-0.0514	0.0882	0.0001	0.0142	1.3031	7.9379	0.1379	0.0000	0.8687	0.0000
46	Tomkins                 	-0.0461	0.0546	-0.0001	0.0146	0.4493	1.1596	0.0705	0.0002	0.9778	0.0000
47	Alliance UniChem        	-0.0801	0.1798	0.0010	0.0146	5.0743	66.0259	0.1820	0.0000	0.6210	0.0000
48	Bunzl                   	-0.0437	0.0593	0.0000	0.0127	0.6611	3.9516	0.1248	0.0000	0.9170	0.0000
49	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.0852	0.0611	0.0010	0.0143	-0.0897	5.3193	0.0877	0.0000	0.9359	0.0000
50	Vickers                 	-0.1086	0.0852	-0.0001	0.0193	-0.2938	7.2693	0.1123	0.0000	0.8758	0.0000
51	McKechnie Group         	-0.1114	0.0784	0.0003	0.0155	-0.3421	10.7871	0.1216	0.0000	0.8698	0.0000
52	EMAP                    	-0.0511	0.0386	-0.0001	0.0094	-0.0688	3.9776	0.1191	0.0000	0.9316	0.0000
53	GKN                     	-0.0732	0.0638	0.0000	0.0178	-0.0900	2.1031	0.0782	0.0000	0.9678	0.0000
54	Amersham                	-0.0704	0.0843	-0.0006	0.0194	0.5658	2.7799	0.0955	0.0000	0.9493	0.0000
55	Wolseley                	-0.1195	0.0474	-0.0008	0.0187	-0.9790	5.2496	0.0656	0.0007	0.9463	0.0000
56	Hays                    	-0.0604	0.0705	-0.0008	0.0162	0.0911	1.9430	0.0568	0.0070	0.9775	0.0000
57	Marconi                 	-0.0655	0.0757	0.0002	0.0188	0.4881	1.9043	0.0667	0.0006	0.9712	0.0000
58	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.0874	0.0598	-0.0003	0.0137	-0.1820	6.7567	0.1018	0.0000	0.9099	0.0000
59	Britax International    	-0.0827	0.0931	-0.0018	0.0157	0.0328	8.7345	0.1547	0.0000	0.8412	0.0000
60	National Express Group  	-0.0629	0.0698	-0.0013	0.0152	0.4678	4.0976	0.1346	0.0000	0.9184	0.0000
61	Serco Group             	-0.1229	0.1079	-0.0015	0.0172	-0.4481	17.5877	0.1916	0.0000	0.7180	0.0000
62	Boots Group             	-0.0693	0.1081	0.0002	0.0169	0.3875	5.3634	0.0683	0.0004	0.9493	0.0000
63	Sema                    	-0.2450	0.1117	-0.0016	0.0289	-2.0173	16.1590	0.1752	0.0000	0.8151	0.0000
64	N. Brown Group          	-0.1056	0.1427	-0.0004	0.0145	1.8327	38.5133	0.2490	0.0000	0.5967	0.0000
65	GKN                     	-0.0727	0.0688	-0.0007	0.0209	0.1097	1.1411	0.0665	0.0006	0.9813	0.0001
66	Carpetright             	-0.1531	0.0828	0.0008	0.0220	-1.2795	12.3645	0.1201	0.0000	0.8443	0.0000
67	BTP                     	-0.0733	0.0874	-0.0014	0.0198	0.2035	2.6717	0.0993	0.0000	0.9483	0.0000
68	Misys                   	-0.2774	0.1556	-0.0009	0.0338	-1.6487	15.3168	0.1250	0.0000	0.8487	0.0000
69	Cadbury Schweppes       	-0.0509	0.0753	-0.0005	0.0177	0.6198	1.6268	0.0660	0.0007	0.9733	0.0000
70	Reuters Group           	-0.0868	0.0954	0.0014	0.0240	0.2578	2.0148	0.0536	0.0145	0.9726	0.0000
71	Unilever                	-0.0459	0.0667	-0.0010	0.0161	0.3009	1.7441	0.0648	0.0009	0.9723	0.0000
72	Pearson                 	-0.0643	0.0929	-0.0003	0.0196	0.4029	2.3585	0.0576	0.0059	0.9711	0.0000
73	AstraZeneca             	-0.0731	0.0651	-0.0005	0.0167	0.1221	1.1424	0.0561	0.0083	0.9873	0.0030
74	Arriva                  	-0.1737	0.0650	-0.0003	0.0221	-2.4523	19.1409	0.1173	0.0000	0.8246	0.0000
75	Jarvis                  	-0.4232	0.1428	-0.0014	0.0350	-4.6054	59.0201	0.1176	0.0000	0.7153	0.0000
76	Johnson Matthey         	-0.0718	0.0872	0.0008	0.0211	0.3462	1.8209	0.0784	0.0000	0.9725	0.0000
77	Hepworth                	-0.0765	0.1067	0.0013	0.0224	0.7960	3.2775	0.1348	0.0000	0.9274	0.0000
78	De La Rue               	-0.1203	0.0958	-0.0006	0.0245	-0.3019	3.7098	0.1231	0.0000	0.9279	0.0000
79	Wolseley                	-0.1226	0.1000	0.0002	0.0271	0.2375	3.1482	0.0969	0.0000	0.9350	0.0000
80	Smith & Nephew          	-0.1092	0.0892	0.0007	0.0224	-0.0122	3.7971	0.0954	0.0000	0.9406	0.0000
81	Rentokil Initial        	-0.2137	0.1009	0.0019	0.0296	-1.4136	10.5466	0.0936	0.0000	0.8889	0.0000
82	United Business Media   	-0.1279	0.0818	-0.0003	0.0222	-0.4312	3.0937	0.0408	0.2000	0.9729	0.0000
83	BBA Group               	-0.1113	0.0764	-0.0001	0.0240	-0.3492	2.0692	0.0890	0.0000	0.9675	0.0000
84	Alliance UniChem        	-0.0706	0.1768	0.0006	0.0151	3.8930	53.1239	0.2010	0.0000	0.6570	0.0000
85	United Business Media   	-0.1283	0.0783	-0.0004	0.0225	-0.4627	2.9333	0.0476	0.0474	0.9741	0.0000





Table 6.13 Late expansion stage 
(Old alpha/beta, no outliers)





3	Burmah Castrol          	-0.03740	0.04940	0.00000	0.00770	0.50600	6.99320	0.09840	0.00000	0.91410	0.00000
4	Reuters Group           	-0.04340	0.04040	0.00020	0.01150	0.22230	1.10010	0.06610	0.00070	0.98510	0.00090
5	EMAP                    	-0.03480	0.04470	0.00020	0.00830	0.34590	4.26530	0.09460	0.00000	0.93590	0.00000
6	Boots Group             	-0.02870	0.02530	0.00000	0.00870	-0.03770	0.37180	0.03840	0.20000	0.99600	0.48680
7	Marks & Spencer         	-0.02720	0.06310	0.00000	0.00810	1.11910	9.70800	0.04920	0.03530	0.93150	0.00000
9	Polypipe                	-0.08290	0.04960	-0.00030	0.01320	-0.26370	5.63970	0.10250	0.00000	0.91900	0.00000
10	IMI                     	-0.04900	0.04210	0.00050	0.01010	0.25130	4.16530	0.11250	0.00000	0.93170	0.00000
11	Vodafone Group          	-0.10900	0.04670	0.00030	0.01660	-0.77350	4.96130	0.06710	0.00050	0.95500	0.00000
12	Wassall                 	-0.05670	0.07550	0.00010	0.01170	0.89130	7.79330	0.12300	0.00000	0.89080	0.00000
13	BTP                     	-0.04070	0.05940	-0.00010	0.01070	1.55640	7.76690	0.17480	0.00000	0.84010	0.00000
14	EMAP                    	-0.04140	0.04450	-0.00010	0.00880	0.29440	4.63880	0.10200	0.00000	0.92470	0.00000
15	BPB                     	-0.04400	0.04280	0.00040	0.01080	0.26790	2.06080	0.05570	0.00910	0.97340	0.00000
16	TI Group                	-0.02860	0.02760	-0.00050	0.00960	0.10490	0.04040	0.04650	0.05800	0.99570	0.42610
17	Unilever                	-0.01690	0.05380	0.00030	0.00760	1.27030	6.75850	0.06230	0.00180	0.93940	0.00000
18	SmithKline Beecham      	-0.06400	0.04270	0.00000	0.01050	-0.23470	4.56030	0.06600	0.00070	0.95540	0.00000
19	Bunzl                   	-0.05230	0.04930	-0.00040	0.01230	0.21530	3.34880	0.09950	0.00000	0.93870	0.00000
21	Kingfisher              	-0.02840	0.03510	-0.00040	0.01010	0.21780	0.64850	0.04840	0.04130	0.99030	0.01730
22	Unilever                	-0.02750	0.05540	0.00020	0.00890	1.66670	8.34860	0.08130	0.00000	0.89920	0.00000
23	Tomkins                 	-0.03760	0.05180	0.00030	0.01360	0.49100	1.12230	0.06890	0.00030	0.98100	0.00010
24	SmithKline Beecham      	-0.06250	0.04390	0.00030	0.01130	0.03560	3.63740	0.06950	0.00020	0.95850	0.00000
25	Sema                    	-0.03900	0.05510	-0.00040	0.01050	1.17260	6.25280	0.16700	0.00000	0.83770	0.00000
27	AGA Foodservice         	-0.03860	0.03520	-0.00100	0.01050	-0.16930	1.59440	0.06290	0.00160	0.97510	0.00000
28	Capital Radio           	-0.04460	0.04400	0.00030	0.00900	0.25140	5.31130	0.15670	0.00000	0.89570	0.00000
29	Bodycote International  	-0.05450	0.07540	-0.00100	0.01170	1.30540	9.64960	0.18060	0.00000	0.79720	0.00000
30	Tomkins                 	-0.04000	0.05660	0.00000	0.01440	0.67080	1.36950	0.07650	0.00000	0.97170	0.00000
31	Davis Service Group     	-0.03900	0.05710	0.00010	0.00910	1.08450	9.61400	0.15190	0.00000	0.82710	0.00000
32	SmithKline Beecham      	-0.03470	0.04300	-0.00020	0.01150	0.32680	0.92090	0.05220	0.01950	0.98850	0.00600
33	Barratt Developments    	-0.06820	0.04810	0.00030	0.01230	-0.05520	3.74440	0.07510	0.00000	0.95250	0.00000
34	EMAP                    	-0.04160	0.04140	0.00020	0.00930	0.29830	3.28460	0.11100	0.00000	0.94370	0.00000
35	GUS                     	-0.06690	0.09470	0.00050	0.01410	0.53410	6.89760	0.07000	0.00020	0.93200	0.00000
36	Tomkins                 	-0.04130	0.05660	0.00060	0.01400	0.50270	1.26280	0.07030	0.00020	0.97700	0.00000
38	Unilever                	-0.02850	0.05540	0.00020	0.01020	1.34610	5.47160	0.07810	0.00000	0.91770	0.00000
40	Wolseley                	-0.08740	0.04720	-0.00020	0.01560	-0.34920	2.88500	0.04590	0.06480	0.97260	0.00000
41	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.08350	0.05280	0.00120	0.01380	-0.25240	5.03680	0.09320	0.00000	0.93870	0.00000
42	BTP                     	-0.05090	0.08880	0.00030	0.01410	1.26690	8.44450	0.14300	0.00000	0.85660	0.00000
43	Wolseley                	-0.12000	0.04690	-0.00090	0.01790	-1.04920	6.57710	0.07750	0.00000	0.93380	0.00000
44	Serco Group             	-0.03440	0.05440	0.00090	0.00870	1.40730	8.19600	0.11370	0.00000	0.86650	0.00000
45	BTP                     	-0.05140	0.08820	0.00010	0.01420	1.30310	7.93790	0.13790	0.00000	0.86870	0.00000
46	Tomkins                 	-0.04610	0.05460	-0.00010	0.01460	0.44930	1.15960	0.07050	0.00020	0.97780	0.00000
48	Bunzl                   	-0.04370	0.05930	0.00000	0.01270	0.66110	3.95160	0.12480	0.00000	0.91700	0.00000
49	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.08520	0.06110	0.00100	0.01430	-0.08970	5.31930	0.08770	0.00000	0.93590	0.00000
50	Vickers                 	-0.10860	0.08520	-0.00010	0.01930	-0.29380	7.26930	0.11230	0.00000	0.87580	0.00000
52	EMAP                    	-0.05110	0.03860	-0.00010	0.00940	-0.06880	3.97760	0.11910	0.00000	0.93160	0.00000
53	GKN                     	-0.07320	0.06380	0.00000	0.01780	-0.09000	2.10310	0.07820	0.00000	0.96780	0.00000
54	Amersham                	-0.07040	0.08430	-0.00060	0.01940	0.56580	2.77990	0.09550	0.00000	0.94930	0.00000
55	Wolseley                	-0.11950	0.04740	-0.00080	0.01870	-0.97900	5.24960	0.06560	0.00070	0.94630	0.00000
56	Hays                    	-0.06040	0.07050	-0.00080	0.01620	0.09110	1.94300	0.05680	0.00700	0.97750	0.00000
57	Marconi                 	-0.06550	0.07570	0.00020	0.01880	0.48810	1.90430	0.06670	0.00060	0.97120	0.00000
58	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.08740	0.05980	-0.00030	0.01370	-0.18200	6.75670	0.10180	0.00000	0.90990	0.00000
59	Britax International    	-0.08270	0.09310	-0.00180	0.01570	0.03280	8.73450	0.15470	0.00000	0.84120	0.00000
60	National Express Group  	-0.06290	0.06980	-0.00130	0.01520	0.46780	4.09760	0.13460	0.00000	0.91840	0.00000
62	Boots Group             	-0.06930	0.10810	0.00020	0.01690	0.38750	5.36340	0.06830	0.00040	0.94930	0.00000
65	GKN                     	-0.07270	0.06880	-0.00070	0.02090	0.10970	1.14110	0.06650	0.00060	0.98130	0.00010
67	BTP                     	-0.07330	0.08740	-0.00140	0.01980	0.20350	2.67170	0.09930	0.00000	0.94830	0.00000
69	Cadbury Schweppes       	-0.05090	0.07530	-0.00050	0.01770	0.61980	1.62680	0.06600	0.00070	0.97330	0.00000
70	Reuters Group           	-0.08680	0.09540	0.00140	0.02400	0.25780	2.01480	0.05360	0.01450	0.97260	0.00000
71	Unilever                	-0.04590	0.06670	-0.00100	0.01610	0.30090	1.74410	0.06480	0.00090	0.97230	0.00000
72	Pearson                 	-0.06430	0.09290	-0.00030	0.01960	0.40290	2.35850	0.05760	0.00590	0.97110	0.00000
73	AstraZeneca             	-0.07310	0.06510	-0.00050	0.01670	0.12210	1.14240	0.05610	0.00830	0.98730	0.00300
76	Johnson Matthey         	-0.07180	0.08720	0.00080	0.02110	0.34620	1.82090	0.07840	0.00000	0.97250	0.00000
77	Hepworth                	-0.07650	0.10670	0.00130	0.02240	0.79600	3.27750	0.13480	0.00000	0.92740	0.00000
78	De La Rue               	-0.12030	0.09580	-0.00060	0.02450	-0.30190	3.70980	0.12310	0.00000	0.92790	0.00000
79	Wolseley                	-0.12260	0.10000	0.00020	0.02710	0.23750	3.14820	0.09690	0.00000	0.93500	0.00000
80	Smith & Nephew          	-0.10920	0.08920	0.00070	0.02240	-0.01220	3.79710	0.09540	0.00000	0.94060	0.00000
82	United Business Media   	-0.12790	0.08180	-0.00030	0.02220	-0.43120	3.09370	0.04080	0.20000	0.97290	0.00000
83	BBA Group               	-0.11130	0.07640	-0.00010	0.02400	-0.34920	2.06920	0.08900	0.00000	0.96750	0.00000
85	United Business Media   	-0.12830	0.07830	-0.00040	0.02250	-0.46270	2.93330	0.04760	0.04740	0.97410	0.00000





Table 6.14 Early maturity stage
(Old alpha/beta, no Dimson adjustment)

col 1	col 2	col 3	col 4	col 5	col 6	col 7	col 8	col 9	col 10	col 11	col 12
 		MinStat	MaxStat	MeanStat	Std. DevStat	SkewnessStat	KurtosisStat	Kolmogorov-SmirnovStat	 Sig.	Shapiro-WilkStat	 Sig.
 	 										
1	Lonmin                  	-0.03530	0.04540	0.00080	0.01150	0.46000	1.71030	0.08830	0.00000	0.96830	0.00000
2	Stakis                  	-0.03730	0.09790	0.00130	0.01260	1.38380	10.54610	0.13410	0.00000	0.88320	0.00000
3	Greene King             	-0.04720	0.06610	-0.00020	0.00670	2.31830	35.29050	0.22480	0.00000	0.63550	0.00000
4	Allied Domecq           	-0.03280	0.03130	0.00020	0.00970	-0.01710	0.73610	0.05360	0.01440	0.99090	0.02580
5	Medeva                  	-0.07300	0.12780	-0.00090	0.01880	1.11540	7.66850	0.10580	0.00000	0.90870	0.00000
6	First Leisure Corpn.    	-0.05300	0.05250	-0.00010	0.00850	0.38170	9.19360	0.12900	0.00000	0.87590	0.00000
7	Reckitt Benckiser       	-0.02930	0.04620	-0.00010	0.00830	0.44670	3.22060	0.06660	0.00060	0.96450	0.00000
8	Whitbread               	-0.05380	0.01780	-0.00010	0.00760	-0.89650	6.43660	0.05140	0.02260	0.94680	0.00000
9	BTR                     	-0.04090	0.03350	-0.00050	0.00890	-0.35320	3.26020	0.06430	0.00110	0.95700	0.00000
10	De Vere Group           	-0.05470	0.02970	-0.00050	0.00820	-0.48900	7.36470	0.10350	0.00000	0.90170	0.00000
11	BOC Group               	-0.02440	0.02440	-0.00030	0.00690	0.17070	1.26080	0.06640	0.00060	0.98100	0.00010
12	Hilton Group            	-0.15450	0.10830	0.00040	0.01840	-0.61470	17.34950	0.11230	0.00000	0.83870	0.00000
13	United Business Media   	-0.03660	0.05040	-0.00020	0.01070	0.88110	4.28170	0.10640	0.00000	0.91890	0.00000
14	Cadbury Schweppes       	-0.04390	0.05770	-0.00020	0.01200	0.36130	2.95280	0.05000	0.03040	0.96740	0.00000
15	BP                      	-0.02570	0.02680	0.00010	0.00850	-0.21280	0.40220	0.05390	0.01360	0.99100	0.02740
16	Allied Domecq           	-0.03500	0.05980	0.00000	0.01070	0.36340	2.83840	0.05390	0.01350	0.97360	0.00000
17	Croda International     	-0.05280	0.07800	0.00030	0.00810	1.78460	29.11810	0.18930	0.00000	0.71750	0.00000
18	United Business Media   	-0.03740	0.05690	-0.00080	0.01130	1.07960	5.26630	0.11430	0.00000	0.89770	0.00000
19	Antofagasta             	-0.04010	0.09710	0.00020	0.01130	2.39980	18.92880	0.31140	0.00000	0.71650	0.00000
20	Hyder                   	-0.04130	0.04590	0.00030	0.00890	0.39260	3.68140	0.07040	0.00020	0.95550	0.00000
21	Thames Water            	-0.02810	0.05760	0.00010	0.01030	0.82280	3.47170	0.06690	0.00050	0.95470	0.00000
22	BG Group                	-0.12250	0.08960	0.00090	0.01730	-0.48680	9.53280	0.10090	0.00000	0.90110	0.00000
23	De Vere Group           	-0.03620	0.03100	-0.00020	0.00780	0.22650	3.05270	0.09850	0.00000	0.94130	0.00000
24	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.03130	0.07630	0.00010	0.01140	1.22670	5.75000	0.11050	0.00000	0.93160	0.00000
25	Hilton Group            	-0.15550	0.10750	0.00000	0.01830	-0.68110	18.05940	0.11870	0.00000	0.83740	0.00000
26	Johnston Press          	-0.06170	0.12120	0.00020	0.01380	2.09090	19.74350	0.19270	0.00000	0.75140	0.00000
27	Scottish Power          	-0.05350	0.05660	0.00030	0.01220	0.16840	3.76430	0.08720	0.00000	0.94100	0.00000
28	United Utilities        	-0.03180	0.04160	-0.00010	0.01070	0.51130	1.01620	0.07280	0.00010	0.98170	0.00020
29	Rank Group              	-0.10590	0.06330	-0.00040	0.01500	-1.11920	8.93050	0.06940	0.00030	0.90850	0.00000
30	Rentokil Initial        	-0.09480	0.06570	-0.00080	0.01250	-0.59570	11.40400	0.08950	0.00000	0.89220	0.00000
31	Scot. & Southern Energy 	-0.03950	0.05120	0.00030	0.01050	0.63950	3.03040	0.08320	0.00000	0.95430	0.00000
32	Cable & Wireless        	-0.08130	0.12620	0.00030	0.01490	1.46690	16.50630	0.07100	0.00020	0.87420	0.00000
33	Tate & Lyle             	-0.03780	0.02340	0.00000	0.00920	-0.63770	2.18140	0.08560	0.00000	0.95430	0.00000
34	Rank Group              	-0.10490	0.06390	-0.00020	0.01690	-1.24980	7.95470	0.07460	0.00010	0.90040	0.00000
35	Rio Tinto               	-0.02780	0.04680	-0.00010	0.01000	0.23930	1.25720	0.04040	0.20000	0.98880	0.00710
36	Reckitt Benckiser       	-0.03000	0.04690	0.00000	0.00980	0.48930	2.02080	0.06450	0.00100	0.97360	0.00000
37	Scapa Group             	-0.05820	0.10440	0.00030	0.01090	3.11190	33.40450	0.19900	0.00000	0.66470	0.00000
38	Cable & Wireless        	-0.04520	0.12370	-0.00050	0.01540	1.72550	12.11470	0.07580	0.00000	0.90340	0.00000
39	De Vere Group           	-0.08970	0.06500	-0.00020	0.01160	-0.59020	14.46940	0.13450	0.00000	0.82960	0.00000
40	Blue Circle Industries  	-0.07300	0.05440	-0.00090	0.01400	-0.23640	2.62980	0.05520	0.01010	0.97420	0.00000
41	Whitbread               	-0.04420	0.06780	0.00020	0.01020	1.38160	8.93650	0.09120	0.00000	0.88990	0.00000
42	Spectris                	-0.05260	0.08150	0.00050	0.01130	1.14290	10.30210	0.16380	0.00000	0.85500	0.00000
43	British Airways         	-0.05980	0.05220	-0.00080	0.01370	-0.23990	2.83350	0.08670	0.00000	0.95840	0.00000
44	United Utilities        	-0.08260	0.06880	-0.00020	0.01260	-0.06970	6.90710	0.06720	0.00050	0.93590	0.00000
45	Lonmin                  	-0.07570	0.08680	-0.00030	0.01880	-0.28000	3.69370	0.09040	0.00000	0.93620	0.00000
46	Tesco                   	-0.05970	0.07050	-0.00020	0.01310	0.01380	3.76490	0.09090	0.00000	0.95220	0.00000
47	Ashtead Group           	-0.04640	0.07630	0.00080	0.01500	1.33110	4.09310	0.17520	0.00000	0.88640	0.00000
48	BOC Group               	-0.07240	0.05750	-0.00070	0.01340	-0.08560	3.47250	0.06090	0.00260	0.96040	0.00000
49	Lonmin                  	-0.07760	0.08670	0.00000	0.02030	0.01970	2.77850	0.08520	0.00000	0.95540	0.00000
50	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.05620	0.07160	-0.00010	0.01380	0.37200	3.60880	0.08130	0.00000	0.95230	0.00000
51	Charter                 	-0.04260	0.07340	-0.00070	0.01160	0.96210	6.95250	0.13270	0.00000	0.89230	0.00000
52	SmithKline Beecham      	-0.09720	0.08100	-0.00080	0.01720	-0.19910	5.19230	0.06020	0.00310	0.94130	0.00000
53	Allied Domecq           	-0.05330	0.05560	-0.00020	0.01390	0.44420	1.69560	0.07310	0.00010	0.97380	0.00000
54	Hanson                  	-0.07660	0.06470	0.00060	0.01590	0.02060	2.22250	0.05940	0.00380	0.97390	0.00000
55	Mirror Group            	-0.04580	0.11040	0.00070	0.01390	1.99550	14.20470	0.15510	0.00000	0.82640	0.00000
56	Croda International     	-0.05240	0.11230	-0.00030	0.01580	1.14380	8.45750	0.12470	0.00000	0.89550	0.00000
57	De Vere Group           	-0.08930	0.06510	0.00090	0.01370	0.15100	9.20620	0.12720	0.00000	0.85970	0.00000
58	Pearson                 	-0.04490	0.09500	0.00040	0.01630	0.85710	4.09910	0.07330	0.00010	0.95040	0.00000
59	Lonmin                  	-0.09730	0.08670	0.00000	0.02230	0.11090	2.33130	0.08310	0.00000	0.96440	0.00000
60	Wetherspoon (J.D.)      	-0.09630	0.07810	-0.00250	0.01610	-0.93420	10.58060	0.23170	0.00000	0.73900	0.00000
61	Diageo                  	-0.07670	0.14730	-0.00090	0.01880	1.27190	11.68890	0.09060	0.00000	0.89820	0.00000
62	McKechnie Group         	-0.10990	0.09030	-0.00120	0.01840	0.25210	7.54720	0.14470	0.00000	0.87370	0.00000
63	Whitbread               	-0.06800	0.06980	-0.00050	0.01510	0.46130	3.66510	0.06150	0.00230	0.95300	0.00000
64	Kelda Group             	-0.03970	0.09420	0.00040	0.01520	0.99960	4.73060	0.07660	0.00000	0.94400	0.00000
65	Diageo                  	-0.07390	0.09030	-0.00020	0.01900	0.30520	2.68830	0.07890	0.00000	0.96450	0.00000
66	First Leisure Corpn.    	-0.09320	0.08670	-0.00210	0.01890	0.16540	5.21690	0.14950	0.00000	0.88930	0.00000
67	Invensys                	-0.11440	0.09950	-0.00090	0.02510	-0.56990	3.52390	0.07930	0.00000	0.94640	0.00000
68	International Power     	-0.07620	0.05500	0.00000	0.01760	-0.37890	1.85230	0.05690	0.00700	0.97760	0.00000
69	Allied Domecq           	-0.14280	0.08740	-0.00080	0.01890	-1.15480	10.82850	0.09660	0.00000	0.89080	0.00000
70	Asda Group              	-0.05580	0.08280	-0.00070	0.02020	0.08520	0.63930	0.03690	0.20000	0.99290	0.08550
71	Morgan Crucible         	-0.34340	0.09480	-0.00040	0.02510	-6.71960	97.90580	0.16650	0.00000	0.59410	0.00000
72	BG Group                	-0.09300	0.07490	-0.00120	0.01890	-0.00160	2.54510	0.07020	0.00020	0.96850	0.00000
73	Croda International     	-0.06250	0.09040	0.00070	0.01910	0.65120	4.44660	0.13750	0.00000	0.90390	0.00000
74	REXAM                   	-0.07500	0.09090	0.00100	0.02020	0.30380	2.07130	0.10110	0.00000	0.96540	0.00000
75	Allied Domecq           	-0.14050	0.08550	-0.00020	0.01890	-1.18310	9.97370	0.09900	0.00000	0.90270	0.00000
76	Whitbread               	-0.06710	0.06260	0.00050	0.01730	0.01220	1.37900	0.05040	0.02800	0.98620	0.00160
77	Hanson                  	-0.05860	0.11800	0.00040	0.02000	0.67320	3.32790	0.08110	0.00000	0.96220	0.00000
78	BP                      	-0.05370	0.08100	0.00000	0.01660	0.70660	3.08340	0.05730	0.00620	0.95950	0.00000
79	Diageo                  	-0.06940	0.08920	-0.00040	0.02130	0.21600	1.22440	0.03770	0.20000	0.98890	0.00740
80	Allied Domecq           	-0.14100	0.11160	0.00000	0.02020	-0.57310	9.95640	0.10210	0.00000	0.89170	0.00000
81	REXAM                   	-0.06660	0.10890	0.00140	0.02230	0.92060	3.29440	0.12300	0.00000	0.94090	0.00000
82	Powergen                	-0.03910	0.05390	-0.00090	0.01590	0.37880	0.54280	0.07180	0.00010	0.98540	0.00100
83	Allied Domecq           	-0.14020	0.11280	0.00120	0.02060	-0.31160	9.69840	0.09580	0.00000	0.89090	0.00000
84	Swallow Group           	-0.11520	0.13700	0.00000	0.02260	0.64160	9.50410	0.16220	0.00000	0.82220	0.00000
85	Hyder                   	-0.07400	0.04610	-0.00070	0.01090	-1.53020	8.97170	0.13040	0.00000	0.86540	0.00000
86	British Airways         	-0.06180	0.06730	0.00020	0.02150	0.20280	0.54910	0.05240	0.01840	0.98980	0.01280
87	TI Group                	-0.08160	0.09960	0.00040	0.02720	0.27310	1.76940	0.06580	0.00070	0.97110	0.00000
88	Mayflower Corporation   	-0.07320	0.08190	0.00080	0.02300	0.41900	2.08510	0.12100	0.00000	0.94120	0.00000
89	Hanson                  	-0.05880	0.11660	-0.00160	0.02150	0.47370	2.35100	0.06960	0.00020	0.97320	0.00000
90	International Power     	-0.06230	0.07660	0.00010	0.01910	0.27580	1.00860	0.05270	0.01750	0.98990	0.01350
91	Spirent                 	-0.10480	0.06410	0.00140	0.01760	-0.02210	4.93250	0.12140	0.00000	0.92410	0.00000
92	Rank Group              	-0.07970	0.10520	-0.00070	0.02680	0.28380	1.21340	0.05930	0.00390	0.98430	0.00060
93	REXAM                   	-0.08110	0.10600	-0.00090	0.02390	0.70350	2.43170	0.09650	0.00000	0.95910	0.00000
94	Laporte                 	-0.13910	0.25610	-0.00130	0.02720	2.01360	23.73180	0.11120	0.00000	0.83250	0.00000
95	Scottish & Newcastle    	-0.07830	0.10700	0.00020	0.02380	0.35520	1.30060	0.04890	0.03770	0.98640	0.00190
96	BT Group                	-0.19900	0.10270	-0.00070	0.02660	-0.72620	9.52620	0.09050	0.00000	0.90830	0.00000
97	Trinity Mirror          	-0.06090	0.10380	-0.00070	0.01610	0.79320	7.12460	0.13270	0.00000	0.89450	0.00000
98	Stagecoach Group        	-0.54240	0.09820	-0.00230	0.04240	-5.86270	73.08970	0.11810	0.00000	0.68640	0.00000
99	REXAM                   	-0.08520	0.10910	-0.00080	0.02770	0.48890	1.42340	0.08950	0.00000	0.97290	0.00000
100	Invensys                	-0.14470	0.12530	-0.00090	0.03000	-0.18250	2.68930	0.06820	0.00040	0.96920	0.00000
101	Kelda Group             	-0.17310	0.14720	0.00170	0.03200	0.17990	5.04970	0.10370	0.00000	0.92410	0.00000
102	United Utilities        	-0.08770	0.12570	0.00060	0.02410	0.29320	2.25000	0.05830	0.00500	0.97900	0.00000
103	Powergen                	-0.14830	0.08540	0.00010	0.02580	-0.42870	3.92570	0.07370	0.00010	0.95360	0.00000
104	National Grid Transco   	-0.09040	0.09730	-0.00020	0.02010	0.12520	2.90380	0.05930	0.00390	0.96950	0.00000
105	Kelda Group             	-0.17370	0.14440	0.00030	0.03350	0.11730	3.83160	0.08860	0.00000	0.94690	0.00000
106	Hanson                  	-0.09420	0.15320	0.00110	0.02630	0.43770	3.36460	0.06820	0.00040	0.96660	0.00000
107	Hilton Group            	-0.17370	0.13960	0.00090	0.03000	0.26190	4.81390	0.07030	0.00020	0.94260	0.00000
108	REXAM                   	-0.12190	0.10830	0.00070	0.02760	0.18740	1.87530	0.05470	0.01140	0.97700	0.00000






Table 6.15 Early maturity stage
(Old alpha/beta, no outliers)

col 1	col 2	col 3	col 4	col 5	col 6	col 7	col 8	col 9	col 10	col 11	col 12
 		MinStat	MaxStat	MeanStat	Std. DevStat	SkewnessStat	KurtosisStat	Kolmogorov-SmirnovStat	 Sig.	Shapiro-WilkStat	 Sig.
1	Lonmin                  	-0.03530	0.04540	0.00080	0.01150	0.46000	1.71030	0.08830	0.00000	0.96830	0.00000
4	Allied Domecq           	-0.03280	0.03130	0.00020	0.00970	-0.01710	0.73610	0.05360	0.01440	0.99090	0.02580
5	Medeva                  	-0.07300	0.12780	-0.00090	0.01880	1.11540	7.66850	0.10580	0.00000	0.90870	0.00000
6	First Leisure Corpn.    	-0.05300	0.05250	-0.00010	0.00850	0.38170	9.19360	0.12900	0.00000	0.87590	0.00000
7	Reckitt Benckiser       	-0.02930	0.04620	-0.00010	0.00830	0.44670	3.22060	0.06660	0.00060	0.96450	0.00000
8	Whitbread               	-0.05380	0.01780	-0.00010	0.00760	-0.89650	6.43660	0.05140	0.02260	0.94680	0.00000
9	BTR                     	-0.04090	0.03350	-0.00050	0.00890	-0.35320	3.26020	0.06430	0.00110	0.95700	0.00000
10	De Vere Group           	-0.05470	0.02970	-0.00050	0.00820	-0.48900	7.36470	0.10350	0.00000	0.90170	0.00000
11	BOC Group               	-0.02440	0.02440	-0.00030	0.00690	0.17070	1.26080	0.06640	0.00060	0.98100	0.00010
13	United Business Media   	-0.03660	0.05040	-0.00020	0.01070	0.88110	4.28170	0.10640	0.00000	0.91890	0.00000
14	Cadbury Schweppes       	-0.04390	0.05770	-0.00020	0.01200	0.36130	2.95280	0.05000	0.03040	0.96740	0.00000
15	BP                      	-0.02570	0.02680	0.00010	0.00850	-0.21280	0.40220	0.05390	0.01360	0.99100	0.02740
16	Allied Domecq           	-0.03500	0.05980	0.00000	0.01070	0.36340	2.83840	0.05390	0.01350	0.97360	0.00000
18	United Business Media   	-0.03740	0.05690	-0.00080	0.01130	1.07960	5.26630	0.11430	0.00000	0.89770	0.00000
20	Hyder                   	-0.04130	0.04590	0.00030	0.00890	0.39260	3.68140	0.07040	0.00020	0.95550	0.00000
21	Thames Water            	-0.02810	0.05760	0.00010	0.01030	0.82280	3.47170	0.06690	0.00050	0.95470	0.00000
22	BG Group                	-0.12250	0.08960	0.00090	0.01730	-0.48680	9.53280	0.10090	0.00000	0.90110	0.00000
23	De Vere Group           	-0.03620	0.03100	-0.00020	0.00780	0.22650	3.05270	0.09850	0.00000	0.94130	0.00000
24	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.03130	0.07630	0.00010	0.01140	1.22670	5.75000	0.11050	0.00000	0.93160	0.00000
27	Scottish Power          	-0.05350	0.05660	0.00030	0.01220	0.16840	3.76430	0.08720	0.00000	0.94100	0.00000
28	United Utilities        	-0.03180	0.04160	-0.00010	0.01070	0.51130	1.01620	0.07280	0.00010	0.98170	0.00020
29	Rank Group              	-0.10590	0.06330	-0.00040	0.01500	-1.11920	8.93050	0.06940	0.00030	0.90850	0.00000
31	Scot. & Southern Energy 	-0.03950	0.05120	0.00030	0.01050	0.63950	3.03040	0.08320	0.00000	0.95430	0.00000
33	Tate & Lyle             	-0.03780	0.02340	0.00000	0.00920	-0.63770	2.18140	0.08560	0.00000	0.95430	0.00000
34	Rank Group              	-0.10490	0.06390	-0.00020	0.01690	-1.24980	7.95470	0.07460	0.00010	0.90040	0.00000
35	Rio Tinto               	-0.02780	0.04680	-0.00010	0.01000	0.23930	1.25720	0.04040	0.20000	0.98880	0.00710
36	Reckitt Benckiser       	-0.03000	0.04690	0.00000	0.00980	0.48930	2.02080	0.06450	0.00100	0.97360	0.00000
40	Blue Circle Industries  	-0.07300	0.05440	-0.00090	0.01400	-0.23640	2.62980	0.05520	0.01010	0.97420	0.00000
41	Whitbread               	-0.04420	0.06780	0.00020	0.01020	1.38160	8.93650	0.09120	0.00000	0.88990	0.00000
43	British Airways         	-0.05980	0.05220	-0.00080	0.01370	-0.23990	2.83350	0.08670	0.00000	0.95840	0.00000
44	United Utilities        	-0.08260	0.06880	-0.00020	0.01260	-0.06970	6.90710	0.06720	0.00050	0.93590	0.00000
45	Lonmin                  	-0.07570	0.08680	-0.00030	0.01880	-0.28000	3.69370	0.09040	0.00000	0.93620	0.00000
46	Tesco                   	-0.05970	0.07050	-0.00020	0.01310	0.01380	3.76490	0.09090	0.00000	0.95220	0.00000
47	Ashtead Group           	-0.04640	0.07630	0.00080	0.01500	1.33110	4.09310	0.17520	0.00000	0.88640	0.00000
48	BOC Group               	-0.07240	0.05750	-0.00070	0.01340	-0.08560	3.47250	0.06090	0.00260	0.96040	0.00000
49	Lonmin                  	-0.07760	0.08670	0.00000	0.02030	0.01970	2.77850	0.08520	0.00000	0.95540	0.00000
50	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.05620	0.07160	-0.00010	0.01380	0.37200	3.60880	0.08130	0.00000	0.95230	0.00000
51	Charter                 	-0.04260	0.07340	-0.00070	0.01160	0.96210	6.95250	0.13270	0.00000	0.89230	0.00000
52	SmithKline Beecham      	-0.09720	0.08100	-0.00080	0.01720	-0.19910	5.19230	0.06020	0.00310	0.94130	0.00000
53	Allied Domecq           	-0.05330	0.05560	-0.00020	0.01390	0.44420	1.69560	0.07310	0.00010	0.97380	0.00000
54	Hanson                  	-0.07660	0.06470	0.00060	0.01590	0.02060	2.22250	0.05940	0.00380	0.97390	0.00000
56	Croda International     	-0.05240	0.11230	-0.00030	0.01580	1.14380	8.45750	0.12470	0.00000	0.89550	0.00000
57	De Vere Group           	-0.08930	0.06510	0.00090	0.01370	0.15100	9.20620	0.12720	0.00000	0.85970	0.00000
58	Pearson                 	-0.04490	0.09500	0.00040	0.01630	0.85710	4.09910	0.07330	0.00010	0.95040	0.00000
59	Lonmin                  	-0.09730	0.08670	0.00000	0.02230	0.11090	2.33130	0.08310	0.00000	0.96440	0.00000
62	McKechnie Group         	-0.10990	0.09030	-0.00120	0.01840	0.25210	7.54720	0.14470	0.00000	0.87370	0.00000
63	Whitbread               	-0.06800	0.06980	-0.00050	0.01510	0.46130	3.66510	0.06150	0.00230	0.95300	0.00000
64	Kelda Group             	-0.03970	0.09420	0.00040	0.01520	0.99960	4.73060	0.07660	0.00000	0.94400	0.00000
65	Diageo                  	-0.07390	0.09030	-0.00020	0.01900	0.30520	2.68830	0.07890	0.00000	0.96450	0.00000
66	First Leisure Corpn.    	-0.09320	0.08670	-0.00210	0.01890	0.16540	5.21690	0.14950	0.00000	0.88930	0.00000
67	Invensys                	-0.11440	0.09950	-0.00090	0.02510	-0.56990	3.52390	0.07930	0.00000	0.94640	0.00000
68	International Power     	-0.07620	0.05500	0.00000	0.01760	-0.37890	1.85230	0.05690	0.00700	0.97760	0.00000
70	Asda Group              	-0.05580	0.08280	-0.00070	0.02020	0.08520	0.63930	0.03690	0.20000	0.99290	0.08550
72	BG Group                	-0.09300	0.07490	-0.00120	0.01890	-0.00160	2.54510	0.07020	0.00020	0.96850	0.00000
73	Croda International     	-0.06250	0.09040	0.00070	0.01910	0.65120	4.44660	0.13750	0.00000	0.90390	0.00000
74	REXAM                   	-0.07500	0.09090	0.00100	0.02020	0.30380	2.07130	0.10110	0.00000	0.96540	0.00000
75	Allied Domecq           	-0.14050	0.08550	-0.00020	0.01890	-1.18310	9.97370	0.09900	0.00000	0.90270	0.00000
76	Whitbread               	-0.06710	0.06260	0.00050	0.01730	0.01220	1.37900	0.05040	0.02800	0.98620	0.00160
77	Hanson                  	-0.05860	0.11800	0.00040	0.02000	0.67320	3.32790	0.08110	0.00000	0.96220	0.00000
78	BP                      	-0.05370	0.08100	0.00000	0.01660	0.70660	3.08340	0.05730	0.00620	0.95950	0.00000
79	Diageo                  	-0.06940	0.08920	-0.00040	0.02130	0.21600	1.22440	0.03770	0.20000	0.98890	0.00740
80	Allied Domecq           	-0.14100	0.11160	0.00000	0.02020	-0.57310	9.95640	0.10210	0.00000	0.89170	0.00000
81	REXAM                   	-0.06660	0.10890	0.00140	0.02230	0.92060	3.29440	0.12300	0.00000	0.94090	0.00000
82	Powergen                	-0.03910	0.05390	-0.00090	0.01590	0.37880	0.54280	0.07180	0.00010	0.98540	0.00100
83	Allied Domecq           	-0.14020	0.11280	0.00120	0.02060	-0.31160	9.69840	0.09580	0.00000	0.89090	0.00000
84	Swallow Group           	-0.11520	0.13700	0.00000	0.02260	0.64160	9.50410	0.16220	0.00000	0.82220	0.00000
85	Hyder                   	-0.07400	0.04610	-0.00070	0.01090	-1.53020	8.97170	0.13040	0.00000	0.86540	0.00000
86	British Airways         	-0.06180	0.06730	0.00020	0.02150	0.20280	0.54910	0.05240	0.01840	0.98980	0.01280
87	TI Group                	-0.08160	0.09960	0.00040	0.02720	0.27310	1.76940	0.06580	0.00070	0.97110	0.00000
88	Mayflower Corporation   	-0.07320	0.08190	0.00080	0.02300	0.41900	2.08510	0.12100	0.00000	0.94120	0.00000
89	Hanson                  	-0.05880	0.11660	-0.00160	0.02150	0.47370	2.35100	0.06960	0.00020	0.97320	0.00000
90	International Power     	-0.06230	0.07660	0.00010	0.01910	0.27580	1.00860	0.05270	0.01750	0.98990	0.01350
91	Spirent                 	-0.10480	0.06410	0.00140	0.01760	-0.02210	4.93250	0.12140	0.00000	0.92410	0.00000
92	Rank Group              	-0.07970	0.10520	-0.00070	0.02680	0.28380	1.21340	0.05930	0.00390	0.98430	0.00060
93	REXAM                   	-0.08110	0.10600	-0.00090	0.02390	0.70350	2.43170	0.09650	0.00000	0.95910	0.00000
95	Scottish & Newcastle    	-0.07830	0.10700	0.00020	0.02380	0.35520	1.30060	0.04890	0.03770	0.98640	0.00190
96	BT Group                	-0.19900	0.10270	-0.00070	0.02660	-0.72620	9.52620	0.09050	0.00000	0.90830	0.00000
97	Trinity Mirror          	-0.06090	0.10380	-0.00070	0.01610	0.79320	7.12460	0.13270	0.00000	0.89450	0.00000
99	REXAM                   	-0.08520	0.10910	-0.00080	0.02770	0.48890	1.42340	0.08950	0.00000	0.97290	0.00000
100	Invensys                	-0.14470	0.12530	-0.00090	0.03000	-0.18250	2.68930	0.06820	0.00040	0.96920	0.00000
101	Kelda Group             	-0.17310	0.14720	0.00170	0.03200	0.17990	5.04970	0.10370	0.00000	0.92410	0.00000
102	United Utilities        	-0.08770	0.12570	0.00060	0.02410	0.29320	2.25000	0.05830	0.00500	0.97900	0.00000
103	Powergen                	-0.14830	0.08540	0.00010	0.02580	-0.42870	3.92570	0.07370	0.00010	0.95360	0.00000
104	National Grid Transco   	-0.09040	0.09730	-0.00020	0.02010	0.12520	2.90380	0.05930	0.00390	0.96950	0.00000
105	Kelda Group             	-0.17370	0.14440	0.00030	0.03350	0.11730	3.83160	0.08860	0.00000	0.94690	0.00000
106	Hanson                  	-0.09420	0.15320	0.00110	0.02630	0.43770	3.36460	0.06820	0.00040	0.96660	0.00000
107	Hilton Group            	-0.17370	0.13960	0.00090	0.03000	0.26190	4.81390	0.07030	0.00020	0.94260	0.00000
108	REXAM                   	-0.12190	0.10830	0.00070	0.02760	0.18740	1.87530	0.05470	0.01140	0.97700	0.00000











Table 6.16 Mature/decline stage
(Old alpha/beta, no Dimson adjustment)

col 1	col 2	col 3	col 4	col 5	col 6	col 7	col 8	col 9	col 10	col 11	col 12
 		MinStat	MaxStat	MeanStat	Std. DevStat	SkewnessStat	KurtosisStat	Kolmogorov-SmirnovStat	 Sig.	Shapiro-WilkStat	 Sig.
1	Booker                  	-0.04390	0.03000	0.00000	0.00970	-0.21690	2.72820	0.10530	0.00000	0.94390	0.00000
2	Inchcape                	-0.23790	0.07380	0.00040	0.02220	-3.61100	37.65690	0.11530	0.00000	0.78110	0.00000
3	Hillsdown Holdings      	-0.04550	0.05330	0.00070	0.01240	0.21670	2.17960	0.07270	0.00010	0.97200	0.00000
4	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.03490	0.04710	0.00050	0.01030	0.02540	1.77920	0.04240	0.18680	0.98220	0.00020
5	REXAM                   	-0.15800	0.05460	0.00040	0.01610	-3.28070	30.92200	0.10690	0.00000	0.78410	0.00000
6	Albert Fisher Group     	-0.06780	0.06710	-0.00040	0.01560	0.47140	3.22740	0.22220	0.00000	0.88450	0.00000
7	Mothercare              	-0.06270	0.07900	-0.00060	0.01250	0.58500	6.46850	0.08230	0.00000	0.92950	0.00000
8	Delta                   	-0.08560	0.03760	0.00000	0.01100	-1.44530	12.69390	0.11180	0.00000	0.86700	0.00000
9	Pilkington              	-0.05030	0.05770	-0.00050	0.01470	0.17650	1.37310	0.05140	0.02290	0.98400	0.00050
10	Uniq                    	-0.06920	0.03440	0.00030	0.00920	-0.87570	9.12540	0.08290	0.00000	0.92300	0.00000
11	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.03910	0.05310	-0.00060	0.01240	0.67500	2.67050	0.10300	0.00000	0.94260	0.00000
12	Elementis plc	-0.06700	0.07250	-0.00040	0.01530	0.23430	3.05520	0.06210	0.00200	0.96330	0.00000
13	Powell Duffryn          	-0.14070	0.04410	0.00050	0.01270	-3.71520	43.03110	0.16030	0.00000	0.72840	0.00000
14	Pilkington              	-0.05110	0.04660	-0.00080	0.01490	0.06240	0.72300	0.04740	0.04980	0.99070	0.02230
15	Inchcape                	-0.08180	0.07180	-0.00010	0.01780	-0.24730	2.46160	0.05360	0.01450	0.97080	0.00000
16	Lonmin                  	-0.08050	0.04500	-0.00080	0.01330	-0.38800	4.09730	0.07800	0.00000	0.95640	0.00000
17	Balfour Beatty          	-0.04440	0.05630	-0.00050	0.01290	0.60000	2.73050	0.10300	0.00000	0.95310	0.00000
18	Cookson Group           	-0.06090	0.06850	-0.00030	0.01500	-0.00190	2.03430	0.06330	0.00140	0.97780	0.00000
19	Powell Duffryn          	-0.13920	0.04380	0.00020	0.01290	-3.37600	39.03710	0.16370	0.00000	0.74500	0.00000
20	Racal Electronics       	-0.19860	0.08180	-0.00030	0.01840	-3.05740	37.83800	0.09140	0.00000	0.78670	0.00000
21	Booker                  	-0.04040	0.05900	-0.00030	0.01020	0.26540	4.67500	0.09370	0.00000	0.93300	0.00000
22	Rugby Group PLC	-0.03650	0.07230	-0.00010	0.01490	0.85830	2.39380	0.09190	0.00000	0.95530	0.00000
23	Inchcape                	-0.08340	0.07100	-0.00060	0.01730	0.30020	2.21620	0.07130	0.00010	0.97040	0.00000
24	Lonmin                  	-0.07750	0.04150	0.00040	0.01390	-0.70350	5.21180	0.09630	0.00000	0.93610	0.00000
25	Christian Salvesen      	-0.14280	0.18640	-0.00040	0.01710	2.34710	52.74830	0.18460	0.00000	0.64030	0.00000
26	Hepworth                	-0.03700	0.04590	-0.00040	0.01020	0.56170	3.37500	0.10300	0.00000	0.94130	0.00000
27	Rolls Royce             	-0.05400	0.04990	-0.00050	0.01370	0.00430	1.05060	0.06480	0.00090	0.98670	0.00210
28	Laporte                 	-0.05350	0.06380	0.00060	0.01140	0.81310	5.50870	0.12470	0.00000	0.90850	0.00000
29	Lonmin                  	-0.07540	0.08690	0.00040	0.01500	-0.31040	7.18380	0.08810	0.00000	0.90910	0.00000
30	Hillsdown Holdings      	-0.05720	0.04670	-0.00030	0.01200	-0.02590	2.60540	0.06450	0.00100	0.96670	0.00000
31	Rolls Royce             	-0.05980	0.05110	-0.00020	0.01500	-0.34970	1.99640	0.05790	0.00540	0.97170	0.00000
32	Powell Duffryn          	-0.04800	0.04440	0.00000	0.00950	0.64550	5.42890	0.13510	0.00000	0.89310	0.00000
33	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.05080	0.07610	0.00110	0.01220	0.58780	6.02610	0.07640	0.00000	0.93670	0.00000
34	RAC                     	-0.02860	0.04330	0.00070	0.01020	0.96550	3.30980	0.15240	0.00000	0.90600	0.00000
35	BAE Systems             	-0.03280	0.03990	-0.00010	0.01080	0.34870	1.29510	0.07450	0.00010	0.97670	0.00000
36	Vickers                 	-0.10850	0.07500	-0.00020	0.01670	-0.48800	8.64430	0.10900	0.00000	0.88080	0.00000
37	Sears                   	-0.04490	0.04930	-0.00040	0.01390	0.11610	0.94480	0.08700	0.00000	0.98300	0.00030
38	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.05410	0.07330	0.00020	0.01290	0.40170	4.65370	0.06260	0.00170	0.94690	0.00000
39	Cordiant Comms. Group   	-0.07380	0.08810	-0.00040	0.01430	0.22100	7.42530	0.14870	0.00000	0.86740	0.00000
40	BP                      	-0.05430	0.03410	-0.00050	0.01150	-0.70600	2.68280	0.05640	0.00780	0.96490	0.00000
41	Meyer International     	-0.06260	0.04500	-0.00100	0.01040	-0.43330	6.21060	0.12560	0.00000	0.89800	0.00000
42	United Biscuits         	-0.06870	0.10930	0.00040	0.01430	1.74570	12.19900	0.13220	0.00000	0.85600	0.00000
43	Vickers                 	-0.10780	0.08560	0.00040	0.01860	-0.25750	8.08810	0.09580	0.00000	0.87260	0.00000
44	Arcadia Group           	-0.05810	0.09500	0.00140	0.01470	0.73900	6.10980	0.06380	0.00120	0.93540	0.00000
45	Low & Bonar             	-0.13780	0.11540	0.00140	0.01860	-1.81670	22.40360	0.20770	0.00000	0.68720	0.00000
46	Racal Electronics	-0.19780	0.08710	0.00090	0.02110	-2.60090	27.77000	0.13660	0.00000	0.74380	0.00000
47	Rolls Royce             	-0.07180	0.07850	0.00050	0.01930	0.09450	2.60680	0.05810	0.00520	0.96160	0.00000
48	Exel                    	-0.05650	0.07880	0.00070	0.01520	0.65910	4.63790	0.11420	0.00000	0.92460	0.00000
49	Unilever                	-0.03490	0.05570	0.00000	0.01080	0.82270	3.57390	0.07240	0.00010	0.95090	0.00000
50	Sears                   	-0.05870	0.07130	0.00050	0.01710	0.47240	2.37490	0.11460	0.00000	0.95690	0.00000
51	RMC Group               	-0.08680	0.05420	0.00040	0.01630	-0.38770	3.36340	0.07800	0.00000	0.95380	0.00000
52	TI Group                	-0.09770	0.06540	0.00000	0.01980	-0.60180	3.15020	0.07370	0.00010	0.95420	0.00000
53	Arjo Wiggins Appleton   	-0.06770	0.09050	0.00110	0.01980	0.96060	2.94880	0.09290	0.00000	0.93900	0.00000
54	Meyer International     	-0.06250	0.05350	-0.00010	0.01110	0.14590	5.41460	0.12230	0.00000	0.91500	0.00000
55	Elementis               	-0.06700	0.11280	0.00030	0.01860	1.65920	8.70140	0.16830	0.00000	0.83290	0.00000
56	Powell Duffryn          	-0.04840	0.06410	-0.00030	0.01090	0.58070	9.22960	0.16750	0.00000	0.80700	0.00000
57	Booker                  	-0.20110	0.09400	0.00110	0.02580	-1.54030	15.83280	0.12900	0.00000	0.80910	0.00000
58	Enterprise Oil          	-0.11020	0.08260	-0.00030	0.01810	-0.05500	5.93920	0.09620	0.00000	0.92270	0.00000
59	De La Rue               	-0.29150	0.06170	0.00050	0.02390	-5.56290	64.83010	0.16100	0.00000	0.65630	0.00000
60	Johnson Matthey         	-0.06880	0.12280	-0.00070	0.01820	0.71440	8.32970	0.11490	0.00000	0.88330	0.00000
61	Elementis               	-0.08460	0.11070	-0.00150	0.02080	1.18460	7.02580	0.15070	0.00000	0.86200	0.00000
62	LASMO                   	-0.07880	0.07300	-0.00060	0.02060	0.36990	1.70980	0.07930	0.00000	0.97140	0.00000
63	Unilever                	-0.04820	0.05230	0.00000	0.01370	0.39100	1.98060	0.06960	0.00020	0.96800	0.00000
64	De La Rue               	-0.29290	0.10470	-0.00080	0.02600	-4.07070	45.78430	0.15810	0.00000	0.71220	0.00000
65	Inchcape                	-0.10900	0.12420	-0.00090	0.02390	0.61800	6.04150	0.12460	0.00000	0.89570	0.00000
66	Racal Electronics       	-0.10580	0.08500	-0.00090	0.02080	-0.00910	5.08960	0.11780	0.00000	0.90420	0.00000
67	Hazlewood Foods         	-0.07520	0.07850	-0.00140	0.01590	0.16190	4.58940	0.12910	0.00000	0.91090	0.00000
68	Babcock International   	-0.09810	0.13620	0.00040	0.02320	1.28320	10.12130	0.20130	0.00000	0.78890	0.00000
69	Rolls Royce             	-0.07220	0.07860	0.00030	0.02140	0.29960	2.25070	0.05990	0.00340	0.96280	0.00000
70	TI Group                	-0.09430	0.09880	-0.00100	0.02560	-0.05870	1.81960	0.06440	0.00110	0.97330	0.00000
71	Hillsdown Holdings      	-0.12140	0.05190	-0.00190	0.01690	-1.15160	9.92750	0.12070	0.00000	0.87140	0.00000
72	Inchcape                	-0.10770	0.12500	-0.00030	0.02490	0.62920	4.95430	0.11700	0.00000	0.91610	0.00000
73	BP                      	-0.05380	0.08060	-0.00010	0.01650	0.74720	3.18820	0.06360	0.00130	0.95730	0.00000
74	Burmah Castrol          	-0.05520	0.06540	-0.00040	0.01730	0.09140	1.87580	0.07040	0.00020	0.96680	0.00000
75	De La Rue               	-0.29040	0.10550	0.00180	0.02650	-3.82360	42.51360	0.17220	0.00000	0.71550	0.00000
76	Taylor Woodrow	-0.07040	0.09320	0.00020	0.01630	0.95020	5.88830	0.12090	0.00000	0.91070	0.00000
77	De Vere Group           	-0.06620	0.09740	0.00000	0.01790	0.72540	4.76310	0.11060	0.00000	0.91030	0.00000
78	RAC                     	-0.07960	0.07840	-0.00040	0.01710	0.22490	3.84910	0.10460	0.00000	0.93700	0.00000
79	Shell Transport & Trad. 	-0.06370	0.08230	-0.00040	0.01730	0.36640	2.29730	0.06380	0.00120	0.97240	0.00000
80	Meyer International     	-0.08960	0.07280	0.00140	0.01620	0.29130	4.63970	0.13120	0.00000	0.92220	0.00000
81	Shell Transport & Trad. 	-0.06430	0.08240	0.00000	0.01800	0.53430	2.42760	0.07680	0.00000	0.96480	0.00000
82	BAE Systems             	-0.13350	0.11930	-0.00080	0.02480	0.08800	4.23390	0.06620	0.00060	0.95130	0.00000
83	Morgan Crucible         	-0.33690	0.09040	0.00050	0.02780	-4.42420	60.05820	0.14650	0.00000	0.69520	0.00000
84	De Vere Group           	-0.06870	0.10000	0.00070	0.01880	0.96080	4.95800	0.12200	0.00000	0.90310	0.00000
85	United Business Media   	-0.07090	0.07900	0.00070	0.02080	0.23880	1.04050	0.05630	0.00800	0.98830	0.00520
86	Senior                  	-0.12520	0.12140	0.00020	0.02280	0.10710	6.59640	0.11760	0.00000	0.89840	0.00000
87	Cable & Wireless        	-0.08420	0.07510	-0.00050	0.02220	-0.21500	0.95350	0.04790	0.04530	0.99020	0.01630
88	Arcadia Group           	-0.29760	0.21290	-0.00050	0.03840	-0.35250	13.11270	0.11740	0.00000	0.87220	0.00000
89	Blue Circle Industries  	-0.23200	0.09640	-0.00110	0.03020	-1.35750	11.18680	0.06580	0.00070	0.90520	0.00000
90	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.06340	0.10960	-0.00020	0.02120	0.64070	2.40890	0.05450	0.01190	0.97210	0.00000
91	EMAP                    	-0.08060	0.12070	0.00120	0.02500	0.75560	3.24760	0.10730	0.00000	0.94260	0.00000
92	MFI Furniture Group     	-0.13380	0.15300	0.00070	0.03360	1.08850	5.73500	0.15530	0.00000	0.86790	0.00000
93	Morgan Crucible         	-0.32770	0.10160	0.00030	0.03210	-2.43330	30.52530	0.15290	0.00000	0.79370	0.00000
94	Vodafone Group          	-0.08560	0.11230	-0.00180	0.02630	0.13280	1.17830	0.05450	0.01200	0.98760	0.00360
95	Tomkins                 	-0.10110	0.09780	-0.00020	0.02280	0.08510	2.44200	0.07910	0.00000	0.96420	0.00000
96	Carlton Communications  	-0.08620	0.13640	-0.00140	0.02610	0.53610	2.87600	0.06680	0.00050	0.96650	0.00000
97	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.13380	0.14290	0.00010	0.02280	-0.07680	7.22730	0.05890	0.00430	0.93150	0.00000
98	Rank Group              	-0.10470	0.13110	0.00140	0.02810	0.37160	2.75660	0.07930	0.00000	0.96310	0.00000
99	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.12620	0.14440	0.00080	0.02520	-0.00930	4.25800	0.05610	0.00840	0.96080	0.00000
100	BAE Systems             	-0.28000	0.10770	-0.00020	0.03220	-1.92580	16.02640	0.10140	0.00000	0.88230	0.00000
101	RMC Group               	-0.08930	0.10730	0.00140	0.02310	0.00510	3.45950	0.07900	0.00000	0.94910	0.00000
102	Sainsbury, J            	-0.11770	0.09900	0.00000	0.02810	-0.06200	2.55300	0.07280	0.00010	0.96310	0.00000
103	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.08070	0.10750	0.00110	0.02560	0.21990	1.19370	0.06910	0.00030	0.98570	0.00120





Table 6.17 Mature/decline stage
(Old alpha/beta, no outliers)

col 1	col 2	col 3	col 4	col 5	col 6	col 7	col 8	col 9	col 10	col 11	col 12
 		MinStat	MaxStat	MeanStat	Std. DevStat	SkewnessStat	KurtosisStat	Kolmogorov-SmirnovStat	 Sig.	Shapiro-WilkStat	 Sig.
1	Booker                  	-0.04390	0.03000	0.00000	0.00970	-0.21690	2.72820	0.10530	0.00000	0.94390	0.00000
3	Hillsdown Holdings      	-0.04550	0.05330	0.00070	0.01240	0.21670	2.17960	0.07270	0.00010	0.97200	0.00000
4	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.03490	0.04710	0.00050	0.01030	0.02540	1.77920	0.04240	0.18680	0.98220	0.00020
6	Albert Fisher Group     	-0.06780	0.06710	-0.00040	0.01560	0.47140	3.22740	0.22220	0.00000	0.88450	0.00000
7	Mothercare              	-0.06270	0.07900	-0.00060	0.01250	0.58500	6.46850	0.08230	0.00000	0.92950	0.00000
9	Pilkington              	-0.05030	0.05770	-0.00050	0.01470	0.17650	1.37310	0.05140	0.02290	0.98400	0.00050
10	Uniq                    	-0.06920	0.03440	0.00030	0.00920	-0.87570	9.12540	0.08290	0.00000	0.92300	0.00000
11	Smith (W.H.)            	-0.03910	0.05310	-0.00060	0.01240	0.67500	2.67050	0.10300	0.00000	0.94260	0.00000
12	Elementis plc	-0.06700	0.07250	-0.00040	0.01530	0.23430	3.05520	0.06210	0.00200	0.96330	0.00000
14	Pilkington              	-0.05110	0.04660	-0.00080	0.01490	0.06240	0.72300	0.04740	0.04980	0.99070	0.02230
15	Inchcape                	-0.08180	0.07180	-0.00010	0.01780	-0.24730	2.46160	0.05360	0.01450	0.97080	0.00000
16	Lonmin                  	-0.08050	0.04500	-0.00080	0.01330	-0.38800	4.09730	0.07800	0.00000	0.95640	0.00000
17	Balfour Beatty          	-0.04440	0.05630	-0.00050	0.01290	0.60000	2.73050	0.10300	0.00000	0.95310	0.00000
18	Cookson Group           	-0.06090	0.06850	-0.00030	0.01500	-0.00190	2.03430	0.06330	0.00140	0.97780	0.00000
21	Booker                  	-0.04040	0.05900	-0.00030	0.01020	0.26540	4.67500	0.09370	0.00000	0.93300	0.00000
22	Rugby Group PLC	-0.03650	0.07230	-0.00010	0.01490	0.85830	2.39380	0.09190	0.00000	0.95530	0.00000
23	Inchcape                	-0.08340	0.07100	-0.00060	0.01730	0.30020	2.21620	0.07130	0.00010	0.97040	0.00000
24	Lonmin                  	-0.07750	0.04150	0.00040	0.01390	-0.70350	5.21180	0.09630	0.00000	0.93610	0.00000
26	Hepworth                	-0.03700	0.04590	-0.00040	0.01020	0.56170	3.37500	0.10300	0.00000	0.94130	0.00000
27	Rolls Royce             	-0.05400	0.04990	-0.00050	0.01370	0.00430	1.05060	0.06480	0.00090	0.98670	0.00210
28	Laporte                 	-0.05350	0.06380	0.00060	0.01140	0.81310	5.50870	0.12470	0.00000	0.90850	0.00000
29	Lonmin                  	-0.07540	0.08690	0.00040	0.01500	-0.31040	7.18380	0.08810	0.00000	0.90910	0.00000
30	Hillsdown Holdings      	-0.05720	0.04670	-0.00030	0.01200	-0.02590	2.60540	0.06450	0.00100	0.96670	0.00000
31	Rolls Royce             	-0.05980	0.05110	-0.00020	0.01500	-0.34970	1.99640	0.05790	0.00540	0.97170	0.00000
32	Powell Duffryn          	-0.04800	0.04440	0.00000	0.00950	0.64550	5.42890	0.13510	0.00000	0.89310	0.00000
33	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.05080	0.07610	0.00110	0.01220	0.58780	6.02610	0.07640	0.00000	0.93670	0.00000
34	RAC                     	-0.02860	0.04330	0.00070	0.01020	0.96550	3.30980	0.15240	0.00000	0.90600	0.00000
35	BAE Systems             	-0.03280	0.03990	-0.00010	0.01080	0.34870	1.29510	0.07450	0.00010	0.97670	0.00000
36	Vickers                 	-0.10850	0.07500	-0.00020	0.01670	-0.48800	8.64430	0.10900	0.00000	0.88080	0.00000
37	Sears                   	-0.04490	0.04930	-0.00040	0.01390	0.11610	0.94480	0.08700	0.00000	0.98300	0.00030
38	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.05410	0.07330	0.00020	0.01290	0.40170	4.65370	0.06260	0.00170	0.94690	0.00000
39	Cordiant Comms. Group   	-0.07380	0.08810	-0.00040	0.01430	0.22100	7.42530	0.14870	0.00000	0.86740	0.00000
40	BP                      	-0.05430	0.03410	-0.00050	0.01150	-0.70600	2.68280	0.05640	0.00780	0.96490	0.00000
41	Meyer International     	-0.06260	0.04500	-0.00100	0.01040	-0.43330	6.21060	0.12560	0.00000	0.89800	0.00000
43	Vickers                 	-0.10780	0.08560	0.00040	0.01860	-0.25750	8.08810	0.09580	0.00000	0.87260	0.00000
44	Arcadia Group           	-0.05810	0.09500	0.00140	0.01470	0.73900	6.10980	0.06380	0.00120	0.93540	0.00000
47	Rolls Royce             	-0.07180	0.07850	0.00050	0.01930	0.09450	2.60680	0.05810	0.00520	0.96160	0.00000
48	Exel                    	-0.05650	0.07880	0.00070	0.01520	0.65910	4.63790	0.11420	0.00000	0.92460	0.00000
49	Unilever                	-0.03490	0.05570	0.00000	0.01080	0.82270	3.57390	0.07240	0.00010	0.95090	0.00000
50	Sears                   	-0.05870	0.07130	0.00050	0.01710	0.47240	2.37490	0.11460	0.00000	0.95690	0.00000
51	RMC Group               	-0.08680	0.05420	0.00040	0.01630	-0.38770	3.36340	0.07800	0.00000	0.95380	0.00000
52	TI Group                	-0.09770	0.06540	0.00000	0.01980	-0.60180	3.15020	0.07370	0.00010	0.95420	0.00000
53	Arjo Wiggins Appleton   	-0.06770	0.09050	0.00110	0.01980	0.96060	2.94880	0.09290	0.00000	0.93900	0.00000
54	Meyer International     	-0.06250	0.05350	-0.00010	0.01110	0.14590	5.41460	0.12230	0.00000	0.91500	0.00000
55	Elementis               	-0.06700	0.11280	0.00030	0.01860	1.65920	8.70140	0.16830	0.00000	0.83290	0.00000
56	Powell Duffryn          	-0.04840	0.06410	-0.00030	0.01090	0.58070	9.22960	0.16750	0.00000	0.80700	0.00000
58	Enterprise Oil          	-0.11020	0.08260	-0.00030	0.01810	-0.05500	5.93920	0.09620	0.00000	0.92270	0.00000
60	Johnson Matthey         	-0.06880	0.12280	-0.00070	0.01820	0.71440	8.32970	0.11490	0.00000	0.88330	0.00000
61	Elementis               	-0.08460	0.11070	-0.00150	0.02080	1.18460	7.02580	0.15070	0.00000	0.86200	0.00000
62	LASMO                   	-0.07880	0.07300	-0.00060	0.02060	0.36990	1.70980	0.07930	0.00000	0.97140	0.00000
63	Unilever                	-0.04820	0.05230	0.00000	0.01370	0.39100	1.98060	0.06960	0.00020	0.96800	0.00000
65	Inchcape                	-0.10900	0.12420	-0.00090	0.02390	0.61800	6.04150	0.12460	0.00000	0.89570	0.00000
66	Racal Electronics       	-0.10580	0.08500	-0.00090	0.02080	-0.00910	5.08960	0.11780	0.00000	0.90420	0.00000
67	Hazlewood Foods         	-0.07520	0.07850	-0.00140	0.01590	0.16190	4.58940	0.12910	0.00000	0.91090	0.00000
69	Rolls Royce             	-0.07220	0.07860	0.00030	0.02140	0.29960	2.25070	0.05990	0.00340	0.96280	0.00000
70	TI Group                	-0.09430	0.09880	-0.00100	0.02560	-0.05870	1.81960	0.06440	0.00110	0.97330	0.00000
71	Hillsdown Holdings      	-0.12140	0.05190	-0.00190	0.01690	-1.15160	9.92750	0.12070	0.00000	0.87140	0.00000
72	Inchcape                	-0.10770	0.12500	-0.00030	0.02490	0.62920	4.95430	0.11700	0.00000	0.91610	0.00000
73	BP                      	-0.05380	0.08060	-0.00010	0.01650	0.74720	3.18820	0.06360	0.00130	0.95730	0.00000
74	Burmah Castrol          	-0.05520	0.06540	-0.00040	0.01730	0.09140	1.87580	0.07040	0.00020	0.96680	0.00000
76	Taylor Woodrow	-0.07040	0.09320	0.00020	0.01630	0.95020	5.88830	0.12090	0.00000	0.91070	0.00000
77	De Vere Group           	-0.06620	0.09740	0.00000	0.01790	0.72540	4.76310	0.11060	0.00000	0.91030	0.00000
78	RAC                     	-0.07960	0.07840	-0.00040	0.01710	0.22490	3.84910	0.10460	0.00000	0.93700	0.00000
79	Shell Transport & Trad. 	-0.06370	0.08230	-0.00040	0.01730	0.36640	2.29730	0.06380	0.00120	0.97240	0.00000
80	Meyer International     	-0.08960	0.07280	0.00140	0.01620	0.29130	4.63970	0.13120	0.00000	0.92220	0.00000
81	Shell Transport & Trad. 	-0.06430	0.08240	0.00000	0.01800	0.53430	2.42760	0.07680	0.00000	0.96480	0.00000
82	BAE Systems             	-0.13350	0.11930	-0.00080	0.02480	0.08800	4.23390	0.06620	0.00060	0.95130	0.00000
84	De Vere Group           	-0.06870	0.10000	0.00070	0.01880	0.96080	4.95800	0.12200	0.00000	0.90310	0.00000
85	United Business Media   	-0.07090	0.07900	0.00070	0.02080	0.23880	1.04050	0.05630	0.00800	0.98830	0.00520
86	Senior                  	-0.12520	0.12140	0.00020	0.02280	0.10710	6.59640	0.11760	0.00000	0.89840	0.00000
87	Cable & Wireless        	-0.08420	0.07510	-0.00050	0.02220	-0.21500	0.95350	0.04790	0.04530	0.99020	0.01630
89	Blue Circle Industries  	-0.23200	0.09640	-0.00110	0.03020	-1.35750	11.18680	0.06580	0.00070	0.90520	0.00000
90	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.06340	0.10960	-0.00020	0.02120	0.64070	2.40890	0.05450	0.01190	0.97210	0.00000
91	EMAP                    	-0.08060	0.12070	0.00120	0.02500	0.75560	3.24760	0.10730	0.00000	0.94260	0.00000
92	MFI Furniture Group     	-0.13380	0.15300	0.00070	0.03360	1.08850	5.73500	0.15530	0.00000	0.86790	0.00000
94	Vodafone Group          	-0.08560	0.11230	-0.00180	0.02630	0.13280	1.17830	0.05450	0.01200	0.98760	0.00360
95	Tomkins                 	-0.10110	0.09780	-0.00020	0.02280	0.08510	2.44200	0.07910	0.00000	0.96420	0.00000
96	Carlton Communications  	-0.08620	0.13640	-0.00140	0.02610	0.53610	2.87600	0.06680	0.00050	0.96650	0.00000
97	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.13380	0.14290	0.00010	0.02280	-0.07680	7.22730	0.05890	0.00430	0.93150	0.00000
98	Rank Group              	-0.10470	0.13110	0.00140	0.02810	0.37160	2.75660	0.07930	0.00000	0.96310	0.00000
99	Peninsular & Oriental   	-0.12620	0.14440	0.00080	0.02520	-0.00930	4.25800	0.05610	0.00840	0.96080	0.00000
101	RMC Group               	-0.08930	0.10730	0.00140	0.02310	0.00510	3.45950	0.07900	0.00000	0.94910	0.00000
102	Sainsbury, J            	-0.11770	0.09900	0.00000	0.02810	-0.06200	2.55300	0.07280	0.00010	0.96310	0.00000
103	Imperial Chemical Inds. 	-0.08070	0.10750	0.00110	0.02560	0.21990	1.19370	0.06910	0.00030	0.98570	0.00120









Event studies -- Brown and Warner (1985) model   


































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.21 Late expansion stage  CARs	
 	 	 	 	 	Event variance	 	Estimation variance	 









































Table 6.22 Early maturity stage  CARs	

 	 	 	 	 	Event variance	 	Estimation variance	 









































Table 6.23 Mature/decline stage CARs	
 	 	 	 	 	Event variance	 	Estimation variance	 














































1) original sample (old original alpha/beta )	-0.0043	0.0010	0.0109
2) deleted main outliers (old original alpha/beta)	0.0006	0.0062	0.0105
3) deleted main and minor outliers (old original alpha/beta)	0.0027	0.0052	0.0088
4) deleted main and major outliers			 
 (old alpha/beta for non-auto cos AND thin traded alpha/beta for auto companies)	0.0035	0.0051	0.0087
5) deleted main and major outliers 			 














































The above figure shows a large distance between the line of the original sample (AAR of the original sample) and the other lines (other AAR lines), which may indicate that deleting outliers will have impact on the results of AARs. However, there is little difference between the line with deleted main outliers and the line of deleted main and minor outliers. This shows that the level of deleting outliers would not have a significant impact on AARs results. Furthermore, there is little difference between a line of deleting main and minor outliers (thin trading adjustment—approach 2) and a line of deleting main and minor outliers (thin trading adjustment—approach 1) in expansion and early maturity stage. Also, there is little difference between these 2 lines in the early mature and mature/decline stages. The thin trading problem may be more prominent in the earlier stages of the life-cycle, such as the late expansion and early mature stages (as these firms would probably trade less frequently). 





Event studies—Dodd and Warner (1983) model

Table 6.25 Late expansion stage Average CPE	
 






































































































































Table 6.26 Early maturity stage   Average CPE	








































































































































Early maturity stage   Average CPE








Table 6.27 Mature/decline stage Average CPE	





























































































































Mature/decline stage Average CPE















Table 6.28 Dodd and Warner (1983) Mean CPEs results
 	Late expansion stage	 	 	Early maturity stage	 	 	Mature/decline stage	 	 
									
 	Mean cumulative 	Z	p-value	Mean cumulative 	Z	p-value	Mean cumulative 	Z	p-value
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